Hybrid Threat Essay

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

Joes, A. J. (1996). Guerilla Warfare: A Historical, biographical, and bibliographical sourcebook. [ebrary]. Retrieved from http/:www.ebrary.com

Blalock’s threat curve (4) is used to visually show the differences between police expenditures and the percent of blacks living in the cities. The threat curve is a graph to find the majority group’s inclination to protect the certain areas that they live in (Jackson, 4, 1989). The threat curve is used to show the correlation between the white population’s capability to exercise police expenditures based on the visibility of minority groups in a particular area. The idea that with the increasing presence of minority groups in a mainly white area that the police expenditures in that area will also increase. Once the minority group becomes the majority, more than 50%, then the police expenditures will start to decrease. The idea is based on the social context of a given city and the social control of the majority group will disturb the curve.

The use of Irregular Warfare has been ongoing for years around the world. Irregular warfare is described as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. I will discuss where the U.S. may apply military force in conjunction with other means of national power to stabilize the nation of Somalia. I will also discuss why it would be considered as an Irregular Warfare environment.

This essay shows how a frightened kid turns into a guy that has to face his fears with going on rides that show them. In Full Tilt by Neal Shusterman, Neal shows that his character Blake, overcomes his fears by going on rides that represent them (His fears). In this book, Neal Shusterman uses Blake to show how he turns from a wimp to a strong, brave person.

Set-up - Warfare is constantly changing, for the tools of war are always evolving, as do the societies that wage war. Between 1400 and 1918, western warfare went through four periods that saw such profound change that it can fairly be said that a "military revolution" occurred. According to historians MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, military revolutions "fundamentally change the framework of war" and "recast society and the state as well as military organizations." While all of the military revolutions studied in H100 were important in the evolution of warfare, one clearly stimulated greater change than the others.

This paper will be explaining the similarities, and differences, between the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan. There are many topics that bring these two wars together. However, I am only going to be talking about public support, policy objectives, military strategy, weapons, fighting spirit, links to home, and death totals. These topics have a lot of information about them, but there is too much to write about every little detail, so I will cover the broad overview of them. Each paragraph will be about one of the topics. There will also be a discussion about insurgencies and counter insurgency operations. These are two big topics in Vietnam and Afghanistan since almost all of the enemy in both wars were, and are, comprised of insurgents and different types of militia groups.

There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of

The enemy making concept of Dr.Lombardo is the one that I found to be interesting. It was also the one that I seem to agree and relate with the most. “There is a tendency to perceive others as different and or less than us”. I find that statement to be very true, you see it every day. When someone doesn’t fit in with the normal American standards, they seems to be more likely of hate crimes. I always believed that being different was a wonderful thing. But you see it more and more every day in the news that someone is being victimized of a crime, because they choose to be different. One example of the enemy concept just recently happen. The shooting of the black church that happen in Charleston South Carolina. This man walked into a church and killed nine individuals because they were different from him. Because he couldn’t

Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are

For African sub-Saharan countries, asymmetric warfare has erupted since their independence and they have developed internal, regional and multinational strategies to respond to threats of modern warfare. In other words, the concept of asymmetric warfare means using of unconventional tactics against a superior opponent operational objectives. So, every country has adapted a national strategy of Defense to respond to asymmetric threats. For example the Special Operation Forces or light infantry units are merged for counterinsurgency operations. At regional level, there are two types of organizations, alliances and coalitions that face the same threats. For example, to fight the Boko Haram terrorist group, Cameroon has signed two bilateral alliances;

While today the Special Forces Operations Units are seen as heroes and the highest caliber of enlisted men in the Army, they were not initially seen as an elite group. Perhaps the Special Forces did not receive the recognition they deserved because their successes in psychological and counterinsurgency warfare strategies were immeasurable during World War II and the Korean War. President Kennedy’s administration would lead the way for the Army’s Green Berets and later the Navy SEALS. However, it wasn’t until the Vietnam War that unconventional warfare, or guerilla warfare as it became known, was utilized in a capacity that would expand the effectiveness and duties of the Special Forces Units.

Van Creveld predicted that armed forces of the world would have to adapt to the frequency of involved conflict. This challenging book was too readily dismissed by some critics as reflecting Van Creveld?s personal proximity to the first intifada against Israel and a classic case of overgeneralization (1991, pg. 25). The massive mechanized assault conducted by an American-led coalition to pry Iraq?s invading force out of Kuwait in 1991 lent credence to those who did not want to contemplate the rise of new modes of combat. ?The Changing Face of War? represents van Creveld?s second attempt to flesh out the developments in military history and the rise of unconventional methods in book-length form.

The Opponent’s front, many elements empowered Hezbollah’s psychological warfare against Israel, First: it created power for itself that focused on causing civilian casualties. Second, exploiting the fear of economic losses that was emphasized in Nasrallah’s speeches. Finally the pressure on the families of Israeli soldiers through instilling a sense of guilt at having "their children across the border.” Furthermore, Hezbollah deepened its information warfare by taking advantage of Israeli governments poor estimates throughout and after the war in order to create a state of “mutual deterrence” between Israel and Hezbollah. These strategies began its inception during the first Lebanon war in 1982 and have enabled Hezbollah today to achieve what many countries in the region failed to do, which is to create a deterrence equation in the Israeli