Implications of Tactical Intelligence

Mission Command is the framework used by the U.S. Army to ensure key leaders receive clear direction from commanders. Clear commander’s guidance allows subordinates to make disciplined and informed decisions to best accomplish assigned tasks. Ideally, application of mission command principles ensures all elements integrate and sync actions, thus creating a shared understanding and purpose. Analysis of Major General (MG) William Garrison’s decision making during the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrates how mission command principles must be applied to gain and maintain a position of advantage during military ground operations. As commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR), MG Garrison demonstrated both successful and failed application of mission command principles. Four principles will be discussed in the

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

Like any other unified team, how does the United States Army gain leverage against our enemies who look to seize the free world? Well like many teams they have offensive operations, which are to seek opportunities to gain leverage against their foes or even gain a win in the end and then they have defensive operations. Defensive operations are the opposite of offensive operations where instead of trying to take advantage of the enemy the Army’s forces are trying to take a stance and push the enemy back. Thus allowing a chance to defend the territory where the soldiers stand and hopefully allow the soldiers to regain their forces. So like many other military forces we have used these tactics for many of years to defend our great nation, but of course over the years are tactics have had to change in order to adapt to different wars. So in this paper you will learn the most current tactics that our Army

Carl Von Clausewitz and Helmuth Moltke the Elder were both practitioners and theorists of the war art in the 19th century. Their military thoughts on war’s character and its dynamics have influenced the later militaries in the conduct of war. Particularly, the Clausewitzian concept of the “culminating point of victory” and the Moltke’s principle of “Auftragstaktik”, or mission type tactics by a decentralized command were implemented and culminated in the battlefield of World War II. Moreover, today, the US Army has adopted both concepts in its latest refined “AirLand Battle” doctrine recognizing their importance in the operational art of modern warfare.

As we have seen throughout the entire history of warfare, ancient world terrorism, political intrigue and elitist terrorism of the middle ages, and into modern terrorism, intelligence is of vital importance on both sides. Armed forces have always used intelligence of some form be it sneaking up a hill and scouting what is on the other side to the use of modern platforms such as

As leaders, Army officers need to be able to make decisions on a daily, even hourly basis. While the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is the typical method for operational decisions, routine issues often require less regimented methods such as Army Problem Solving . Our point of view, the information at hand, the concepts we base our views upon, our personal implications and assumptions, and the purposes that motivate our need for decisions are all critical in determining the ultimate effectiveness of this problem solving process. Drs. Paul and Elder enumerate the “Elements of Thought” which include and incorporate supporting traits and standards. Through proper integration of these accepted standards into our thought processes can and does significantly improve our overall use of the Army Problem Solving process by enhancing our critical thinking skills and our ability to think rationally.

Major General Burnside’s failure at the Battle of Fredericksburg could initially be attributed to the army not receiving the pontoon bridges in time to cross the river and sustain the army’s momentum. However, MG Burnside’s bigger issue can be linked back to his lack of mission planning. The issue of not receiving the pontoon bridges relates directly to the lack of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). During IPB, the battlefield environment is defined, battlefield effects are described, the threat is evaluated, and threat courses of action are determined (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994). If MG Burnside had taken the time to conduct proper terrain analysis of the Rappahannock River

To fully identify how counterintelligence supports the maneuver commander an understanding of the operational framework that the maneuver units operate in must be understood. The Army’s overall conceptual framework has changed over time due to the Army’s participation in conflicts. To appreciate the current mission of maneuver forces a quick glance of recent history must be accomplished. In 1982 the Army’s capstone doctrine focus was AirLand Battle. This primarily

Imagine sitting in a helicopter that is taking to a battle ground were an estimated 2000 enemy troops are awaiting your arrival. You know you are heavily outnumbered but regardless, you have a mission to complete. The lives of your subordinates sit in the brink as they are counting on your ability to make split second decisions, employ meticulously devised tactics, and give precise orders. These are the challenges Lieutenant General Harold “Hal” Moore faced on 14 Nov 1965 during the first battle of the Vietnam War.

Throughout history, The United States has been involved in many confrontations with various types of enemies. As a military force, we try to learn from the mistakes made. We have After Action Reviews in order to find out how we can change our plans for future battles. We change our Field Manuals and Army Regulations in order to fit those plans. However, there are rare instances when things work out perfectly. When the doctrine created for training and organization match perfectly to the battles we face. Unfortunately for us, when things go so well, we think we have the perfect plan. It isn’t until future confrontations that we learn how wrong we are.

The American Army 's history, composition, and structure predisposed the leadership to a rigid fixation on conventional warfare. In contrast to the British army-as-force-projection model, the American Army found its first task a matter of national survival. This historical trend - the continued perception of the Army fighting a war of annihilation - helped in many ways to keep the Army purely focused on its military objectives. Unconditional surrender was the name of the game, and smaller political goals were seen at best as derivative to, and at worst, preventative of the fabled 'total victory '. The varied composition of personnel which make up the US army also ensured a degree of formality, and a deference to rank. The structure, born of open-combat wars at large scale, was constituted around large divisions, which often rotated officers and manpower in and out. In short, everything within the Army was organized -rigidly- around the principle of a large scale conventional war. What worked against the Germans would work against the Russians.

The United States Military faces many challenges engaging in conflicts around the world. Stretched thin, the elements of war evolves from AirLand Battle to Unified Land Operations. From the Cold war to Operation Iraqi Freedom the way of the military is winning on offense, winning decisively, while maintaining the initiative.

Maneuver Warfare is the only style of warfare that is “rapid, flexible, and opportunistic” enough to achieve dominance in both time and space. Again, speed is considered a primary tool used to get inside the enemy’s decision-making cycle. FMFM-1 argues that this will result in “shattering his moral and physical cohesion” by creating multiple dilemmas that will cause the enemy to panic and become paralyzed. Although it provides important points regarding the need for a rapid decision-making process, FMFM-1 fails to integrate historical evidence with how this theory will succeed against a numerically larger foe, or any foe for that matter. Lastly, it continues to eschew the science of warfare as something that detracts from a Maneuverist’s ability to defeat a numerically superior

According to Milan Vego in, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice, he defined Operational Art as, “a component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic or operational objectives in a given theater.” (p. I-4) Even though I am not in the business of defining the term Operational Art, I would still suggest amongst all of the various definitions that I have read this one definition by Vego appears to be practicable and serves its purpose well. For any military action, there must be planning, sustaining, executing of a mission such that theater objectives are met. In other words, a belligerents Center of Gravity must be identified through means of military and policy actions to obtain success.

As military members we are educated to think very linearly about strategy. For many years we have been trained to have a strategic thought process based on the use of a methodology that espouses three major steps: Ends (Objectives), Ways (Strategic Concepts), and Means (Resources). (Barber 1997)