Hybrid Threat Analysis

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

Joes, A. J. (1996). Guerilla Warfare: A Historical, biographical, and bibliographical sourcebook. [ebrary]. Retrieved from http/:www.ebrary.com

The use of Irregular Warfare has been ongoing for years around the world. Irregular warfare is described as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. I will discuss where the U.S. may apply military force in conjunction with other means of national power to stabilize the nation of Somalia. I will also discuss why it would be considered as an Irregular Warfare environment.

According to Hedley Bull, war is “organized violence waged by sovereign states” which was the outcome of a “process of limitation or confinement of violence” via the ethical doctrine of just war theory. Clausewitz classified warfare as not just an act, but also a social institution for obtaining ulterior objectives (e.g. political) and strategic lines of command within and between states. He defined the social relationship between forces and the elements of war (rationality, chance and violence). Martin Shaw claims that contemporary warfare has completely evolved so that the “core of the new mode of warfare is a different general relationship between war fighting and the political, economic, and cultural-ideological domains.” (Nowaczynski, J. (2012, December). E-International Can

In conducting the Counterinsurgency agent networks and noncombatant-targeted violence study, researchers attempted to identify how and why recruited foreign agents become subjects of violence. The researchers, also attempt to identifying in what manner and why this transpires is crucial for emerging intelligence methods to improve and implement effective Counterinsurgency standard operating procedures.

In the book, the author makes it clear that executing counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is a difficult task for Special Forces operators. She explains that the commanding officers knew these operations would be a challenging feat. For instance, the author details Major General Scott Miller’s efforts to expand the Afghan Local Police initiative to the rural areas of Afghanistan. Major General Miller felt that the same approach that was taken in the cities would not work in the rural areas. In other words, the “Afghan local policemen by themselves were not sufficient to bring peace to rural Afghanistan, and the country had to be stabilized from the village up” (Robinson 2013, 26). In this instance, the book demonstrates the Generals knowledge and awareness of the situation in the region. That is to say, “the only capacities for dispute resolution and law enforcement in much of the country consist of village or tribal councils and mullahs who administer a crude interpretation of Sharia” (Rubin 2007, 76). Both the author and the general realized the importance villages have in securing peace in Afghanistan.

There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of

You did a good job with the creation of your ruff daft for your threat model process flow diagram and threat model process description document.IT appears from both these document you have a excellent base for the creation of your final product. However, I do have a couple of recommendations which I hope will be able to help you in the creation of your final product. My first recommendation is for the steps of your threat model process. Though you have some very important steps which are need for an threat model process, it may be necessary to add a few more steps for better clarity and more guidance on how to perform your threat model process. To do this you might want to go back and look at the week one instructions. In these instruction the professor provided several steps which are commonly used in thereat modeling processes. These steps included:

Considering the inherently negative connotation of the word “insurgency,” it might come as a surprise to realize we Americans once represented that definition; moreover, when one closely scrutinizes the circumstances surrounding the

THREAT PROFILING: Threat or Threat profiling is a method of proactively identifying threats based on human behavior. The key word is proactively. In Left of Bang, Patrick Van Horne and Jason A. Riley discuss this method and explains how to identify threat by using six domains; Kinesics, Biometric Cues, Proxemics, Geographics, Iconography, and Atmospherics (Van Horne, Riley 67).

Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are

While today the Special Forces Operations Units are seen as heroes and the highest caliber of enlisted men in the Army, they were not initially seen as an elite group. Perhaps the Special Forces did not receive the recognition they deserved because their successes in psychological and counterinsurgency warfare strategies were immeasurable during World War II and the Korean War. President Kennedy’s administration would lead the way for the Army’s Green Berets and later the Navy SEALS. However, it wasn’t until the Vietnam War that unconventional warfare, or guerilla warfare as it became known, was utilized in a capacity that would expand the effectiveness and duties of the Special Forces Units.

Van Creveld predicted that armed forces of the world would have to adapt to the frequency of involved conflict. This challenging book was too readily dismissed by some critics as reflecting Van Creveld?s personal proximity to the first intifada against Israel and a classic case of overgeneralization (1991, pg. 25). The massive mechanized assault conducted by an American-led coalition to pry Iraq?s invading force out of Kuwait in 1991 lent credence to those who did not want to contemplate the rise of new modes of combat. ?The Changing Face of War? represents van Creveld?s second attempt to flesh out the developments in military history and the rise of unconventional methods in book-length form.

The 'Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) case study is regarding the U.S-Philippines partnership in counter-terrorism (CT) operations that took place from 2002-2011. The CT operation was titled as 'Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) and was conducted by the partnership of Philippine security forces and US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The CT cooperation took place at three levels, tactical, operational, and strategic. The role of JSOTF was that of 'advise and assist' whereby ground operations were conducted by the Philippine forces. The US cooperation for CT in Philippines was guided by the Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and a policy and action framework to act as a binding framework for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational CT operations using full range of military operational capacity. The OEF-P was also conducted by incorporating JP 5-0 principles and guidelines of engagement. The OEF-P took place in Southern Philippines. Following is an assessment how the US forces used termination, military end state, and objectives of operational design (Joint Pub 5-0, page III-18) to develop and refine their operational approach.

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US