Identifying Requirements For High Level Policy Makers

The analysis is then given to consumers and policy makers, once it is checked by the analyst supervisor and peers. The analyst should also be ready to give a briefing on short notice. But both the analyst and the policy maker or consumer have to be aware of at all times, is that the intelligence field does not know everything. “On any given subject, the intelligence community faces what is in effect a field of rocks, and it lacks the resources to turn over every one to see what threats to national security may lurk underneath” (Pillar).

Good evening to all. I hope all is well this week. As many of you have stated, I thought I had a descent grasp of the United States Intelligence oversight. However, to my surprise I found that I actually did not have as good of an understanding as I thought. My shortcoming was in understanding just how convoluted the system is. The system has evolved over the years just as many things do. However, the system still has a long way to go before it’s as effective as it could be. Former Under Secretary Charles Allen noted that “virtually any terrorist attack on the homeland that one can imagine must exploit a border crossing, a port of entry, a critical infrastructure, or one of the other domains that the department has an obligation to

In this paper the subject of interest is the role of congress in the oversight of strategic intelligence, or the lack there of. Does congress have a proper role in the oversight of strategic intelligence? If not what should the proper role be? These are the questions best answered by looking at the history of congressional over sight and where it is at today. The next few pages will cover the topics above and shed light on what it is congress calls oversight.

Other kinds of intelligence failure have resulted from the fixed ideas of leadership and their deliberate sightlessness to uncomfortable facts. To some extent, intelligence chiefs are more comfortable with conformity than the contestability of ideas. In fact, the more rigid the hierarchy, the higher is the likelihood of intelligence failure.

According to Robert Jervis, “Policymakers say they need and want good intelligence. They do need it, but often they do not like it, and are prone to believe that when intelligence is not out to get them, it is incompetent.” In order for intelligence to be

Congress has for a long time has tried in various ways to oversee the intelligence community which have shown to be sometime controversial, and a very difficult responsibility. What make this task so hard is the secrecy and sensitivity intelligence information finding, the sources, and the methods in which the information is obtain. Congressional oversight has evolved since the mid-1970s and a lot more since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. The critics about Congressional oversight by some as being inadequate, ineffective, or worse, while at the same time proposal that was made in the 9/11 commission report was met with challenges from within the Legislature Branch and from the Executive Branch

Perhaps the most important change in how the federal government was reorganized after September 11th is the creation of both the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004 with the passage of the same IRTPA that created TSA. This concept had been first suggested in 1955 after a study by Congress then and was recommended time and again but only became a reality after the September 11th attacks drove the need for major intelligence reform home and the 9/11 Commission continued the push for the creation of such a position (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-5). As one can see from the mission and vision of the ODNI, the importance cannot be overstated. The mission includes leading intelligence integration while having the IC produce the most insightful intelligence products possible and the vision is fully integrating the IC thus making the nation more secure (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-2).

Intelligence gathering operations is vital to any operation and the same holds true to border and coastal security. While the question pertains mostly to Post 9/11, the DOD provided intelligence and manpower in support of border security and in the war against drugs. In the mid1990s, I was assigned to a Joint Task Force (JTF) with several missions within the United States. One such operation was in Arizona providing over watch for specific areas the United States and Mexican border. Our role was strictly intelligence gathering for US Customs and Border Protection (CFB) and they acted upon the information gathered. We had the man power, experience, and more importantly stealth to carry out the missions while the CFB could concentrate on other areas until our surveillance and information gathered led to the arrest of individuals who were leading the border

The intelligence community has undergone some major changes in the past thirty years. During the cold war this section of defense had massive funding. There needed to be an ability to predict what the Soviet Union was planning to do and what they were actually doing in order to prevent a nuclear war. After this period in time ended there was again large changes. The budget to the intelligence community was cut astronomically because there was perceived to be less of a threat to the United States (“9/11 Intelligence Failures Report”, 2002). This misperception was actually due to a lack of ability to shift to a new changing threat. This mind set allowed many unwelcomed risks to enter into the United States.

The “need to know” system is an outdated and inefficient way of sharing information, both within a single agency and when it comes to interagency cooperation. The “need to share” system is a much more logical way to go about disseminating intelligence of all variations. The “need to share” system theoretically mandates the interagency sharing of information that is pertinent to national security , and operational success, thus paving the way for much more efficient operations between the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as other federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. If I were in charge of the DHS I would put into effect a long term interagency liaison program, that would be aimed at the sharing

Why Do Political Leaders Ignore Intelligence Warnings? Political leaders ignore intelligence warnings based on several motives. These motives range from cognitive biases and mindsets that create unrealistic expectation of intelligence and non-acknowledgement of relevant intelligence, to plausible deniability, and the creation of opacity. Both plausible deniability and opacity are significant motivations, as it takes a conscious action to ignore intelligence warnings, while mindsets are an unconscious motivation. However, mindsets and cognitive biases play a more significant role in a political leader’s decision to ignore intelligence warnings.

For instance, most common domestic terrorists targeted National Security are gangs and other forms of terrorists inside the US. Intelligence is a solid component of past data that stays permanent. Current intelligence is the non-stop information gathering process to complete the puzzle. Collecting and analyzing the material is what is occurring at this time. Information can be changeable and is also a brainstorming of information. Intelligence estimates is the future information that can be presented as brainpower on a major problem solving technique in our country. Intelligence analysts design endless drills on a how to manual that states explanations on circumstances such as terrorist attacks, nuclear accident, biological war, etc. let’s not forget that all these intelligence techniques are designed to protect and maintain the integrity of our president, our country, its allies and

The United States Intelligence community draws on advanced technology and analytical techniques. An intelligence process that sets objectives, collects, analyzes, and report findings, with feedback loops integrated throughout. Explicitly, the intelligence community advantages technology and tradecraft within a proscribed process. However, estimation of threats and decision-making are outcomes of human thinking. Analysts and policymakers create mental models, or short cuts to manage complex, changing environments. In other words, to make sense of ambiguous or uncertain situations, humans form cognitive biases. Informed because of personal experience, education, and specifically applied to intelligence analysis, Davis

Abstract: In this analysis, it is shown throughout the many different agencies how the intelligence cycle is interpreted. Within each of the different agencies everyone has their own way of obtaining information and different policies that they follow, within the constriction of the US constitution. The intelligence cycle states the many different steps taken to obtain intelligence from domestic to foreign information.

In most cases these INTs community compete among each other to provide needed intelligence information to policy makers to justify their budgetary allocations (Lowenthal, 2014). However, intelligence collection can be divided into five main categories referred to as “intelligence collection disciplines” or the “INTs”. These include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence