Introduction According to a white paper conducted by the Intelligence Committee of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), both law enforcement and intelligence organizations recognize the need to collaborate, share, and exchange information. However, the events leading up to 9/11 document how the legal and artificial boundaries between them created a serious impediment to protecting the country. First this paper will discuss some of the reasoning and initiatives behind the development of information sharing between the Intelligence Community (IC) and law enforcement agencies; and this paper will also discuss the similarities and difference between Title 50 United States Code (U.S.C.) intelligence activities to law enforcement information gathering/sharing. Apparently, the consensus is that, the IC and the law enforcement agencies need to share more information, that include operational strategies and tactics—especially those focused on transnational issues such as terrorism, drugs, counterintelligence, and weapons of mass destruction—needed to be better integrated. In hopes of improving information sharing between the IC and law enforcement agencies, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), and also established a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The position of DNI replaced the Director of the Central Intelligence (DCI) as the senior intelligence official, head of the
While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one, centralized agency, securing the homeland involves the cooperation and collaboration of many, different agencies and organizations ranging from local law enforcement to national agencies such as the NSA, CIA, and FBI. Each of these agencies contributes to the development of homeland security intelligence. By carefully analyzing and commenting on the objectives, tasks, strengths, weaknesses, and roles of each agency, a larger picture emerges regarding the capabilities and limitation of intelligence in supporting homeland security efforts.
Counterintelligence is one of the most vital areas of the United States intelligence system, and is heavily intertwined with our history, laws and ethics. According to the National Security Act of 1947, counterintelligence (CI) is defined as “information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.” It consists of five activities and functions: operations, investigations, collection, analysis and production, and functional services. In this aspect, CI is unique in that it is both an activity and its product. U.S. intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collect and analyze both CI information and foreign intelligence. There are many counterintelligence activities that the United States is involved in, as both CI and foreign intelligence play an important role in countering threats to our country’s national security. Among these most controversial and misunderstood activities are counterespionage and disinformation.
In 1974 when President Truman signed the National Security Act, which recognized the intelligence community and required congress be “fully informed”. In 1956 President D. Eisenhower establishes the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to counsel the White House on the quality and adequacy of intelligence. 1976 President Ford establishes the Intelligence Oversight Board to advise the President of the legality of intelligence activities. 1977 The House of Representatives establishes the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It was not intel 1991 that congress passed the Intelligence Authorization Act, requiring the President to inform congress in writing of all covert actions undertaken by the CIA. Then the attacks of 9/11 happened and in July 2004 the 9/11 Commission released a public report of approximately 40 suggested reforms, several of which were to improve Congressional oversight of intelligence activities. The committee also stated that congress was most responsible and their dysfunctional oversight of intelligence was always dependent on newspaper headlines. This leads to January 2007 when the House responds to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations by establishing the House Appropriations Select Intelligence Oversight
Congress built upon the reforms of the 1970s by passing the Intelligence Oversight Act in 1980. This Act was an amendment to the Hughes-Ryan Act and obligated the IC to report covert actions to both the SSCI and the HPSCI prior to their implementation, unlike the ambiguous previous requirement of a timely manner. The Intelligence Oversight Act was noteworthy in that it constrained the intelligence community more than any previous legislation (Riley 2010). The two biggest shortfalls I see to the system is the number of contributors there are to the system on such a large scale. When I think about all of the redundancy built within the system, I think about all of the possible breakdown in communications that could take place. The second shortfall I see is the legislative leverage that is held over the Intelligence community. I personally believe this to be a mistake because this power could be held in a negative manner and to gain a political stance or agenda. The Congress can withhold money and resources, can leak information to the media and which could cause a mission or operation to
The position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The position of DNI replaced the Director of the Central Intelligence (DCI) as the senior intelligence official, head of the intelligence community’s 16 agencies, and principal intelligence advisor to the President of the United States (POTUS) and the National Security Council (NSC). The IRTPA of 2004, also established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as an independent agency to assist the DNI. The ODNI 's goal is to effectively integrate foreign, military and domestic intelligence in defense of the homeland and of United States interests abroad.
Congress has for a long time has tried in various ways to oversee the intelligence community which have shown to be sometime controversial, and a very difficult responsibility. What make this task so hard is the secrecy and sensitivity intelligence information finding, the sources, and the methods in which the information is obtain. Congressional oversight has evolved since the mid-1970s and a lot more since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. The critics about Congressional oversight by some as being inadequate, ineffective, or worse, while at the same time proposal that was made in the 9/11 commission report was met with challenges from within the Legislature Branch and from the Executive Branch
“Prior to September 11th intelligence agencies and law enforcement failed to communicate with each other about terrorist hijackers… This lack of communications had its roots deep in the culture of government… Fortunately, in the Patriot Act, congress began to tear down the walls that cut off communication between intelligence and law enforcement officials” (Gerdes 36)
The 1776 united States of America Declaration of Independence contain the words that succinctly describe our national objective, strategy, and message, “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” In today’s United States of America, the world acknowledges American’s as the preeminent owner of individual freedoms, holding and promoting these three basic principles for some 240 years. During these years, the U.S. has employed the use of intelligence to shape its objectives and strategies, and then in times of war used the same intelligence to shape strategic messages against foreign powers. However, as hostilities decline and give way to the restoration of relative peace, the use of intelligence for strategic messages against foreign powers ceases. Under these circumstances, the void created by secession of U.S. messages, provides a communication opportunity to foreign powers for transmission of anti-U.S. messages. Attempts have been made to reinstate the offices that during war countered these anti-U.S. messages to a comprehensive reorganization of the U.S Government intelligence community. This paper does not support creation of a new agency or department to utilize existing strategic intelligence.
Since 2010, integration has been the vanguard initiative of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). This initiative has been successful in several areas to include: the creation of National Intelligence Managers (NIM) for all primary geographic regions and functional areas; enhanced transparency; and the focus on the negative impacts of over classifying documents. However, not all efforts to integrate the intelligence community (IC) have been successful. For instance, the ODNI did not succeed at creating a comprehensive sharing environment, and has not fully integrated federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. Although, these failed areas of integration can be mitigated in the future through the appropriate initiatives taken by the ODNI.
The devastating events of 9/11 provided a forewarning to our country concerning the dangers of terrorism. However, it has created a particularly greater impact on the duties and standards expected of law enforcement agencies on all levels (local, state, and national). Law enforcement has begun implementing new tactics in an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks from threatening our national security. One aspect of policing in which terrorism has brought about is the process of information sharing between all levels of law enforcement. Our nation has also witnessed a change from traditional policing to that of a militarized one. Furthermore, after the incidents of September 11th, the
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks was among the agencies that associated the 9/11 attacks with lack of coordination among agencies (Best, 2015). This prompted the Congress to enact a legislation that established a centralized intelligence leadership, popular as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). However, the legislation only helped to increase tension between different agencies, especially on how to approach funding. The legislation was not clear regarding the boundaries between the activities of the DNI, and their interaction with the mainstream intelligence agencies. The congress debated these concerns and later established the framework for the working of the DNI and relationship with different intelligence agencies. Most importantly, this legislation focused on one element of reorganization, which was enhancing coordination of activities between different
The Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet had made the national intelligence budget classified prior to 9/11. The years prior to the classified budget had shown the budget to be around 26.6 billion dollars. In the 4 years after 9/11 the intelligence budget had been expanded to over 44 billion dollars (Shane, 2005). With more funds available for more personnel and technology, the intelligence community could produce more intelligence
The fusion centers and the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) are initiatives that were put forth and initiated by the Department of Homeland security in hopes of improving information sharing amongst both Federal, State, Local and tribal law enforcement agencies. The attacks of 9/11 proved that intelligence capabilities and willingness to share information lacked greatly. These programs were developed to hopefully counter that issue. The use of fusion cells started off with hesitation and complications initially. However, the use of fusion cells are absolutely critical to the sharing of information between agencies. “The goal is to fuse together lots of information into intelligence products that are useful to customer needs both at the federal and state/local levels. The Bush administration viewed the fusion centers as critical to information sharing, and they were a central component in the National Strategy for Information Sharing. The Strategy considers fusion centers to be “vital assets” that provide the federal government with critical information about state and local governments, while the state and local governments obtain information about terrorist-related threats” (Logan 2010). The ITACG along with the fusion cells started off with a few hiccups and has steadily improved overtime.
Rationale: This source has shown the document from the DHS on the subcommittee on intelligence, terrorism risk assessment, and information sharing between various different agencies. This
Intelligence collection and apprehension of criminals have occurred for many years; however, with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, these actions were performed by different organizations. Nonetheless, roles and responsibilities have changed since the attacks on September 11, 2001. Intelligence-led policing and the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing program were incorporated, and fusion centers were established to help gather intelligence from different levels of the government. Although law enforcement at the local, state, and tribal levels aid in intelligence collection, it is important to ensure that intelligence gathered to protect national security and law enforcement