IED Attacks In Iraq: A Case Study

The process the U.S. Army utilizes to fill the units they design with personnel to fight and win the nation's wars, equipment to own the air and the night, money to put fuel into the vehicles and bullets in the weapons, and facilities to house the soldiers and their families in is the Acquisition process. The army cannot continue without new soldiers to fill its ranks or weapons and bullets to destroy the enemy, this phase is the building block for the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model and helps dictate training and the rest of the model forward.

Concepts lead change for the Army and drive the development and integration of future capabilities. More specifically, they provide a framework for analysis, readiness assessments, prioritization, and feedback. In addition, concepts serve as a foundation to help the Army maximize effectiveness and minimize risk through both materiel and nonmaterial capabilities. The role of concepts is to describe how future forces will operate. Concepts assists in the identification of prioritized capability gaps and integrated Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).

This document was compiled by the IOSS project office and summarizes how many of the Joint Base Powell Infrastructure, Operations, and Support Services (IOSS) requirements listed in the draft PWS were acquired in the past. Each service area is briefly covered by providing information about any current initiatives/contracts, current performance problems, and stakeholder comments about any changes in projected requirements.

On 22 January 2013, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released a white paper describing his vision for the Joint Information Environment (JIE) and how it would support operations in the years to come.1 This mandated transition is driving a reassessment of the most appropriate command and control (C2) structure to conduct operations within the domain. Attempts to achieve a standardized fully interoperable environment will only achieve limited success due to the innate variability and changing nature of technology, exacerbated by service unique capabilities and requirements as well as inconsistent funding. Existing C2 models either fail to address the uniqueness of operations in the cyber domain or otherwise fail to

Expertly represented the Capability Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) at the HQDA Office of the Provost Marshal General's 2025 MP Strategy Plan development Work Group. CPT Kilgore ensured that the CDID's material development efforts were fully synchronized

Just about anyone of working age has been around a new project at work. Everyone has an opinion on how it should be completed. Disagreements are almost guaranteed. How these are solved is usually by the supervisor considering all recommendations and determining the path. This is a fairly easy process, however when dealing with the Department of Defense (DoD) joint acquisition process, the development of a new weapons system is much more in depth. With a diminishing budget and higher costs associated with new weapons systems the DoD has leaned more towards joint acquisition programs. This decisions improves logistics, interoperability of the services, and saves money. The DoD’s supervisor in the above scenario is better known as the joint Program Manager (jPM). The jPM’s role is vital to the success of joint acquisitions, by utilizing His or Her special skills, and could be a dream job for someone with aspirations for greatness.

Often, this meant exposing the technician to increased risk as insurgent forces observed this behavior and began to specifically target bomb technicians. Sniper fire, additional secondary “booby-trap” IEDs and hoax devices became commonplace on IED response operations. However, these threats were deemed necessary as fingerprint and DNA material gathered at the site of IED’s defused or detonated would later prove critical to identifying bomb makers and bomb emplacers. In Figure 4, the shift to move “left of boom” is demonstrated. The focus on biometric identity operations illuminated terror networks and allowed for targeted counter terror

By 2004 it was clear that Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were lethal and the weapon of choice for insurgents engaged in irregular warfare in Iraq. Field commanders faced a struggle regarding how best to protect their troops from the evolving IED threat and the resulting catastrophic injuries and fatalities they produced. Standard thin skin Humvees did not provide ample protection, nor did up-armored Humvees. Route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal vehicles, known as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP), gained a reputation among field commanders for being survivable vehicles. (Feikert, aug07, p2) Thus began the debate as to whether to continue using up-armored Humvees, push for MRAPs, or hold out for a future vehicle

typical acquisition program, the success of the program was because of a collaborative effort by

b. The LOE staff matrix provides a vehicle for assessment and identification of potential gaps in USAG Ansbach 2020. During the planning process, MO and SO Leads identify requirements, decision points, and milestones. The matrix allows the plotting of decision points and milestones in alignment with the Program Objective Memorandum and the Future Years Defense Program, which supports resource planning, integration, and coordination

Between the time the military conducted initial MRAP tests and the initial approval in 2006, the military was transitioning away from the original Requirements Generation System (RGS) to the current JCIDS. Requirements from the field through each service branch drove the RGS process resulting in standalone solutions to specific threats often not considering non-material alternatives. “JCIDS provides systematic, integrated and interoperable material and non-material solutions to capability needs.” JCIDS determines requirements from the top and develops joint solutions with long term sustainment plans. The JROC is the final approving authority within JCIDS before passing the requirement to the acquisition process. During this transition the JROC membership remained unchanged, but they did change from last to first approving authority in the major defense acquisition program process. This

In order to properly prepare for a terrorist incident at the strategic or tactical level there must be a threat assessment taken for each of an organizations assets. This assessment will ask a few basic questions. What are the capabilities of the terrorist organizations? What type of terrorist attack is most likely to occur against this asset? What can be done to protect against this type of terrorist attack (GAO 2002, p.4)? In order to answer these questions an organization must have a thorough knowledge of the vulnerabilities of the different types of its assets which include fixed, mobile, and personnel. Once the vulnerabilities are determined, steps must be taken to secure the assets focusing on the most critical.

Defense Industrial Base sector is a worldwide complex built to house research and development (R&D), design, production, delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems. Essentially, the idea is to meet the U.S. military requirements. The Department of Defense components, companies, and contractors make up the sector. The sector provides and protects the elements that handle deployments, military operations, and mobilization (HS,

JOPP is a seven-step process that begins with planning initiation, mission analysis, Course of Action (COA) development, COA analysis and war gaming, COA comparison, COA approval, with the outcome being the best COA in order to produce the order or plan. The application of operational approach or operational design by the commander is what initiates JOPP into the planning phase. Mission analysis studies the task or set of tasks and provides direction in order to focus effort onto the problem. The output from the mission analysis should be a restated mission, the joint force commander’s initial intent statement, planning guidance, and the initial commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). A COA should accomplish the mission with

Thus, related to above “force development” approach, and current status analysis, the critical missing “capabilities gap” is in the command and control (C2) and intelligence dominions. C2 and an appropriate command structure to provide the unity of effort and unified action from respective stakeholder