Indiscernibility Of Identicals

Shared identity – when two or more people have the same characteristics, for example: name, height, eye colour, date of birth.

Identity is a group of characteristics, data or information that belongs exactly to one person or a group of people and that make it possible to establish differences between them. The consciousness that people have about themselves is part of their identity as well as what makes them unique. According to psychologists, identity is a consistent definition of one’s self as a unique individual, in terms of role, attitudes, beliefs and aspirations. Identity tries to define who people are, what they are, where they go or what they want to be or to do. Identity could depend on self-knowledge, self-esteem, or the ability of individuals to achieve their goals. Through self-analysis people can define who they are and who the people around them

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

In John Perry's A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Gretchen Weirob argues that an individual has different character traits that split that person into diverse identities, no one is simple and he or she may have a complex identity. A person who experiences false memory may not be the same person Gretchen makes a careful distinction between two types of identities; these are the numerical and qualitative identities. The writer declares the former to be the identity and the later as the exact similarity. Same body same soul does not necessarily mean it resides in one person. I am numerically identical to myself. The same body could be equated to being numerically identical to oneself, for instance as they could be two and both of them boys, but in essence, they are still two people.

For example, fire and snow are not themselves opposites, but fire always brings hot with it, and snow always brings cold with it. So fire will not become cold without ceasing to be fire, nor will snow become hot without ceasing to be snow. (103c-105b)

Identity is anything that can provide us with a way of answering what we are. I believe that there is a core basis of

What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind.

Identity refers to “a relation that everything has to itself and to no other thing”, and our perception of personal identity is the knowledge that we are ourselves, and who we have been – basically, that I am the same person I was last week, last year, etc. Leibniz’s Law states that if one thing (A) is identical to another (B) at one given point in time, they share the exact same properties, making them the same, one thing (A = B).

2. The model always remained distinguishable from the reality it claimed to represent: Model was always a copy of the original

Identity-“Ones personal qualities.”Identiy is something only he or she can fully define. My uncle says I am affectionate,cheerful, and calm. My grandmother sees me as slim, pretty and sweet. My dad described me as perky, cheerful and happy, my mom says beautiful, gentle, and self-conscious. These adjectives describe me accurately, yet they are only abstract versions of me. Adjectives cannot begin to describe me and I aknowlege these descriptions for what they are, a condensed translation from my outward self to the world. It is impossible for anyone to understand me completely because nobody has experienced the things I have. My mother has never cherished a raggedy doll named Katie and my father never

Churchland breaks it down to this: if mental states are identical all to brain states then when you observe you mental states you are also observing the brain state which is identical. Churchland states, “ I may not describe my mental state as a brain state but whether I do depends on what information I have about the brain, not upon whether the mental state really is identical to some brain state . The identity can be a fact about the world independently of my knowledge that is a fact about the world” (Churchland, 2).She gives the following example “ Jones swallows an aspirin, he thereby swallows acetylsalicylic acid, whether or not he thought” in other words “identities may obtain even when we have not discovered that they do”(Churchland, 2).

In philosophy, the issue of personal identity concerns the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time. An analysis of personal identity

Plutarch brings up the question of bodily identity and numerical identity in Theseus. Theseus’ ship needs repairs and so he begins to replace the old parts, piece by piece, building an additional ship with the old pieces. In the end he has two ships, one old and one new. Both have the same function, and form, and are therefore qualitatively identical, however the question

Leibniz’s law of identity states that mental and physical states are not identical, and cannot be the same entity because they do not share the same traits. The notion of sameness(considered Leibniz’s law) serves to present a case where if A equals B, then A and B share all the same properties. Even

Many people question themselves, what is it exactly that makes them unique? What is it that defines them as a unique person that no one in the world possesses? In philosophy, these questions do not have just one answer, and all answers are correct depending on which theory appeals most and makes sense to you. In general, there are two ways people approach this question, some say that a person’s identity is the “self” that carries all of their experiences, thoughts, memories, and consciousness (ego theorists), and some say that a person’s identity is just a bundle of experiences and events that a person has been through in their life, these people deny that the “self” exists (bundle theorists). In this paper, I will be arguing that a person’s identity is just a bundle of experiences, denying the self and the memory criterion.