Idealism International Law

Institutionalism rejects neorealist claims that the international system is characterized by anarchy. Rather, it is more accurate to think of international system as made up of rational states that exhibit growing interdependence. Interdependence creates incentives for cooperation among states as it offers mutual benefits to all parties engaged. States learn cooperation through reciprocity or are forced to cooperate for sake of securing public goods. Institutionalists also focus on the free riding problem, which assumes that nations will tend to cheat and not do their part in producing public goods. International institutions, such as the United Nations or World Trade Organization, can help in establishing and sustaining cooperation among states by reducing transaction costs, helping with monitoring (free riding problem), and offering third party mediation.

According to constructivism “The world of international relations is not just the world of material capabilities and materialistic opportunities it is also a social world”. Constructivists believe that actor states are occupied with both normative and material factors. They do not deny that the material world shapes their structure, but they believe that through reflections and discourse, actor states are malleable and influenced by each other. Constructivism thus deals with the process through which principled ideals become social norms. In being so, constructivism becomes a critical component for the international recognition of a state. This becomes crucial for actors, as the internationalization of social norms will ensure compliance over external pressure. Thus, democracy promotion can be subsumed under the socialization and internalization by actors. The persistence of democratic international institutions after the cold war as well as the mass identification of states as democracies and the absence of a strong alternative political ideology have contributed to a process of socialization promoting democratic cooperation. Therefore, after the Cold

Taking this into consideration, dealing with external activities of a state, international law has extensive latitude. In Article 38 (1) of the Statue of the International Court of Justice, the following sources of international law are acknowledged: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law (36). Sources having a technical meaning related to the law making process and must not be confused with information sources, research sources or bibliographies on international law (35). Rules expressed and recognized by consenting states are referred to as treaties and/or conventions. Treaties are codified agreements established by consenting states as means of resolving a dispute or to recognize mutual interests. Since treaties are codified, they are favored over customary law; therefore, becoming a vital part of building a more stable foundation for international law. States are required to meet their international obligations as well as formulate efforts to

AIPA 2: UNDERSTANDING ACTORS, INTERESTS & POWER Institutions  Basic level – states exist to provide (1) defence and (2) social order  this requires the presence of a functioning economy.  State not only produces, consumes and redistributes; it’s also the main source and enforcer of “rules of games”.  “Rules of games” are institutions  institutional quality is related to economic performance.  Evidence: No country has gotten rich with bad institutions. Politics  Politics is the process of creating new institutions. Existing institutions create a constraint on this process.  Political processes can be analysed in terms of Actors involved in the processes, their interests and their relative power (AIP).  Actors: Political,

The Phenomena we’re trying to address will be encapsulated by the term ‘Institutional Inaction’. Formally, a case of ‘Institutional Inaction’ is found any time an institution decides to not speak, not learn, not publicize, all with the intention of improving or maintaining the standing, prestige, or funding of the group. It rests a great deal upon the assumptions of a ‘Bureaucratic Politics Model’, which posits that states are not unitary actors, but instead, that their myriad institutions vie for funding and clout in order to carry out their adopted objectives. Institutional Inaction 's closest relative is ‘Bullshit’ of the Frankfurt variety – the objective of such inaction is not necessarily related to any

Basically, Ratner discusses how we have two challenges: how to make universal rules legitimate amongst a community of diverse nations and how to make these rules effective in the absence of a governing authority. He then goes on to explain how there are four fundamental shifts in these kinds of issues. New Forms, New Players: Rules of international law used to reside in treaties or customary law, but as new domains from the environment to the internet become appropriate for international regulation, states become unwilling to embrace strict rules. Soft law enables states to adjust to the regulation of new areas without fearing punishment upon failure to comply. New participants are making demands

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that norms evolve in three stages, which they call the norm life cycle. In the first stage of norm emergence, there is a conviction that something must be changed and the “norm entrepreneurs” persuade states to adopt the norm. If a “tipping point” is reached, which is usually one-third of the states, states adopt the norm for domestic political reasons (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The second stage is norm cascade where states adopt norms in response to international pressure; they do this to enhance domestic legitimacy, conformity, and esteem needs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The final stage is norm internalization in which the norms become internalized and professionals press for codification and universal

There are many acts of violence committed around the world today. One common problem that arises from these issues and wars is the aftermath of sorting out who did what and where to discuss this information. Pierre Leval, who is a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote the article, “The Long Arm of International Law” (2011). Leval was born in New York and received his bachelor’s degree in 1959 from Harvard (2011). Shortly after, in 1963, he earned his first professional doctorate degree as a Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School(2011). After his nomination by President Bill Clinton in 1993, Leval joined the court (2011). Prior to this, he served on the Southern District of New York, joining in 1997 after appointment from President Jimmy Carter (2011). On August 16, 2002, Leval assumed senior status (2011).

Having grown up in a developing country, and having lived in multiple countries as an immigrant and a visible minority, I have seen and experienced varying degrees of inequality first hand. My experiences as an immigrant and visible minority have transformed me into an advocate of social justice and made me keenly aware of the complex issues facing immigrants. These experiences have given me the desire to pursue a legal education, with a career goal of becoming a lawyer specializing in labor and international law. I intend to utilize the knowledge gained in helping new immigrants in my adopted country, Canada, gain a foothold in the Canadian job market.

The EU, with representatives from its 28 member states, enacts a broad set of policies and guidelines that local laws are supposed to be consistent with. Often considered

The process of EU development is characterized by uncertainty that often plagues joint decisions and creates collective action problems that is overcome by the implementation of uniform norms, or common European values such as “human rights”, “rule of law”, “democratization”, and “common foreign policy”. If there is uncertainty about the relevance of these values in a supranational organization such as the EU, then the notion that a normative framework binds the organization is cannot be supported. The relevance of uncertainty in international relations is discussed by the major political

As a result, institutions assume an important role in facilitating and structuring cooperation, thereby reshaping the role of anarchy in the international system by imposing some form of order (Jervis 1999, 53). Both neoliberals and defensive realists believe that conflict is not always necessary for states to achieve their goals. However, defensive realists argue that institutions are established only when states believe that participation confers direct benefits to the state itself (Jervis 1999, 63). Therefore, institutions are merely tools of statecraft and a reflection of self-interest (Jervis 1999,63). In contrast, neoliberal institutionalists argue that institutions can be greater than the sum of their parts (i.e., member states) and can confer benefits to a wider number of states or even the international system, as a whole. Consequently, institutions are not instruments of statecraft but international players in and of themselves. When analyzing a power transition neoliberals stress the importance of the nature of the rising state’s regime and the degree of dissatisfaction with the existent world order (Ikenberry 2008, 26). Arguably, even more important is the state of the international order itself, as conditions could either entice a rising state to

Application of differences in viewpoints analytical captured in figure 2.1 for theories as much as the internal politics of those international relations . ( 86 ) Thus, in their analysis of domestic politics , and national security studies Orthodox tend to stick to the same physical and rational perspective that distinguishes realism at the international level . This work has taken two main forms : Checking individual decision-makers , it was observed more often in times of crisis , and bureaucratic organizations to participate in the process of policy formulation and implementation . State theory implicit in the former state model is rational , as he and the actor, and the theory of politics implicit in the latter is the plurality of bureaucratic red tape or bureaucracy.

Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions provides that States parties undertake to “ensure respect for the present Convention ”. The same provision is repeated in Additional Protocol I in relation to respect for the provisions of that Protocol . It further provides that in the event of serious violations of the Protocol, States parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in cooperation with the United Nations and in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. A similar provision is included in the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property.

International law is the set of rules generally regarded and accepted as binding in relations between states, to the maintenance of international peace and security. Although, some of the country may agree to definition of international norms, there are some countries that does not agree with the United Nation international laws that generally accepted as international norms. Even though, some country does not agree with UN international laws, because of the powerful nation that are the member of the nation, the Security Council can enforce their international law via various ways toward a state or individual; and the International court of Justice (ICJ) also give advisory opinion to get settle between state to state conflict, in accordance with international law.