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Evidently, constructivism provides a more optimistic outlook towards international politics. The static view taken by the realist theory places balance of power as an inevitable consequence of the international system wherein chaos is unavoidable, resulting in war and conflict. On the other hand, constructivists believe that conflict is not inevitable, rather threats of conflict can be extinguished through the analysis and restructuring of identities. In brief, whilst constructivists accept the presence of anarchy in the international system, they argue that its effects are dependent on the subjective meanings we place on it.

Hans Morgenthau, “A Realist Theory of International Politics and Political Power,” in Mingst & Snyder,

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War is easily explained through the lens of social conflict theory, a sociological theory that suggests society tends toward conflict because it is made up of groups with competing interests and unequal resources. The theory proposes that a

War, in all its forms, is tragic. International law was created to establish some basis of rules to abide by—including war—and states have signed on to such a contract. The actions of states in this ever globalizing world are difficult to be controlled. The source of international law operates through the hands of the United Nations. The enforcement of the law occurs through reciprocity, collective action, and a display of international norms (Goldstein, p. 254). War in fact has been given a justification, though it is arguable whether or not the basis of the idea is correct. Wars can be just under certain conditions.

Conflict theory’s perspective on war is considerably less positive than that of functionalism. There are quite a few different views within conflict theory in regards to war, but three main views are prominent. The first view exhibits

A myriad of battles make up war. Physical force is used to make an opponent inept to further confrontation. War is thus an art of force to compel our enemy to do our will. In human history, the 20th century was the bloodiest, priciest century of warfare. Since 1914, there have been two world wars, and several major revolutions such as the Russia Civil War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War among others. According to Clausewitz, war is an inherent subset of politics where every military act has political consequences. Politics is about power, and war is a violent expression of disagreements and tensions arising among political groups. He argues that the intrinsic feature of war demonstrates a clear relationship between war and politics. Time and again, the overpowered state regards the result purely as a temporary evil for which a resolve may still be found in political situations. Whereas, it is expected that militarily powerful states would win war against their weak adversaries, they have sometimes failed in achieving their desired political outcomes. This essay endeavors to look into some contributing factors to these failures and point out what strategies should do to increase their likelihood of success.

Two authors agree, and one, the offensive realist John Mearsheimer, a man many IR majors and theorists have grown to know and love, continues to maintain his position. Mearsheimer’s next book should be called, Mutually Assured Destruction by John Mearsheimer. His Offensive Realist perspective creates a “gloomy forecast” that he wishes to refute for the Chinese-American great power debate. With this book being published in 2001 and the most updated copy in April 2014, it is probably very interesting to read the first edition of this book in comparison to the most update version. However that being said Mearsheimer’s initial arguments of the chapter assigned, has proven to be true. Recently assigned, was an article on the current situation in the South China Sea. An imperative region specifically for the U.S and home to one of the busiest shipping lanes in the World, Mearsheimer discusses in depth the Chinese position in this region. Mearsheimer gives an extensive synopsis of his core elements of IR theory, but his main argument which all three theorists seem to agree on is the American resemblance of China’s geo-political strategy. While Ikenberry and Glaser, focus on international diplomacy that must be taken to prevent major war and the dismal likelihood of a great power war between these to powers.

Addressing the question of whether war is a rational decision or a mistake is important to understand the causes of war and explain the reduction in the number of wars fought among countries in today’s nuclear era. The argument, under which war is a mistake, is a normative claim about what action states should have chosen, based on the outcomes that have been produced. That is, for a decision to be good, it needs to have produced the actor’s preferred outcome. However, the mistake perspective is problematic under the uncertainty and competitiveness of the anarchic international political system.

The occurrence and recurrence of wars are made by rational actors, but what are the prerequisites for a war? There are numerous answers to this question with a wide range of answers that give a perspective on the various sources of conflict. The first is that the cost of war cannot be outrageously high. The anticipated outcome of gaining resources, power, and/or territory cannot exceed the expected cost of conflict, including damages to property and life. The second is that a failure in bargaining must be present to create the inability of reaching a mutual agreement. Understanding war between rational actors and why bargaining fails is based on five factors:

Kenneth Waltz in his book Man, the State, and War, distinguished three images of international relations, or levels of analysis, in terms of which we usually try to analyze the causes of war. According to the first image, war is traceable to human nature and behavior. It is embedded within the human psychology. However, Dougherty argued that international war cannot be adequately explained only by reference to psychological and biological explanations of individual aggressiveness. The first image does not provide a rational explanation for the causes that led to the Cold War, as it is limited to the human psychology. This individual level of analysis points towards the way individual leaders and their inner circles decide to go to war. George W. Bush’s decision to go to Iraq in the second Gulf War can serve as an example for a decision that was made through this first image. President Bush and

In “Anarchy is What States Make of It” Alexander Wendt describes two opposing state systems—competitive and cooperative. In competition, “states identify negatively with each other’s security so that ego’s gain is seen as alter’s loss.” In cooperation, “the security of each [state] is perceived as the responsibility of all.” Currently, there are problems such as the spread of nuclear weapons, terrorism, poverty in developing countries, international financial instability, and climate change that confront the entire global community. Ideally states could cooperate in order to solve all of these dilemmas in the next twenty years. Realistically, they will only solve problems with specific and easily stated solutions. Cooperation tends

James Fearon aims to shed light on the question why conflicts occur despite high costs for the actors involved and an uncertainty of outcome. He employs a rationalist explanation with states as main actors not the international system. The high costs and risk of war create an ex post inefficient, which should provide motivation for rational states to find an other way of solving their differences which would be preferable to a open conflict (Fearon 1995: 380). Yet despite the awareness of the negative outcome and thus an incentive to avoid it, wars between states occur and this creates the central “Puzzel” for Fearons theory (Fearon 1995: 383). “The ex post inefficiency of war opens up an ex ante bargaining range” (Fearon 1995: 390). This bargaining range expands between the two preferred outcome of the two opposing states. Between the two preferred outcomes a “continuous range for peaceful settlements exists” (Fearon 1995: 389). Both states have a bargaining range with possible solutions bound by expected utility of war as well as by the costs and risks of fighting (Fearon 1995: 388).

Whenever Game theory is taught at colleges, politics is one area that is never touched upon as an application of game theory. Though game theory in international relations and national politics has been a studied in detail in the past, there has been a recent increase in the popularity of this study. An increasing number of game models are extensively being used in informed studies of arms control, preservation of international peace, disarmament policies, environmental treaties, national politics, international trade negotiations and bargaining process etc., with all the studies sharing the assumption that all the players in the international arena are rational with respect to the goals they seek to advance.

The articles for the week looked at theories of deterrence in international crisis in general and the various shades of it in particular. Schelling’s argument, based on classical deterrence theory is that by using manipulative strategies, a nation’s threat will be assumed credible even if the state does not intend to resist. Danilovic on the other hand argued that regional stakes are more important than a refinement of manipulative strategies or state capabilities. According to him, inherent credibility can limit the effectiveness of costly signal. Huth and Russett argue that a defender considers alternatives before using military force when deterrence fails. They agree with Danilovic that relationship between defender and protégé will affect the probability that deterrence will fail/escalate to war. Fearon on the other hand brought a fresh but not entirely different perspective to the arguments. He asserts that classical rational deterrence theory is flawed because it does not account for strategic self-selection in international disputes. Let me talk about the various arguments in detail and how they relate or affect each other.