Identify A Possible Area Of Focus And Problem For Research Inquiry

Foreign and domestic policies are not linear, rather the policies are connected in a circle, with each policy reinforcing the values of another. Domestic American terrorism in the prison and detention systems and governmental reforms are influenced by the mobilization and ethnocentrism abroad. The militarization internationally is justified by the domestic handling of the same cultural issues within the United State borders. The United States has strangely used a near Catch-22 to handle dilemmas. The United States has allowed perspective to become reality, whether with oneself or regarding issues abroad, specifically in the Middle East. Terrorism is the use or threat of fear for political or economical gain. An internal characteristic of terrorism is how dependent it is of perspective, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. To understand “terrorism,” a focus must be applied to the history, what drove an organization to commit such acts. Respectively, the Middle East has been a hotbed for the key word “terrorism,” especially because of 9/11. Subsequently, Muslims have been stigmatized by the United States as terrorists. The consequences spawned because of 9/11 require a look to the past to understand the present.

The book “How Terrorism End; Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns”, written in 2011 at the height of Al-Qaeda, the most well-known international terrorist group of our time. The author of this work, Audrey Cronin, at the time of print, served as a professor of strategy at the United States National War College in Washington D.C., and a senior associate at Oxford University’s Changing Character of War Program. Both positions allowed her to impact strategic policy making in the execution of the Global War on Terror by allowing her access to senior military and civilian policymakers. Her previous area of her prior work has been mainly focused on international terrorism with an emphasis on al-Qaeda. She has authored

Terrorism is a massive problem--everybody realizes that. Regardless of origin, culture, country, or political standpoint, every sane person understands that terrorism is something that is still relatively prevalent in the world, and something needs to be done about it. The problem, however, is that there is no easy solution. The United States tends to take overbearing control and responsibility for all terrorist threats, groups, and attacks, but this is simply not reasonable. Although we cannot expect every country to take initiative against terrorist threats like ISIS, sustained international coordination is necessary to effectively confront transnational terrorist groups (Shirkey). This way, the US can begin taking care of themselves and their own country, as they still have many issues that have yet to be solved. While working together is important, though, it is not the key to solving the problem. What we must do in addition is investigate and address the root causes of terrorism, and analyse them in detail in order to best combat terrorist groups at their roots.

This paper will discuss religious terrorism in particular. Religious terrorism can be defined as “the terrorism [is] carried out based on motivations and goals that have a predominantly religious character or influences.” (“Religious Terrorism”) An example of this will be the 9/11 attacks. It was “a series of four coordinated terrorist attack launched by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda upon the United States in New York City and the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.”(“September 11 attacks”) This attack had led to a serious causality, “almost 3000 people dies in the attacks.” (“September 11 attacks”) Osama Bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, declared a “holy war against the United States” (“September 11 attacks”) In his “letter to America”, he stated the motives as follows: In opposition to western support for attacking Muslims in Somalia; supporting the Indian oppression against Muslims in Kashmir; the Jewish aggression against Muslims in Lebanon; the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia; U.S support of Israel and the sanction against Iraq. (“September 11 attacks”) The disastrous attack leads to a serious attention of re-constructing the old version of counter terrorism strategy, which had failed to protect the citizens against terrorism. However, ‘terrorism is far to complex for one solution to be effective in dealing with all the possible threats.” (Lygutas 146) Therefore, some of the measures have difficulties in balancing the rights of

In his 1996 FATWA, Usama bin Laden placed personal responsibility upon each individual Muslim to unify and fight oppressive forces, particularly the United States. With this FATWA comes the distinction of the “near” and “far” enemy, an innovative philosophy utilized by bin Laden and Al Qaeda that illustrates the overarching oppressive nature of the United States to Salafi Jihadist sympathizers. Integrating this ideology into the Salafi Jihadist movement is particularly useful for terrorist organizations, as their fighters—particularly their suicide bombers—are ideologically validated for their actions, and are confident that they will receive a reward in the afterlife should they strike against the enemy.

On September 11, 2001 the United States of America was forever changed. A series of attacks lead by a man named Osama Bin Laden, the leader of the organization called Al-Qaeda, would bring America into a new war, the War on Terror. This war would not be like the wars of before, nation against nation, but would rather be a much more global conflict (“War”). The war would also not merely involve the United States, but also every western country. The reason behind this war is one word, Jihad. The definition of jihad is “a war fought by Muslims to defend or spread their belief” (“Jihad”). The United States of America has changed the way it

From intellectuals to policy-makers alike. All of the extraordinary output on the subject of al-Qaeda, has recently led to a number of far-reaching theories about the group which remain startlingly unexplored. The two assumptions, this paper examines and reveals each one 's foundational role in assertions as well as debates about al-Qaeda, despite the relatively unexplored status of each. These 2 assumptions relate to: (1) the role of the internet in actual terrorist activity; and (2) the association between combating a

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In this essay I am going to discuss whether Al Qaeda still poses a threat to the United States. The essay will discuss the current state, since 2013, of Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups. It will use the information to lay out claims and facts that show Al Qaeda is still remains a threat. Although the threat has diminished some since the 9/11 terror attacks it still remains. The threat has gone from huge major attacks to smaller, lone wolf, attacks on the mainland of the United States. Al Qaeda still poses a threat to U.S. embassies in the Middle East, troops stationed abroad, and U.S. aid workers abroad. Al Qaeda also poses a threat to the financial welfare of the United States. The

The fictitious attack described in this essay is intended to be an example of coordination within a sleeper cell. The sleepers are a real threat and there are no definitive indicators of when and where they will attack. The momentum of ISIS and terrorist groups has not been put to a halt based on the worlds current events. The persistence of ISIS indicates they are still well funded with an emboldened tenacity. The puzzle of ISIS tactics, techniques, and procedures in the United States is not solved. Shared intelligence between local, state, and federal law enforcement is critical to get in front of the enemy’s momentum. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies

Ever since September 11, 2001 Americans along with the majority of the world’s population have been skeptical of Muslims. It’s a sad reality but it’s hard for people to think of a Muslim without linking them directly to terrorism. But these assumptions aren’t totally out of the blue—the Muslim’s religion, Islam, teaches a low tolerance for other religions and the Islamic government has no separation of church and state, so it’s only normal to assume that their government shall have a low tolerance as well—some however, immediately translate this into terrorism. Through the Islamic government and religion, relations with foreign countries, and separation amongst themselves it can be concluded that Islamic Fundamentalism is clearly a threat

This epistemological study will define the political ideology of “blowback” that occurs through the contextualism of American foreign policy and the rise of ISIS in the Middle East. The origins of ISIS in the Middle East was a historical development that occurred within the historical context of American foreign intervention in Afghanistan and other Islamic nations that involved the funding of Muslim terrorist organizations. In this contextualist conception, the history of American funding of terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda in the 1980s, defines why the concept of “blowback” has become a major political ideology in the rise of other, more advanced terrorist organizations, such as ISIS, that have grown in the 21st century. Blowback is a theory that defines the increased presence of terrorist organizations in the Middle East due to the historical funding of Islamic terrorist organization by the U.S. government. On the other hand, American nationalism tends to define the “war on terror” as a basis for nationalism and foreign interventionist policies, which would contradict the political idea of “blowback” as a cause for the rise of ISIS. These relative terms define the contextualism of the increasing power of ISIS in the Middle East, yet the premise of “blowback” provides a more accurate ”context” for epistemological purposes. In essence, a

They selectively pick from the Islamic tradition only those elements that advance their tampered agenda, but however they pull from the same religious sources that notify the lives and practices of more than a billion other Muslims (Moghadam, 2008). This is why ordinary Muslims reframe from speaking to non-Muslims as they find it challenging and dangerous to challenge Salafi-jihadist without jeopardizing the risk of being suspected of targeting Islam as a whole. The United States should grasp every opportunity to highlight the disastrous consequences that Salafi-jihadist violence has brought on the everyday lives of Westheimer’s, rather than having the desired effect of weakening their ideology’s appeal. The primary victims of Salafi-jihadists are Muslims, who are killed and mutilated in far greater numbers than non-Muslims. Salafi-jihadists openly justify the killing of civilians, including Muslims under a logic of the ends justify the means (Moghadam, 2008). I found it was equally a fact that leaders of Salafi-jihadist organizations deceitfully preach about the benefits of killing, but rarely, if ever conduct suicidal operations themselves, or send their loved ones on such missions. Waging a battle against a religious ideology such as the Salafi-jihad is a challenging task that requires commitment and resourcefulness. If we were to highlight a few simple, yet damaging facts about the actual results of Salafi-jihadists can and will go a long

As a direct consequence of September 11, a number of substantial challenges lie ahead in the area of counter-terrorism..   The most prominent of these is the changing nature of the terrorism phenomenon.  In past years, when terrorism was largely the product of direct state sponsorship, policymakers were able to diminish prospects for the United States becoming a target using a combination of diplomatic and military instruments to deter potential state sponsors.  Today, however, many terrorist organizations and individuals act independently from former and present state sponsors, shifting to other sources of support, including the development of transnational networks.

Differing accounts on either pole focus on al-Qaeda’s continued relevance as the premier terrorist network, whether it is any longer effective or not. From there, the natural conclusion comes around to asking how effective al-Qaeda is, and by which mechanisms does it project that effectiveness. Aside from this, both parties agree that al-Qaeda has an uncanny habit of surviving in the turbulent international dialectic that spawned radical Muslim distress, vicariously.