In This Paper, First I Am Going To Introduce The Criterion

In his book, ‘Language, Truth and Logic’ (1936), A.J. Ayer reinforced the verification principle when he noted that since the existence of God cannot be rationally demonstrated, it is not even probable because the term ‘God’ is a metaphysical term referring to a transcendent being that cannot have any literal significance. Interestingly, Ayer also rejected atheistic and agnostic statements since any statement that includes ‘God’ is meaningless. Ayer argued that since claims about God cannot be contradicted, they are not significant propositions, they are neither true of false, but cannot be valid. He writes: “The notion of a being whose essential attributes are non-empirical is not an intelligible notion at all.” In order to understand the verification principle fully, the principle also subsequently rejects all statements that express unverifiable opinions including moral and ethical statements, historical statements, religious statements and emotional statements. Ayer maintained the view that those statements are all meaningless since they cannot be verified. Beliefs about life after death are also problematic because they suggest that we have a soul. This, however, is a metaphysical assertion beyond any form of empirical testing. (Ayer, 1952)

In this essay, I will take into account Russel and Coplestone's debate about the Metaphysical Argument. I will be arguing my opinion that Russel's view on the matter is right. First, I will briefly discuss both philosopher's take on the argument before I begin discussing my reasons for picking Russel. I will also take into consideration what someone taking Coplestone's side might respond to my opinions and defend myself.

The argument of whether God does or doesn’t exist has been a popular philosophical topic and everyday topic around the world for many centuries. It is a very important concept that philosophers have been trying to grasp since the beginning of philosophy. Anselm and Hume both have arguments that give us reasons to believe whether God exists or doesn’t exist. In this paper, I will venture into Anselm’s ontological argument, Hume’s contra-ontological argument, and objections to both of these arguments.

Many philosophers have provided their arguments for the existence of God. Their arguments are a priori or a posteriori. A posteriori is based on experience of how the world is. In which the Cosmological view of William L. Rowe comes from. This paper will show how Rowe took the cosmological argument and its principle of sufficient reason and failed to make it an established argument of the existence of God.

To have a belief in something is not to be mistaken as having knowledge of something, for these terms (belief and knowledge) are not to be seen as synonymous. This is further explored within the written philosophical work titled On Certainty by Ludwig Wittgenstien. This piece stands as a response to G.E. Moore’s written work “A Proof of The External World”. As way to justify that there is a world external of our sense, Moore uses his hand as a (sufficient) tool. This because he believes that what can be known through immediate sense experience is how one can acquire “commonsense” knowledge. To Moore, commonsense knowledge is knowledge that denies the possibility of doubt, which in turn lays down a foundation for all knowledge.

In this paper, I will discuss the truth-belief-justification conceptual analysis of knowledge, which I will refer to as TBJ, Gettier cases, and an example that refutes TBJ. Conceptual analysis is an analysis of a proposition P with given premises to acquire knowledge of that P. The truth-belief-justification analysis of knowledge fails to provide sufficient conditions for someone to possess knowledge. For a condition to be necessary, it has to be satisfied to have knowledge of a proposition. If a condition is sufficient, then the person x will have some information to know something about proposition P. Jointly sufficient conditions are conditions that all need to be satisfied together to have knowledge about some P. They are necessary and supposedly jointly sufficient, but Gettier cases prove that extra conditions on top of TBJ are required to be jointly sufficient.

Throughout this paper I will discuss the argument of Anselms ontological argument for the existence of god. His basis of his argument being an analytical breakdown for the reason fot gods exsistence. While also establishing that Anselms inferences found with his use of deduction and logical means to prove the existence of a higher being are indeed true. In addition I will defend Anselms argument by depicting other people’s objections against his argument. Specifically the argument made by Gaunilo, who disagreed with Anselms argument and tried to use logical reasoning to prove him wrong. Essentially, Gaunilo stated that Anselms use of deduction could be altered and used to prove the existence of any concept by simply using the similar notion that Anselm used to prove the existence of god.

Many philosophers and theologians have provided varying arguments for the existence of God. These arguments are either a priori, understood independent of worldly experience and observation (Ontological Argument), or a posteriori, dependent on experience and based on observations of how the world is (Cosmological and Teleological Arguments). This paper will focus on the Cosmological Argument, and show that its underlying principle, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, fails to establish it as a sound argument for the existence of God. To accomplish this, I will, first, define the Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason; then explain the argument, and how it is based on

Bonjour explores the moderate empiricist view of a priori reasoning as contrasted by the rationalist view of a priori reasoning. He first describes the moderate empiricist view as “a priori justification limited to the consequences of definitions or meanings” (Bonjour 78). This view of a priori reasoning points out that as long as we understand the definition of the concepts embedded in the proposition, then there is sufficient evidence for the claim to be justified. In addition, the moderate empiricist holds the view that all meaningful knowledge stems from our sensory experiences. The rationalist view on the other hand, depends less on the understanding of the concepts, and more on concrete evidence. The rationalist holds the view that a priori justification is achieved through reason rather than experience.

It is normal that the peruser will take the crucial proclamations upon confidence, similarly as he would take explanations concerning a law of electrical activity in the event that they were proclaimed by a Marconi or an Edison; and, taking the announcements upon confidence, that he will demonstrate their reality by following up on them without dread or delay. Each man or lady who does this will absolutely get rich; for the science thus connected is a correct science, and disappointment is outlandish. For the advantage, nonetheless, of the individuals who wish to examine philosophical speculations thus secure a coherent reason for confidence, I will here refer to specific experts.

Next, (ii) as indeterminism postulated that actualities exist in a wider sea of possibilities from which they are selected, and this sea exists somewhere

The arguments which question the validity of God's existence, have more than likely, persisted for over several centuries. However, amongst these arguments, questioning the existence of God, exist major arguments presented in the teleological and cosmological arguments. In “On Being an Atheist,” McCloskey (1968) sets out to reiterate his position as an atheist by offering counterarguments to specific theistic positions. Moreover, while contending his claim that the arguments which question the validity of the existence of God are fundamentally false and that without absolute proofs, people ought to dismiss the idea that there is an omniscient and omnipotent being. Likewise, he alleges that the major indicator of the non-existence

Religious language describes a way in which much of the writings, particularly that of the Christian Bible use a particular way or mode of language in order to present a message, teach certain doctrines, but most importantly for the prospective believer, and most troublesome for the philosopher or the scientist, metaphysical assertions. That is, claims about the truthful nature of reality. A problem, as it has been and continues to be, because religious beliefs are often presented with the challenge of meaning. The discussion has lead to four easily distinguishable positions over the spectrum from hardline verificationism to the more popular falsificationist series of

Skepticism about the external world is one of the most widely discussed arguments in the history of philosophy. Barry Stroud defines skepticism as the idea that we cannot have knowledge about the external world (Stroud, page 1). This conclusion is the result of Rene Descartes’ Dream Argument and has been a topic of discussion ever since. No matter how we attack the argument, it seems that we inevitably arrive at skepticism. In this paper, I will argue that the skeptical conclusion is true and why it seems to be compelling as a necessary condition for knowledge. I will describe the Dream Argument and take a look at Moore’s promising response to the conclusion as an inconsistent proof. In the end, Moore’s argument for evidence of an external world will fail to disprove the skeptical conclusion due to its lack of justified belief. Although I am intuitively inclined to deny the skeptical argument, I cannot logically do so but will argue against full-blown skepticism and explain how mild skepticism is a more approachable route to knowledge.

In Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963) Edmund Gettier challenged the classical analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, showing cases where a justified true belief was held but knowledge wasn’t. In his cases luck correlates the belief with truth, not justification. If this analysis is correct, then justified true belief ≠ knowledge. In what follows, section-one will outline the classical analysis of knowledge and Gettier’s challenge to it. Then I will explore two respective proposals in response to this challenge: section-two, Lehrer and Paxson’s No-Defeaters approach (ND); section-three, Goldman’s Appropriate Causality Proposal (ACP). Concluding both limit knowledge too strictly to be full accounts of knowledge; raising further problems needing resolving. ND implies we know very little by due to subjunctive conditionals. ACP limits knowledge to a causal relation, thereby denying the internal account of knowledge and necessitating a further reliability condition. Ultimately, both raise unanswered questions on the limit of knowledge and to what degree any justification condition applies.