Section C: 8
Before the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) coming into force, the UK subscribed to a ‘weak’ judicial review. However, the Act has brought a drastic change into the practice of judicial review in the UK. In this essay, I shall argue that with the new powers conferred to the courts under sections 3 and 4 (ss 3 and 4) of the HRA, they have developed a mechanism which allows the court to communicate with Parliament through their interpretations although the practice of judicial review remains relatively ‘weak’. I shall also argue that the courts should continue the adoption of the new approach to judicial review in the UK to counterbalance and limit the possibility of State violations of fundamental human rights of individuals whilst still keeping the principle of parliamentary sovereignty intact.
A weak judicial review is a creation of statute (i.e. the HRA) that reviews the legitimacy of executive powers to ensure the Government acts within the scope of power Parliament has conferred to them. Compared to a ‘strong’ judicial review, the UK courts have neither the power to strike down a primary legislation nor can they review legislation decisions. A weakness of ‘strong’ judicial review is that it would undermine the principles of separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty that underpin the UK Constitution as it would allow the courts to put legal constraints on Parliament. Therefore, the judiciary should respect the Parliament’s decisions and remain the
Both statutory interpretation and the Human Rights Act are a doctrine of precedent by which law is changed and justice is served. The doctrine of precedent is an essential principle of English legal system, which is a form of reasoning, interpreting and decision making formed by case law. It suggests that precedents not only have persuasive authority but must also be shadowed when similar situations arise. Any rule or principle declared by a higher court must be followed in future cases. In short the courts and tribunals are bound within prearranged restrictions by prior decisions of other superior courts. All the judges are also obliged to follow the set-up precedents established by prior decisions which is called Stare decisis. Making decisions according to precedent helps achieve two objectives. Initially it aids to maintain a system of stable laws which gives predictability to the law and affords a degree of safety for individual rights. Moreover, it ensures that the law progresses only in accordance with the developing perceptions of the community. Therefore, it more accurately mirrors the morals and prospects of the community that we live in.
All people are unique, individual and different. But fundamentally all humans on the planet have a fundamental human right to make the choices they want about their life and the way they live it. In the social care setting, this means the people we support too. However, although not providing support in a person centred way takes away and individual’s rights, it also means we are not meeting the needs if the people we support and it means there are no established boundaries of what the people we support need support with and what they can do for themselves.
In 1966 the House of Lords announced that it would in future be prepared to depart from a former decision by the House when it appeared right to do so . It is vital that the judges update the law according to the society and values today. An example of this case of R v R where a man was charged for raping his wife. This matter was brought up to the House of Lords, the judges pointed out that the ‘status of a married woman in our law have changed quite dramatically. A husband and wife are now for all practical purposes equal partners in marriage.’ They also highlighted that the common law is ‘capable of evolving in the light of changing social, economic and cultural developments.’ This implied that judges (House of Lords) can change the law only if it is a necessity.
In relation to the Charter, my advice is that Josh’s conduct is not protected and the cancellation of his parole by the Adult Parole Board was not in breach of the Charter. Moreover, the conduct of Dianne and Cary is initially protected by the Charter however due to the limitations placed upon human rights it can be argued that Dianne and Cary’s conduct are indeed in breach. Additionally Victoria police in partner with AX6 are in breach of numerous rights set out in the Charter, which will be discussed in further detail.
The reform of the Human Rights Act can illustrate that the constitutional reform did not go far enough. In 1998, the Blair government announced that the citizens ' rights would be safeguarded and strengthened through incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. However, this created a problem as the UK now has two sets of rights – those built up under Common Law and those in the Human Rights Act. These two sets of rights may conflict and, in addition, cases can be taken using these rights to both the UK Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights (which is the supreme court for the European Convention on Human Rights). The UK judiciary is divided on how to resolve this issue.
xiii) Influence of EU ensures that altering UK constitution is hard – cannot be incompatible
The Human Rights Act and anti-terrorism in the UK: one great leap forward by Parliament, but are the courts able to slow the steady retreat that has followed?
The Bancoult N.2 case dealt with 2 main issues; the reviewability of the prerogative legislation where the GCHQ case was presented concluding that the prerogative power was reviewable, and judicial review is applicable. The prerogative order in the council are primary legislation therefore an act of the parliament so there is ‘no reason why prerogative legislation should not be subject to review on ordinary principles of legality, rationality and procedural impropriety in the same way as any other executive action.’ The second issue is about the legality of the prerogative power where it was decided that it was lawful. Lord Bingham and Mance said that ’’ There should be no distinction made from the colonial territories and the British citizens since due to the rule of law everyone has equal rights’’. This case can be seen as a case law that enters not the complexity of
“Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute” (Lord Hope). Discuss with reference to at least three challenges to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliamentary sovereignty is the concept that Parliament has the power to repeal, amend or create any law it wishes and therefore no body in the UK can challenge its legal validity. There are many people who would argue that this is a key principle to the UK Constitution, on the other hand, there are those who strongly believe that this idea is one of the past, and that the idea of the UK Parliament being sovereign is false. One of these people is Lord Hope, who said “Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute”. During the last 50 years there have been a variety of developments that have proved to be a challenge for the legitimacy of parliamentary sovereignty, and the ones which will be examined in this essay are: the devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament; The United Kingdom’s entry into the European Union in 1973; and finally the power of judicial review. Starting with the devolution of powers, these challenges will all be evaluated when discussing whether or not the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty applies to the United Kingdom. Westminster’s sovereignty has been gradually diminishing over time as varying amounts of power have been devolved to Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland. In this essay, the devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament will be
This essay will explore the changes that Article 263 TFEU has had to the accessibility of judicial review before the CJEU as well as assessing whether the reforms introduced were sufficient enough in improving a private parties ability to bring government decisions under scrutiny. In addition, the judgments of the Court in Inuit and Microban will be considered. This essay will analyse present criticisms of the definition set out in the two cases and the overall effect of the new article.
The power to strike down Acts of Parliament is defined as the power to declare legislation invalid because it is unconstitutional. This paper will critically assess sections 3 and 4 of the HRA 1998 by defining them, reviewing case law surrounding their use, and by evaluating the powers that they give to the judiciary. By doing so, it will demonstrate that section 3 gives judges powers that are not significantly different from the power to strike down Acts of Parliament, whereas section 4 does not.
Some judges in their obiter dicta have declared their inclination to disregard the Parliament’s legislative objectives, and therefore limit parliamentary sovereignty if the rule of law is vulnerable or if the circumstances demand “a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism” . They have also suggested that, while the British Constitution is dominated by parliamentary sovereignty, “The rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based” . This represents a possibility of stretching the dominance of the rule of law in constitutional law so that it becomes more powerful than parliamentary sovereignty in the British Constitution .
Every human being is born with certain rights. These are protected by various charters and are considered inseparable from the human being. The reason for this is a belief that these rights create the fundamental and necessary conditions to lead a human life. Freedom of movement is one of these and has been recognised as such in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If a family finds themselves faced with starvation, the only chance they have of survival might be to move to another place where they might live another day. It is inhuman to condemn individuals to death and suffering for the benefit of some nebulous collective theory. While we might pass some of our freedoms to the state, we have a moral right to the freedoms
From the past, education has always been seen as a crucial aspect of our lives. In 1968, Durkheim stated that ‘society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential similarities that collective life demands.’ Education has become even more indispensable as more instruments start to recognise the right to education. For instance, Article 2 of the First Protocol (A2P1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 28(1) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. This essay will assess the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) in protecting the right to education in England. It is noted that the HRA 1998 provide a relatively limited protection as compared to the rest of the instruments. But looking in light of the proposed reform on HRA 1998, the current protection provided by the HRA 1998 has undeniably secured certain protections toward the children’s educational rights. Firstly, this essay looks into the scope of protections that are provided by the HRA 1998. Secondly, the effectiveness of A2P1. Thirdly, the influence of other conventions with regards to the right to education. Lastly, the essay will conclude by looking at the future reform of the HRA 1998.
If the judiciary are intentionally straying into matters of governmental policy then they as unelected, impartial adjudicators should only do so when cases arise that call for such action, potentially when governmental action threatens the rule of law – a right afforded to them as a constitutional check on governmental power. While the judiciary can be viewed as in a constant skirmish with the Legislature and the Executive much of the judiciary’s power to interoperate statutes liberally comes from powers delegated to it by parliament .