Essay about In Defense of Direct Perception

The author of the time lag argument seems to feel that by simply arguing from admitted facts of physical laws, one will realize that belief about objects of vision are mistaken. However, in this paper, I will show that the author has failed to realize that the key to the argument is the notion that we perceive things happen when they happen, and not later; and we perceive things in the states in which they are, at the time when we perceive them. I argue that the argument pivots on the ordinary use of the word “perceive”. So the real argument is how “perceive” ought to be used.

Indirect realists often ask us to consider hallucination and perceptual illusions. In hallucinations, you see something, but nothing which exists. In illusions, you see something, but not as it really is e.g. a straight stick in water appears bent. In each case, what you see, they claim, is a mental thing, an appearance, a ‘sense-datum’. We can then say that what we perceive ‘immediately’ is the appearance, which has secondary qualities; and that it is by enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk © Michael Lacewing perceiving the appearance that we perceive the physical object, which has only primary qualities. So we see the appearance of the vase, which is a mental thing which really is red; and this way, we indirectly see the vase, which is a physical

The issue with this argument lies within the second premise which claims that in order to perceive an object, all parts must be observed at once. This claim is invalid as perceiving an object does not require all parts to be observed as once just as reading a book does not require all pages to be read at once or visiting friends does not require all friends to be visited at once. In the direct perception of an object we do not see the whole object, however only a section. It is correct that we may not recognise or identify the object we are perceiving, however it is not true that in doing this we are not in fact directly perceiving the section of the object exposed for observation. There is no reason to assume that direct perception does not occur unless every angle and layer of the object in question is observed and therefore the partial character of perception argument is invalid.

This discussion is all about perception and how we look at things. Everyday we use our senses to improve our ability to see, hear, and become aware of something either good or bad. You can also use perception as a way of regarding, understanding, or interpreting something as well. During the watching of this video, there are some key points your wanting to know and understand.

“What’s out of sight, is out of mind.” (Myers, D.G. 2000). This one of Piaget’s theories for the sensorimotor stage. It was definitely part of my development between the ages of birth and two years, but this was only for a very brief time when I was very young. I feel that object permanence, the awareness that things exist even when not visible, is part of a childs early years and that

The Internet Encyclopedic of Philosophy by Dwayne H. Mulder says that object is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it. In other words, the object would be there, as it is, even if no subject perceived it. For example, a perceiving subject suffering from jaundice could seem to perceive an object as yellow when the object is not actually yellow.

When I was in school our teacher once showed us a drawing of a rabbit, so I thought. Staring at the picture a little bit longer, the rabbit transformed itself into a duck. Some of my classmates were only able to see the rabbit others could only see the duck. This very illusion was used by American psychologist Joseph Jastrow to point out that perception is not just a product of the stimulus, but also of mental activity. Studies of illusions and ambiguous images have shown that the brain’s perceptual systems actively and pre-consciously attempt to make sense of their input. If I had never seen a rabbit before I may have only been able to see the duck. Only through my own experience I could see both animals. The images were switching constantly

In the article “Getting the Big picture in Perspectivist Optics”, by Mark A. Smith, he purposes the argument of how we come to understand and categorize objects. He does this in an elongated analogy of sight and cognition. He suggests that the perspectivists was about the origins of sight, and how we understand objects. Due to this, perspectiva should been understood in a scientific view, not just our visual perception, but rather visual cognition. To help understand his view of how we understand objects, he uses Aristotle’s theory, the perspectivists’ point of view, and the human eye and how it perceives objects to the brain. Each of these served as a stepping stone to one another, and helped us further our understanding of how we can see,

Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them…This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way…since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must

Many of us take our vision for granted. We seem to accurately use our properties of vision with little effort or thinking at all. At times we often see things with our eyes and wonder how can this be possible?

In this essay I will consider two common theories that attempt to account for the problem of perception, namely Direct, and Indirect realism. I will outline several arguments against direct realism and show how the theory of indirect realism more plausably accounts for the problem of perception. Objections to the arguments against direct realism will be considered and possible counterarguments given. This paper will consider two theories of perception that attempt to account for this problem, namely Direct and Indirect realism, and argue against direct realism in favour of indirect realism, leading to the conclusion that indirect realism is the more plausable of the two.

Is it possible for two people to perceive the same picture and have the same experience? How are experiences of, and consequent judgments about, artworks affected by artistic and aesthetic expertise (Stokes, 2014)? Let’s say that each person shares the same mental states, beliefs, and desires about this picture. If this scenario is possible, then it must be that cognitive penetration is possible too. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility of cognitive penetration by using aesthetics as an example. Cognitive penetration states that, belief, experiences, moods, and desires or background knowledge can affect the content of perceptual consciousness (Pajus, 2012). If it can be proven that the perception of art can effect mental states, then it would solidify cognitive penetration’s current position. It should be noted that philosophers that adopt modular theories of the mind will be opposed to my position. With that said, it is the aim of my argument to go against those who maintain modular positions on this topic a.k.a. that perception is cognitively impenetrable. This paper assumes that everybody reading it maintains a modular view on the mind, or a similar opposing view. In this paper the underlying goal is to use the example of, an art expert and an art layman’s perception of art in order to reinforce the view, that perception is cognitively penetrable.

Perceptual observations are the grounds by which our concept of reality exists. Another quote from Aristotle backing this point says, “If we do not perceive anything, we will not learn or understand anything, and whenever we think of anything we must at the same time think of an idea”. (Aristotle Barnes Pg 58). Man perceives facts. If one looks at a purple object and thinks this is purple he will most often be correct. However, if one says this is a purple rose, he has a greater chance of being incorrect. The color purple is a particular fact, easy to perceive (with the exception of those who are color blind), however the flower said to be a rose can be misperceived. Aristotle says a group of similar perceptions, or memories, turn into experiences, which are close to knowledge. Knowledge is achieved when we understand why the rose is purple or, in another words, why the experience occurred. (Aristotle Barnes Pg 58 - 60).

From such a radical conception of visual perception, Gibson (1979) expanded and evolved his theory of visual perception into the theory of information pickup by saying, “when vision is thought of as a perceptual system instead of as a channel for inputs for the brain, a new theory of perception considered as information pickup becomes possible” (p. 262). According to this information pickup theory, information does not have to be stored in memory because it is always available. What he argued, as opposed to the information processing view of cognition, is that information is not something that has to be processed, rather one that is provided and structured invariant within the environment to be used in activities. As such, his direct perception implies a new theory of cognition that is offered as a substitute for the theory of past experience, memory, and mental images.

Perception is in other words what you believe to be the truth, based on your past experiences and past conditioning.