ISIS Synthesis Essay

The United States is fronting the conflict against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; therefore, we feel strongly inclined to support the inhibition of online recruiting tactics used by ISIL. Previous attempts to thwart the online presence of ISIL have been misguided and incomprehensive - and have thus faltered against high expectations. Our reasoning for this stance is because in the past year alone, an estimated hundreds of recruits have joined ISIL through online mediums - additionally, ISIL has encouraged and coaxed recruits into committing domestic

Although the Nazi regime did not have computers, the social influence of propaganda was still successful. Propaganda is used as a tool to manipulate and provoke behaviors to further the intentions of the group. When people already have pre-existing beliefs, they are enhanced by propaganda, which makes it a useful, but dangerous tool when the intentions of the group are to harm those who have different beliefs. Similar to the Nazis, the intentions of ISIS is to protect the land and, according to the Quran, only Muslims may live in the caliphate while obeying and promoting their government efforts. Many online ISIS supporters will never actually come into contact with ISIS soldiers, but the power of their social media support system is still strong enough to worry the U.S. government that they may have gained followers who reside on American soil and are a significant threat to national

must increase control of Information Operations (IO). IO is the integrated employment of core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception and operations security; specified to influence, disrupt, and corrupt the adversary. The anti-American propaganda that is released via the internet by ISIL continues to deceive the impressionable and attract volunteers to this terrorist group. The U.S. faces great challenges combating adversary propaganda from ISIL. Successfully locating, jamming and shutting down websites and social media that stream propaganda is not always effective; sites are shut down and moved too quickly. Adversary propaganda is designed to affect behaviors and influence American’s and our allies to disapprove of the war on terrorism, persuade society that their actions are justified and not terrorist actions; several sites solicit funds as well as

ISIS obtains such a profuse amount of money that they are wealthier then several actual countries. ISIS has grown from a violent growing cell to a violent growing state. But fighting a war to establish a caliphate is expensive, especially when the U.S is trying to flip the bill. According to some estimates, they have placed Isis’ income to 3 million dollars per day. The Government has begun to examine and understand how ISIS raise their money. Isis has revenue coming from multiple areas such as: capturing cities, capturing oil feeds and refineries, as well as donations. Surprisingly, a majority of their funds come from ransoms, kidnappings and, unorganized crime extortions.

FBI.gov, “ISIL Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization and Recruitment on the Internet and Social Media.” Michael Steinbach, July 6, 2016

“A recent US report concluded that ISIS is winning the social media war. The Internal State Department paints a dismal picture of the efforts by the Obama administration and its foreign allies to combat the Islamic State’s publicity machine” (Ali 10). Unlike other terrorists organizations like the Taliban or al- Qaeda, ISIS uses social media as a great tool to distribute their propaganda and to recruit their newest members. Also unlike these other terrorist organizations ISIS allows women to have significant roles in their projects, or they at least make these women who join feel that they are significant. ISIS lets their western female recruits have important positions in public roles on social media. “ISIS pays its supporters up to 10,000

Now the coalition has its message. Once implemented, this message coupled with a focused social media campaign will be an effective counter to ISIS propaganda. The first step is to use various media networks to promote this message to populations around the globe. Then build communities where recruits can study the new message. The goal is to make this message an accepted explanation of their existence. The calculation is, as consensus for the new message grows, the combatants will question their reasons for fighting and redirect their energy toward more peaceful endeavors and study the new message.

These include creating their own video games, use of the fire chat app to facilitate planning of coordinated attacks, using ask.fm to respond to inquiries from potential recruits, as well as using Instagram and Twitter accounts. This adoption of peer-to-peer technology means that peer-to-peer radicalization, recruitment and mobilization have become the norm and support for these organizations can initiate from a simple click of ‘like’ or ‘follow.’ These easily accessible social media channels all feed into one another through direct, real-time communication; moreover, connections formed through the sending and receiving of images and messages increase the legitimacy of these groups as reputable, high-performing organizations. The World Bank’s report on global access to the internet would be useful to look at in order to compare places such as Iraq and Syria to the UK and France. This is useful to determine the rate at which Westerners are able to access the internet to explain how their heavy use can justify the means of using social media as a radicalization tool. As a tool, the internet allows for constant access to information and offers users the ability to conveniently gather or post material. It also acts as a space where people can virtually gather with likeminded individuals and post and/or observe without stating who they actually are; indeed, this anonymity

Motivations for recruits vary widely and surprisingly; motives vary partially depending on country of origin. “Foreign fighters from places like the United States and Western Europe were far more likely to be facing some sort of identity crisis, a desire for a personal sense of recognition that ISIS can provide. They were also more likely to be motivated by a rejection of Western culture… People who joined ISIS or similar groups from another Muslim country, however, were far more motivated by the perceived plight of the Syrian Sunnis.” (Tucker). One thing that ISIS did well was to spread its propaganda online. Not all recruits actually left their homelands to join; the recruits could be radicalized at home. “ISIS recruiting pitches on the Internet are warm and welcoming… They are expertly targeted to address real or imagined ambitions and grievances… to offer an attractive cause worth fighting for.” (Graham). ISIS uses its egregious ideology to sway people to join; they use their beliefs to build a sense of “us vs. them.” Propaganda is ISIS’ biggest weapon, with large numbers of people leaving their homelands to join it. As the group grows, we must wonder how the adversaries of ISIS are going to counter their propaganda and how to have the same reach as

Chief among these ideas is “exploiting social media to spread its message and to attract recruits” (Fisher). This is something they have taken in stride, posting “well-produced killings on video” (Fisher) that radicalise many Western born Muslims. It isn’t just effective posting of videos on social media that has contributed to the explosion in size of the Islamic State’s military force, but their ability to convince potential recruits that “ISIS is a thrilling cause and call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends” (Douthat). It is difficult for most Westerners to comprehend why young people decide to join radical groups that commit heinous war-crimes, but often the cause is simply that “many human beings, especially young ones, still crave a transcendent purpose” (Douthat). ISIS has done a remarkable job of doing that, convincing many potential radicals, even ones that have no connection with Syria or Iraq, that they will be able to change the world. Their outreach programs have caused a dramatic switch in the reality of those who are potential recruits, even to those that were not religious to begin with. For example, the recent Paris attacks are a good example of this. Hasna Aitboulahcen was one of those killed by police in the raid shortly after the attacks in Paris. She wasn’t connected to Syria or Iraq through either her or her family, and did not practice her religion fervently before her radicalization spurred by the Islamic

Social has made it easier for interested Westerners to connect with an ISIS recruiter and join the ‘cause’. Recruiters use messaging apps to communicate with those wanting to travel to Syria.

Along with rap videos and video games, those interested in inspiring potential terrorist also have social media platforms such as, forums, blogs, YouTube, and Facebook, which all help in spreading propaganda and accelerating the recruitment process. Virtual networks have proven to be one of the most useful tools in the recruitment of terrorists, as it allows them to form relationships with like-minded individuals, as well as serves to validate and support the beliefs of an individual (Dornbierer, 2011). The use of social media outlets has become a modern psychological warfare operation by influencing and intensifying extremist thoughts. Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-born U.S. citizen who unsuccessfully detonated a car bomb in Times Square, was recruited directly through the social-media platform. The immersion into social media by like-minded potential jihadists provides them with extremist material that encourages violence, thus enhancing the chance of an attack on the United States.

ISIS is known today for its impending threat to society and causing thousands of deaths. But when did this group originate? Honestly, no one really knew when ISIS came to be. Some sources trace the group back to 1999 (Miller, 2016), while others say that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria emerged around 2011. The most common belief is that ISIS stemmed from the group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI was formed after the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was backed by the Shiite militia of the Sunni tribes until 2007 when the government of Baghdad encouraged citizens to no longer support AQI. At this point people began to think that AQI had been defeated, but the group resurfaced during the uprising in Syria over their dictator Bashar al-Assad. AQI had many contacts in Syria because they would go there to resupply during the Iraq War. AQI decided to relocate their group to Syria when the uprising turned into a civil war. After moving, the group renamed themselves the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). At the time Al-Qaeda was already trying to establish an “Al-Qaeda in Syria” and wanted this ISIS group to “remain separate.” Some members of AQI wanted to stay loyal to Al-Qaeda and started a war with their renamed partners, ISIS. After the war between the two groups ended, ISIS had officially separated themselves from Al-Qaeda and have become what we know them as today (Cassis, 2015). Now, ISIS has been a threat to the world for nearly a decade. The

Social media has played a big part in this story, making it easy to make plans and execute them. "In spite of ISIS 's ferocious social media presence, partly responsible for successful enlistments -- its affiliates posted 129,600 tweets in 2014 alone, before some 500 accounts were deactivated -- till late 2015, ISIS had lured and converted only some 17 Indians to its cause, according to United Nations and the US National Counterterrorism Centre statistics." (Daniels). It is easier to meet on an anonymous online chat room via. Facebook than it is to fly thousands of miles for a terrorist meeting. But the dangerous part is, when to believe ISIS. A case in India states that a family hired a tutor for their son who apparently was part of ISIS.

However, existing U.S. strategies have three shortfalls: 1) scope (addressing all dimensions in the information environment), 2) deterrence (defining acts of war), and 3) whole-of-nation approach. The first shortfall is that the scope must be broader. U.S. strategies sufficiently address threats to the physical and informational dimensions within the information environment. However, the U.S. lacks a strategy that identifies challenges and threats in the cognitive dimension within the information environment. Adversaries, such as ISIS, are effectively utilizing influence campaigns to advance their agenda by manipulation of the values, perceptions, and beliefs of the U.S. public and other target audiences. Information, or misinformation, is a primary means to shape global opinions. The U.S. continues to yield the initiative in influence operations and function in a reactionary capacity. Strategic communication messaging to enhance U.S. credibility and legitimacy have been slow and at times ineffective. The behavior data generated through social media has enabled researchers to understand groups, globally making it easier to spread and