I.Prisoner’S Dilemma As A 2 X 2 Matrix. (X1, X1)(X2, X3).
977 WordsMar 19, 20174 Pages
I. Prisoner’s Dilemma as a 2 x 2 Matrix
(x1, x1) (x2, x3)
(x3, x2) (x4, x4)
A2 (D) B1 (C) B2 (D)
Figure 1. Prisoner 1’s Dilemma as a 2 x 2 Matrix, Figure 1 shows the Prisoner 's Dilemma as a 2 x 2 Matrix subject to the following conditions:
a) 2 (x1) is greater than x2 + x3 is greater than 2 (x4)
b) x3 is greater than x1
c) x3 is greater than x2
d) x4 is greater than x2.
"C" and "D" represent strategies in which players would "cooperate" or "defect".
What this means is that for both players, strategy 2 dominates strategy 1 (A2 dominates A1 for the row player and B2 dominates 31 for the column player). However, the choice (A2, B2) results in a payoff (x4) to each player smaller than…show more content…
South Korea 's order of preference among the choices are:
1. unification under a democratic system,
2. "peaceful" unification
3. the status quo,
4. unification under a communist system.
What can be said about these four outcomes as they apply to the Prisoner 's Dilemma? First, neither North nor South Korea sees the status quo as the worst choice. Second, each side sees the opponents most desired outcome as its worst possible outcome. Third, each side prefers a "peaceful unification" to the status quo. And lastly, neither side prefers a "peaceful unification" to its own best choice. The result of this is, as in the matrix in Figure 1 the preferred choice is the dominating strategy for both North (B2 dominating B1) and South (A2 dominating A1). Specifically, North Korea prefers a communist settlement of unification to either the status quo or a "peaceful" unification. South Korea prefers a democratic settlement to either the status que or a "peaceful" unification. Thus, the dilemma that faces both sides is: since neither side can have its own best choice, they settle for the status quo. This is done in spite of the fact that the possibility of a peaceful settlement to unification is exists (a "peaceful" unification) that might be better for both sides than their own optimal choice. Neither side can choose collective interest over self-interest because they are forced to assume that the other will follow the