Identity Theory Mental States

In this essay, I am going to write a response to the objection raised by the functionalists towards identity theory. Identity theory is a form of physicalism; it states that a particular mental state is identical to a particular physical state of body and brain, for instance mental sensation such as pain is simply just the firing of C-fibres (Smart, 1959). This is a reductionist view as it reduces our psychological state to a materialistic and physical form. A prominent objection against identity theory is Functionalism, in which the main advocate Hilary Putnam stated that identity theory is too narrow as it ignores multiple realisability. In the next paragraph, I will write a little more about functionalism, and in the end, I will ultimately conclude that functionalism is a better theory than identity theory.

The brain has been determined to be the control centre for all nervous messages in humans. The complexity of the brain allows us to interpret these nervous messages into thoughts which in turn allow us to respond to them. To be able to have a sense of consciousness the brain must receive some form of stimulus. Type physicalism/identity theory which was first developed by Place (1956), which describes how different mental states are triggered due to the firing of the corresponding fibres. Philosophers like Place (1956), Smart (1959), Feigl (1972), and Armstrong

Showing only the physical side of this transformation, Bliss presents the assumption that the physical side of human identity is

Identity theory maintains that mental states just are brain states (Lecture notes). There is a correlation between what we perceive mentally and what we can observe neurologically because we are observing mental states when we observe the brain. In the case of Zombie Ed, this theory faces extraordinary difficulty resolving the question either way with satisfaction. Zombie Ed does have a brain, albeit one greatly damaged since Ed underwent zombification; if it accepts that Zombie Ed must have a mind because he has a brain, then how does it discern brains? Our association of mental states with brain states is only because we have mental states, not because we already knew there was something about the brain that had an immediate causal influence on the mind somehow (for example, the ancient Egyptians thought the heart was the source of mind). By identity theory we ought to be able to know that

J.J.C. Smart applied the Identity Theory in avail to challenge behaviourists ' view (notably regarding sensations). Let us take an example when Smart claims to be in pain (which is similar example in seeing a yellow-orange after-image). When he says “I am in pain”, he is not genuinely reporting it, nor does he claim to report something “irreducibly physical” (Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes, page 142).

Kripke disagrees with J.C.C. Smart’s Brain-identity theory by exposing flaws as to what identity really is. Smart’s physicalism suggests that mental states are identical to brain processes. If C-fibres represent a certain brain state, then pain refers to the brain state associated with pain. The firing of pain is C-fibres. This identical statement is contingently true because it is only known as a ‘posteriori’, but the firing of C-fibres is not a necessary truth. Kripke refutes that an identity statement can be both contingent and true. He asserts that in order for an identity statement to be deemed true it must be a necessarily true. If two things are identical, then they each must be rigid designators and therefore are not contingent. However, if pain is a rigid designator and the firing of C-fibres is a non-rigid designator, then it is not a necessarily true statement.

Place’s second reason why an identity thesis is logically possible. Statements about consciousness as a brain process are not confirmed in the same way red is a color is confirmed. “His table is an old packing-case” is confirmed by observation. It is not necessary or impossible for us to observe otherwise. Analogously, science might confirm by observation consciousness is a brain

There could be types of things and there could be particular token of those types. Token events are dated, particular unrepeatable events. The distinction between type of events and token of events is important to explain how these three principles of the mental could be precise. Token identity theory shows how the mental and the physical are related to ensure that these three principles could be true together. Moreover, it states that every token mental event is a physical event but there is no assertion that the types of mental events are identical to the types of physical

Self-identity is singular. The belief in this existence of one’s self, presupposes all our experiences of consciousness. We all hold that this identity is ours alone. I speak of my experiences as experienced by me. I would seem to be talking nonsense , if I referred to myself in the plural or spoke of how the multiplicity of ‘me’s’ experienced an event. Although most will submit to the existence of levels of consciousness, we categorize those people who exhibit distinct personalities as non-ordinary. All popular theories of self-identity set about the task of proving a singular self. I will attempt to analyze the currently held theories of self-identity, and consider cases where the singular self-identity of normal individuals is called

Under the identity theory the sensation of pain it is invariably identified with a specific brain state – a set of neurons firing. Moreover, according to identity theory, ceteris paribus this brain state of pain should be the same for all subjects that have the same neurological properties. But it seems that not all persons experience pain in the same way; for instance, there are people that find pleasure in pain, and other animals react mentally to pain. Consequently, it might be argued that there are different brain states for the same ‘mental state’, even in other animals. Putnam (1967) advanced a series of arguments in support of the view that mentality is multiple realizable and not reducible to a unique brain state. Fodor, echoing Putman’s view, argued in favour of the autonomy of special sciences (like psychology); according to Fodor mentality is physical but cannot be described with the

Since mental states are not located whilst physical state is; thus the mental states cannot be the physical states. He then proceeds to point out that mental state and neural state ascriptions refer to the same accompanying phenomena. Therefore, because the real value of the two ascriptions are different does not mean that the identity theory is untrue. These ascriptions can be referred to the same phenomenon but in a different way. This theory can also not be considered false just because of the fact that mental state and neural state ascriptions are not

Similarly, we are able to manipulate our external behaviors, despite our private mental states. For example, we are able to withhold our thoughts and opinions, keeping them private, and we are also able to manipulate and misrepresent them and ourselves. Similarly, people are able to experience similar – or even the same – mental states and experiences, but show no behavioral difference. How does identity theory explain the sense in which the mind and its mental states are

A person relates to the world through different mental and corporeal experiences. The former is associated with one having a (non-physical) mind, which contains beliefs, desires, feelings and so on, while the latter involves having a (physical) brain. The Mind/Body problem questions whether the mind and brain are the same or different objects. For a long time, the interpretation of these experiences has been much debated by philosophers and scientists. One influential interpretation is Descartes’s Dualism of substances, which became one of the most lasting legacies in his philosophy. However, a scientifically stronger interpretation was advanced through the Mind/Brain Identity theory. Prior to discussing how Elliott Sober’s presentation of the Identity Theory is philosophically stronger than Dualism, I will begin by evaluating the philosophical perspective of Dualism; I will examine the distinction between mental and physical substance and assess the strengths of dualism. I will also attempt to show the subsequent problems that rise from such distinction and some of the prominent reasons for why Dualism do not hold weight against the Identity Theory.

A philosophical perspective of the mind and body affiliation provides added insight into the various schools of thought regarding the ways in which our minds and our bodies interact. While some 'dualist '-based philosophies suggest that the mind is an entity completely independent of the body and vice versa, 'monoist ' viewpoints propose that the mind and the body are a part of a single being and thus function as one unit accomplishing different objectives. One such stance is the philosophical theory of behaviorism, which holds that “being in a mental state is the same as being in a physical state. In other words, since all that we can know about another person 's state of mind is through their behavior, there is nothing else” (Gatis, 2003). Thus the way one thinks has a direct impact on the way the body functions. For example, if an individual were to say, "I am

Mind-brain identity theorists like to say that "mental states" are "brain states" but we will see that much more than abstract "states", "events", "properties", and "laws" are involved in explaining how the mind emerges from the brain. On the other hand, a more extreme sayings is deny the existence of mind which is only a brain exists. Identity theory explains the interaction