I. Introduction
In 2011, Operation Unified Protector performed air strikes over Libya, destabilizing the country and enabling the murder of Libya’s dictator of 42 years, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi. The United Nations Security Council justified the Libya Intervention for NATO allies on the grounds of an imminent humanitarian crisis that was thought to occur at the direction of Gaddafi. Thus, the United States, UNSC, and NATO allies are culpable for the humanitarian catastrophe in Libya and the killing of Gaddafi, because of their misuse of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) for their “Humanitarian Intervention” in 2011.
In this paper I will provide a brief history of relations between the U.S. and Libya since 1979 and give an overview of the 2011 NATO-led “Humanitarian Intervention” in Libya claimed to prevent an anticipated humanitarian crisis. I will examine the stated motivations behind the NATO-backed Intervention that resulted in the regime change. I will explain President Barack Obama’s motivations to move forward with the intervention, as well as his current state of mind on the matter. In addition, I will explain Secretary of State Hillary Clinton motives at the time of the intervention, the reasons as revealed in her recently released
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and her NATO allies performed the intervention without a post-intervention rebuilding plan in place and asserts that they are content with this outcome (Youssef Sawani, E-Int’l Relations, The US and Libya: Turbulent History and Uncertain Future, 2014). Referring back to Obama’s current thoughts on the Libya Intervention, he admits that there was no plan in place to re-stabilize the country after the fall of Gaddafi. According to Recchia, an effort to share in the burden of peacekeeping and stabilization plans is necessary for public support (p. 262) (Stefano Recchia, Soldiers, Civilians, and Multilateral Humanitarian Intervention,
At the time of the attack, Libya was in a state of chaos and need for help. In 2011, a civil war in Libya was occurring. Numerous people were in an effort to overthrow the leader of Libya, Gaddafi. The people that were rebelling were militants who fought along Al-Qaeda, former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and jihadists that fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. To help the men that were trying to coup d'état, the United States began to send weapons over, even though western counterterrorism officials worried that the weapons would later be used for future terrorist attacks. In addition to sending weapons, the United States deployed analysts from America’s Delta Forceware to teach the rebels about weapons and different tactics. After the end of the civil war, the US State Department, including US Ambassador Stevens, decided to stay in Libya. They remained in Libya to identify and collect arms used in war, to secure Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles, and to train Libya’s new intelligence service. Dozens of CIA operatives were in Libya at the time of the attack because they were monitoring a couple of suspected Al-Qaeda members.
Libya is a country east of Egypt with just over 6,000,000 people. Libya’s first ruler was King Idris I, he was elected after World War II when the people were looking for a new leader. He was Libya's only King. He established embassies with many large countries such as the U.S. and also allowed U.S. military to come in to restore and maintain the rights of the Libyan people in his first decade as a king. After King Idris I died in 1969, Libya fell apart. A new ruler, Gaddafi, began destroying Libya and its government. In 1972 tensions increased so much between the American and Libyan governments the American ambassador was removed from the embassy in Tripoli. In 1979 all American embassy workers were removed after an attack. In 2011 the people
Interesting topic! When reading your post, a question came to mind, does the Libyan crisis lie in government, struggle of power or the distrust toward Libya’s public financial system? Your research seems very broad, how might the topic be narrow down, so you concentrate on the most important aspect of your questions? Additionally, which questions are you concentrating on the
The efficiency of humanitarian intervention is normative because of people having different views on the output and the unlikeliness of every one being pleased by the new regime therefore it is very hard to affirm the real results of the intervention. In 2011, a group of countries intervened during the Libyan civil war, which lead to the abolition of Muammar Gadhafi’s regime. The Operation Unified Protector by NATO was partly successful because they achieved to kill the dictator on 20th October, but partly ineffective because the standards of living in Libya have not increased and the state is facing a lack of government’s ruling. This case study supports the statement that HI could be an abandoned project as it is not always favourable to everyone.
My team and I are defending the Libyan Government in regards to the acts that happened from the early 1970’s to early 90’s.
Much recent discourse surrounding humanitarian intervention has focused on the responsibility to protect (R2P). Prevention is a key component for good international relations and few would say it is not important, but as evidence to date would show prevention is very ineffective, the legality of military intervention still needs to be debated, as to date there is no consensus. For any intervention to be legitimate, whether unilateral or multilateral, it must comply with international law. So as not to cause any confusion, any situation in which an “intervention” is done with the permission or by request of the state being intervened, should be considered humanitarian assistance as state sovereignty is not breached. This paper will
The key objections to humanitarian intervention include the conflict of interests with the self-interested state and sovereignty, the difficulty of internal legitimacy, the problematical Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, and the debate over legality of intervention. The issue of morality stands as an overarching issue which touches on all of these. Overall, one finds that despite a moral imperative to intervene, humanitarian intervention should not occur but is perhaps the lesser of a series of evils.
In early 1991, Somalia fell into a state of civil war, precipitating a catastrophic famine (Baum 188). Almost two years later, in late November 1992, following a year in which the United States first resisted intervening altogether and then did so only relatively modestly, President George H.W. Bush decided to launch a large-scale, American-led military intervention termed Operation Restoration Hope (Baum 188). Less than a year later, amid rapidly deteriorating public and congressional support for the mission, President Bill Clinton announced his intent to end U.S. involvement in Somalia (ibid.). While there were successes under the Bush administration’s limited aims to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the Clinton
This reasoning thus begs the question, who would provide troops in the event should intervention occur? And further, what intervention framework will be used? As BRICS countries proposes, would it be likely that an R2P ‘lite’ intervention framework that focuses on a political process, rather than a military solution. Forcing the narrative on optional intervention strategies, as those proposed by the five countries that opposed the Libyan intervention, inherently carries with it genuine regard for abuse and political expediencies. However, placing humanitarian initiatives, rather than self-interest at the forefront of any discussion that involves intervention, will ensure that focus remains on the issue of prevention, protection, and peace,
The 1999 Kosovan War is a controversial event, usually used as a shining example of when humanitarian intervention has worked; unfortunately, when examined, it is unclear whether the international campaign for peace was an actual success or not. NATO justified their involvement by labelling Kosovo a ‘humanitarian war’ after diplomatic negotiations ground to a halt in March 1999 (Wood, 2007). A wide range of sources supported the war in Kosovo, such as David Clark in 2009, with ‘Every member of NATO, every EU country, and most of Yugoslavia's neighbours, supported military action’ (Clark, 2009). Leaders from the US and the UK respectively also stated ‘upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace’ (Clinton, 1999), and ‘to avert what would otherwise be a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo’ (Blair, 1999). However, it was not only ambassadors and high-profile politicians that took this stance; scholars and intellectuals were also vocal about their support for the war (Mellon, 2001). This implies that not only did the foreign western powers believe that a
This paper will briefly explain the geographical layout of Libya, the ethnic background, and religion . This paper will examine the current events that have devastated the country of Libya, and assess the threat to regional stability. This paper will also expound upon how a destabilized Libya affects its relationship with the U.S. This paper will also explain the significance that the U.S. has in a stable and affluent Libya.
The revolution was your first international crisis intervention since the day you took office, nothing new there. You began with the help of CIA aiding and arming the rebellion forces to topple Gaddafi. This was no secret due to the fact that the Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Mike Mullen Joint Chiefs Chairman testified that small squadrons of CIA operatives were working in Libya. According to a report by The New York Times, the Central Intelligence Agency collected Intel for military airstrikes against Qaddafi as well as supporting the rebels in the fight. However, little was said about the identity or their ideological thoughts of these fighting insurgents. Why could that be? Not shocking considering the fact that the leader Abdel-Hakim
The French initiated military action against Libya on March 19, 2011, with NATO taking over operational control of the action on March 25, 2011. Again, under the leadership of NATO, air power was deployed to stop human rights abuses on the ground. This time, the use of force was authorized by the UN Security Council. NATO’s intervention came in the form of an air campaign—the so-called operation “Unified Protector”--which targeted Libyan air defense capabilities, government facilities, military facilities, and military troop formations on the ground without contemplating a follow-on ground campaign.
Although non-militant humanitarian intervention holds many superior traits to military intervention, sometimes global powers have no alternative except to demonstrate military force. Humanitarian military intervention must only be utilized in a limited set of circumstances. First, global powers must only employ military force to combat extreme catastrophes such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Second, global powers may use military intervention as a last resort, having exhausted all other non-militant options. Finally, interventions who meet the first two criteria must only respond to the situation with a proportionate response. In his article, “Humanitarian Intervention: Loose Ends ,” Fernando Tesón describes this
back to their homes and had promised to do so. (IICK 2008:89). As NATO was intervening due to their attempt to save Kosovar Albanians, many see this as being a humanitarian justification because they were trying to protect lives and stop the destruction caused by the ethnic cleansing of Albanians under Milosevic. There seems to be the belief that an intervention can be deemed humanitarian if it attempts to save the lives of others,