President Harry Truman’s use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan during the Second World War is the most controversial decision in history. While it was an undoubtedly difficult decision, it was indeed necessary in order to end this six-year war that had ravaged the world. While many critics argue that the bomb was used primarily as an act of vengeance toward Japan, simplifying such a crucial moment in human history downplays the very real risk invading Japan posed to the United States. While avoiding strained relations with the other Allied countries, Truman had to assess the possible danger of the Soviet Union in a post-war world. Furthermore, the possibility of an arms race, the moral implications of using this …show more content…
This agreement signed in August 1943 and implemented in June 1944 stated, among other things, that the United States and Great Britain would never use this weapon against one another, use of this weapon against another country as well as informing another country of this weapon required mutual consent. The Soviet Union, while an Allied nation, is absent from this meeting and is not informed of this project mainly because of their “diplomatic, information, and espionage groups in the United States” indicating that they more than likely knew about it anyway. It is obvious by this point in the war that these two countries share a mutual distrust for one another which would continue for an extended period of time. By September, 1944, before Roosevelt’s death, the threat of a nuclear arms race and possible retaliation for the use of this weapon is already a point of concern. The Office of Scientific Research and Development’s memorandum to Secretary of War Henry Stimson outlines some of the dangers the United States and Great Britain face in continuing the secret development of this “art”. Realizing this technology in the hands of the Soviet Union or other countries, especially defeated enemies, would make highly populated cities especially vulnerable. They also concluded that there was a high possibility of a “major power, or former major power undertaking this development.” The threat of the Soviet Union or Germany developing this weapon was a
During World War II the war in Europe ended after the unconditional German surrender at General Eisenhower's Headquarters in Reims, France, May 7, 1945. "After the unconditional German surrender in Europe the war shifted to Asia and the Pacific. As the war continued against Japan the Allied forces captured islands such as Iwo Jima and Okinaawa close to Japan brought the Japanese homeland within range of naval and air attacks." (Dannen) On August 6, 1945, the city of Hiroshima was the target of the first atomic bomb used against civil population in history. On August 9, 1945, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb over the city of Nagasaki. In total,
Imagine yourself making the toughest decision in your life, whether sacrificing a million of our men and thousands of war ships and plans, verses several thousand of Japanese civilian populists. This decision was on the shoulder of Harry S. Truman, the United States President, who had to make this decision by deciding whether or not to drop a newly designed weapon. The atomic bomb was tested in the sands of New Mexico, where it proved to be very successful. Harry S. Truman made a very successful decision, because he wanted to end the war quickly, show others that the United States had power, and the retribution of Pearl Harbor.
In 1945, World War Two was coming to an end. Following Adolf Hitler’s suicide, and Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender on May 7, 1945, the war in Europe was finally over. The allies began began postwar planning for future, as well as establishment of post-war order and peace treaties issues. America’s war wasn’t done yet as they were still fighting Japan, eventually pushing them back to their main island. The Japanese’ plans of defending themselves was a group of final decisive battles on the Japanese mainland utilizing all people in Japan to fight to death against the Americans. Fearing costly land battles,
While Truman himself stated in an August 1945 radio address and further emphasized in his 1955 memoirs that the atomic bombs were dropped in order to “shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans” (Doc H), historians and government officials are split on the issue of the true motivations behind dropping the a-bombs. However, given his sour relationship with Stalin, it is clear that Truman intended the bomb to be used more than merely as an atomic weapon. When the Truman Administration made the decision to drop the atomic bombs, it was neither completely military or diplomatic. The decision was militaristic in that it tried to end the war with Japan in the most efficient manner possible, and was diplomatic in that it tried to prevent the Soviets from gaining too much
America’s use of the atomic bombs on the Japanese cities also opened the door to other countries challenging them through their own use of nuclear bombs. Many have criticized that the atomic bomb was an act of “muscle flexing” due to the sheer power and destruction caused by the decision to drop the two bombs. (Nicholls, 67). Not only were these bombs a demonstration of the power that these nuclear weapons had, but they were a testament of power that the United States now held. Never before had a country surrendered in war without first being invaded, so the decision to drop the bomb and Japan's subsequent surrender were extremely significant (Baldwin, 39). These bombings didn’t just impact the Japanese, but the whole world and gave way to
By then, the Soviet union was already in the process of creating their own weapons of mass destruction in order to prepare for The Cold War. America was determined to demonstrate that surrendering to the Soviet Union was not an option. As Donald Kagan states, "The bomb was dropped primarily for its effect not on Japan but on the Soviet Union. One, to force a Japanese surrender before the USSR came into the Far Eastern war, and two, to show under war conditions the power of the bomb. Only in this way could a policy of intimidation [of the Soviet Union] be successful" (Kagan, 1995). The detonation of these nuclear weapons would prove that America would not capitulate to a communist party. At the end of World War II, the relationship between the U.S and Soviet Union was badly compromised without much negotiations
During World War II (WWII), President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) organized a committee to advise him “on questions of policy relating to the study of nuclear fission” (Stimson 1947). This committee was involved of all aspects of the atomic project from whether
On August 7, 1945 the headline of the front page of the New York Times read: First Atomic Bomb Dropped on Japan; Missile is Equal to 20,000 Tons of TNT: Truman Warns Foe of a “Rain of Ruin.”1 Now the debate between historians on the question of whether Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb was correct or not had begun.
President Truman made the best decision he could have when he chose to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during WWII. When you ask any historian whether or not Truman was right to drop the atomic bomb, you’re asking one of the most debated questions among them. This may seem like it should have a simple yes or no answer, but if you look deeper than the surface level, you’ll see it’s a lot more complex than that. Some think he was wrong to drop the bomb, and morally he was. However when you put yourself in the shoes of a president protecting your country and look at the war from a political and strategic viewpoint, you begin to realize he was right for dropping the bomb.
The atomic policy against Japan was closely related to the fear of Soviet expansion in Asia. U.S. leaders were strongly conscious of Russia’s agreement at Yalta to join the war against Japan three months past Germany’s surrender on May 7, 1945 (Fogelman, 124). Among the U.S. invasion of Japan planned for November 1, 1945, U.S. officials were doubtful about the cooperative mission with Russia in which Russia would have power at the peace table. However, the successful detonation at Alamogordo had transformed everything. The bomb guaranteed that the U.S. no longer required Russian aid to win in the Pacific (Wainstock, 132).
President Harry Truman determined to release nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the optimum decision of circumstances that supported the surrender of Japan in World War 2. Many arguments will doubt the atomic bombs had made results any better. While, the other handful of individuals, supporting Truman’s authorization, have considerable justification. Toss away the reasons for disagreement and contemplate the motives that lead descending atomic bombs as the right choice of a weapon.
To fully examine the factors that led to the United States to drop an atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki, one can look at the event as a result of two major decisions. The first decision concerned the use of newly developed nuclear weapons in lieu of other military techniques to secure a timely Japanese surrender. The second decision was to use several of these weapons instead of only one. Although the Truman administration displayed little hesitation or ambivalence over the decision to use atomic weapons (Walker, 51), it is important to examine what factors contributed to these swift actions.
President Truman’s bravery in dropping the atomic bomb is and always will be one of the most significant events in American history. At the time of Truman coming into office, he had no previous knowledge of the making of the atomic bomb (Donovan, 1977, p.45). However, much focus was placed on using this bomb because of how much time and money had been put into the project (Donovan, 1977, p.45). A major figure who helped push President Truman to use the bomb was former President Roosevelt (Donovan, 1977, p.47). During his time with President Truman, he contributed to the master plan by having crews trained to attack Japan with atomic bombs (Donovan, 1977, p.47).
This would give the United States an advantage, but it also makes them look like they are dropping the bomb for the wrong reasons. By this time in the war the Soviet Union and the United States’ alliance was fading because they were almost competing for power. Vannevar Bush describes the bombs in his letter, to the secretary of war, to be “enormously powerful hydrogen bombs” that could bring danger in a global perspective (“The…” Document 1). Many of these same people believed that the Manhattan Project was creating weapons way too powerful to play with, but the United States hoped that using the atomic bomb would establish the idea that they were untouchable. Although this was discouraged, the diplomatic strategy was a part of the decision on dropping the atomic bomb on Japan. The Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, “estimated that possession of the bomb” is a huge advantage because it is a unique weapon (“The…” Document 7). He called this advantage a “royal straight flush” and said if America must plays their cards right the atomic bomb would be a major success (“The…” Document 7). This strategic play proved to other countries that the United States could not be pushed around, but “ The Russian Premier showed” no interest in the move that America made (“Truman Tells…”). This approach may have intimidated some countries, but not the
When President Harry S. Truman ordered the nuclear attack on Hiroshima on the 6th of August, 1945, most people were supportive of it because it ended the war before an invasion became necessary. Seventy two years since the first and last nuclear attacks, many 'traditionalist' historians still believe that Truman made the best possible decision in the given circumstances. However, in the 1960's, Truman's critics, who reinterpreted history began to believe that the bomb played no significant role in ending the war and was thus unnecessarily used. These revisionist historians have gone so far as to characterize the use of nuclear weapons as “the single greatest acts of terrorism in human history” (Awan, 16). On the other hand, traditionalists argue that the bomb was an important