Impossibility Of Moral Responsibility Analysis

Whether we have free will is widely controversial. The absence of a universal definition poses a primary problem to this question. In this essay, I shall base my argument on a set of three conditions for free will: 1) that the actor is unconstraint in his action, 2) the actor could have acted otherwise and 3) the actor must be ‘ultimately responsible’ (Kane, 2005: 121) for his action. After I have explained them, I shall apply these conditions to three scenarios that cover most, if not any, circumstances that occur when taking choices. The purpose of this essay is to show that if my conditions are true, none of the scenarios is based on free will and thus we do not have free will.

In this essay I will analyze Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument. I will first outline his main premise of the Basic Argument and then I will examine one of his criticisms. Specifically, I will be looking into his third premise, “But you can’t be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all”. I am defending Strawson’s argument that you are indeed not responsible for your actions. I will be focusing on genetics and upbringing’s in order to support Strawson’s reasoning. Due to the genetics individuals inherit and the environment they are brought up in, it is difficult to go against Strawson as he provides valid evidence that supports his argument that you cannot be ultimately responsible for your actions.

For example, Strawson believes true moral responsibility is when someone is completely responsible for their actions. Through the story of heaven and hell, he reveals the idea that true moral responsibility is when it would be just to punish someone to eternal torment in hell and reward others with eternal bliss in heaven. However, he states that no one is completely responsible for their actions because they aren’t the cause of themselves; since one didn’t bring themselves into being, and isn’t responsible for the way they are (at least in certain mental aspects). For instance, for one to choose to be the way one is, they would’ve had to exist already and be in possession of the principle of choice; however, since there is no completion of the limitless succession of choices of principles of choice, then there is no self-determinism. Overall, considering the Basic Argument states that nothing can be the cause of itself (causa sui), and true moral responsibility is dependent on causa sui, then there can’t be true moral

Vardaman and Dewey Dell, why tho? Throughout the book As I Lay Dying by William Faulkner, he has displayed different perspectives from each character by their actions. The actions from Vardaman and Dewey Dell might not be as noticeable as Darl, but they do have different perspectives in the situations they are handling. Which shows how Vardaman and Dewey Dell’s psychological state differs from everyone else.

The arguments presented by D’Holbach and Hobart contain many of the same premises and opinions regarding the human mind, but nonetheless differ in their conclusion on whether we have free will. In this paper, I will explain how their individual interpretations of the meaning of free will resulted in having contrary arguments.

The argument I am go to object to is Galen Strawson’s argument that states moral responsibility is impossible, even if determinism is true or false. The argument does not rely on determinism alone for it to be valid. As stated in his basic argument, we do not contain the ability to be morally responsible of something even if our actions are determined or not. I believe this is false. Strawson’s premise two of his basic argument would be invalid and it would follow that the other premises as well would be invalid, if it did not rely on determinism alone.

2) In order to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions one would have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects. 3)Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible (Strawson). As stated by Strawson. “...it makes no difference whether determinism is true or false.

The incompatibilists argue that one is morally responsible for what she has done given that she could have done otherwise. Further, they think that if determinism is true then one could not have done otherwise, so if determinism is true, one is not morally responsible for things she has done. In debates surrounding the issue of free will, philosophers have focused on discussing whether determinism is true or false. Harry Frankfurt thinks even though the requirement of alternative possibilities in order to be held morally responsible for our actions seems intuitively plausible, it is a questionable premise in the argument provided by incompatibilists. Frankfurt calls the premise that “a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise” the principle of alternative possibilities or PAP (Frankfurt, 829). He argues that PAP is false and a person can be held morally responsible even if she could not have done otherwise.

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility talks about the principle of alternate possibilities. The principle of alternate possibilities states that someone is morally responsible if they could have chosen to do otherwise. People who believe in free will are very supportive of the principle Free will is the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one’s own discretion. The principle of alternate possibilities, moral responsibility, and free will are all involved in this paper written by Harry Frankfurt. Frankfurt states that “its exact meaning is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether someone who accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and determinism

In Strawson’s argument I don’t see how this pattern of reasoning can provide that much of an argument against moral responsibility. I could understand if Strawson argued that to be responsible for how one acts, one must have chosen to be the way one is and leave it at that. However, Strawson adds the part that in order to be responsible for how one acts at, one must also be responsible for the prior choices that lead to one being a particular way. This is not the case because there are cases of intentional self-modification that allows someone to be responsible for what they do, without choosing it. Intentional self-modification is my argument against Strawson’s argument and I will elaborate with examples throughout the paper.

Have you ever wonder why you act differently in any given time? People need to better understand why they do things the way they do. We sometimes act out our own behavior because of we think is the right attitude without even try to interpret the cause. Self-perception theory suggested that people draw their conclusion just by observing their own behavior and by developing their opinions and attitudes. What are the possibilities if knew our own mind and what will are action be.

Over the course of time, in the dominion of philosophy, there has been a constant debate involving two major concepts: free will and determinism. Are our paths in life pre-determined? Do we have the ability to make decisions by using our freedom of will? While heavily subjective questions that have been answered many different authors, philosophers, etc., two authors in particular have answered these questions very similarly. David Hume, a Scottish philosopher from the 18th century, argues in his essay “Of Liberty and Necessity” that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that they can both be accepted at the same time without being logically incorrect. Alike Hume, 20th century author Harry G. Frankfurt concludes in his essay “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” that the two major concepts are compatible. These two authors are among the most famous of Compatibilists (hence the fact that they believe free will and determinism are compatible ideas) in philosophical history. The question that then arises in the realm of compatibilism particularly, is one dealing with moral responsibility: If our paths in life are not totally pre-determined, and we have the ability to make decisions willingly (using free will), then how do we deem an individual morally responsible for a given decision? Frankfurt reaches the conclusion that we are held morally responsible regardless of

In this essay I will explain why I think the strongest position of the free will debate is that of the hard determinists and clarify the objection that moral responsibility goes out the door if we don’t have free will by addressing the two big misconceptions that are associated with determinists: first that determinism is an ethical system, and secondly that contrary to common belief determinists do believe in the concept of cause and effect. I will also begin by explaining my position and why I believe that the position of the indeterminist does not hold water as an argument and the third

Though the clips were somewhat interesting, they appeared to follow the dominant discourse poking at areas of moral panic to sell a one sided experience. All of the clips also addressed the topics from an essentialist perspective to draw their audience while selling a false sense of betterment to view the lives of those in the clips. However, the experience would be more valuable if greater focus and a constructionist perspective were used to create a stronger sense of cultural competency to address the realities of those depicted. In turn the clips perpetuated the fears of the unknown and strengthened the moral panics in society. In addition is seems that dominant discourse remained unchallenged in the clips and added to the kyriarchy that

Halbur & Halbur (2011) states that “Humans are shaped and determined by sociocultural conditioning. This paradigm is basically deterministic because all beahaviors are believed to be a product of learning through