Information Warfare: Marine Corps Research

The MOL system has transformed how the Marine Corps functions in many different ways. The IS has allowed the organization as a whole to reduce waste and streamline the data it collects to a central location. Requirements of the system have always been present within the organization until recently has not been reasonably attainable with the amount of employees within the organization. The ultimate drive of the system is unit readiness and the unit readiness is easily quantifiable within the system because the commanders within the Marine Corps have instant access to the information required to gauge it. Unit readiness is the ability to leave at a moments notice when called upon by the president or congress to deploy to a war zone. The type and basic uses of the system are some of the most essential parts of the IS. Without the basic use of this system the Marine Corps as a whole would be at a loss without the use of it. In essence the application of this system has changed the business processes of the Marine Corps as a whole.

Current capability set fielding along with future fielding 's including Bradley engineering change proposal (ECP), Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD), and full rate production (FRP) radio variants are the Army 's answer to brigade combat team modernization. The tactical environment is the tip of the spear, a challenging space where effectiveness, survivability, and sustainability provide the keys to success. That success is becoming increasingly reliant on data. Data drives our missions, from operations, intelligence, and fires, to other areas such as medical and logistics. Consumption of data is being fueled by the introduction of new communication systems. Warfighter information tactical (WIN-T) has begun to bring this data down to the Brigade and Battalion level with the Point of Presence (POP), and the Battalion and Company level with the Soldier Network Extension (SNE). New radio waveforms are providing conduits for data down to the tactical edge. WIN-T and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radios are being integrated into Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) vehicle platforms now. The Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) is just around the corner in FY17.

a. Your Specific Research Question: Is the Marine Corps is properly trained, manned and equipped to operate, fight and win against a near peer threat in a contested future information environment?

Starting the third week of CIS610 Information Warfare Class it I had a very good idea of what was expected of me as a student in this class. I was able to determine this based on the quick grading and excellent feedback provided on each of my assignments in week one and two. This allowed me to use this information to improve my work to better meet the expectation of the teacher. Along with this, going into the third week of class I felt as if I had gotten into a schedule which would work best for ensuring the completion of my assignments in an organized and timely fashion.

The EA-6B Prowler has been the Marine Corps’ electronic warfare platform since the 1971, serving in every major operation to include Vietnam, Desert Shield/Storm, and all post 9/11 conflicts. By the end of fiscal year 2019 (FY19) the Prowler will have flown its final mission and will be officially retired. There is no replacement or additional airframe being added to the fleet to serve in its electronic warfare role. The retirement of an airframe is never an uncomplicated or straightforward task, as we have seen in recent times with the sundown of the CH-46, however a large number of those Marines transitioned into the MV-22B. Unlike the CH-46 program, there is no clear transition path for members of the Prowler community, aircrew or

The overall business for the U.S. army is simply to fight and win the nations wars by using a full range of operational tactics. One domain which the Army relies upon is cyber. Without the ability to communicate across boarder and into dark areas of the world, the U.S. armed forces, to include the U.S. Army would be hard pressed when devising plans to win. However, to remain the superpower the world looks to during times of strife, organizations such as the Army must define the technological edge, and ensure the organization keeps upholds that standard. To fulfill the requirements associated with defining the edge, decision makers must remain aware of change. Unfortunately change happens, and requires a reevaluation to ensure the organization has not, or will not become stagnant. If events were to occur, the organization would no longer be able to define what it is to be on the edge of technology. Moreover, the organization could also easily find itself in a situation where it is hard pressed to devise the plans required to win.

During Operation Desert Storm, it became evident to the world that there was a new American way of war and it was arguably a new revolution in military warfare. First, it was the speed in which entire divisions could move so fast they consistently outmaneuvered the enemy. The speed and mobility in which the US military drove into the heart of enemy lines put the Blitzkrieg to shame. Complete air-superiority gave US commanders total command and control of the airspace and denied the Iraqi’s the ability to conduct their own ISR. Second, it was the new technological advancements in night-vision and thermal imaging that gave the US military the ability to truly “own the night.” Night vision and thermal imaging enabled tank commanders to see the heat signatures of Iraqi tanks hiding the desert in the middle of the night and kill them. The latest generation electro-optics attached to sniper scopes, helicopters, and special forces troops took the battle into the night to a level previously unseen in the history of warfare. In addition, advancements in global positioning systems for navigation, location tracking, and precision guided munitions. Never before has there been the ability of a military to drop bombs sometimes miles away and be remotely guided to their target with precise lethality. Enemy government buildings

With the ever-increasing rise in technological dependency for many military units, it is my strong belief that ADF members and contracting personnel, with their inadvertent tendencies to release information, is the greatest cyber threat to the ADF. Safety and battle worthiness of ADF units are key to insuring mission success (Gilson, 2007) and through various avenues of information gathering, other nations or parties have the ability to undermine the security of ADF units and operations (Wroe, 2016). This potential stems from ADF members having a great capacity to unwittingly leak information, due to higher stimulus of social media, nescience of information gathering procedures, as well as increasingly popular concepts such as Open Source Intelligence

I can’t agree more with your point that OPSEC is essential to defeat our adversaries in information warfare. We not only need to know our enemy’s capabilities but also our own. We have to acknowledge that we can’t rule of the possibilities of counter deception from our enemies. The less vulnerable we are, the harder for our enemies to attack our resources. Cyr argues These individuals must possess an intuitive sense and ability to function in an increasingly fast Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop. They will also have to rapidly combine their knowledge of the adversary (culture, values, modes of operation) with the real-time picture they receive from sensors in order to “convert information advantage to operational advantage.

The intelligence community has still not adapted to the non-traditional problem set. Threats evolve much faster than bureaucracies can ever hope to adapt. Doctrine is a mire and tradition clogs the wheels of the machine. Groundbreaking ideas are shouted down; intelligence operations are run “by the numbers.” On a personal note, as a senior intelligence NCO and acting intelligence officer with multiple tours in Special Operations, I have made a career out of breaking training exercises in garrison, with our troops meeting all commander’s requirements and desired end-states several days early, by re-tooling doctrine and reconfiguring intelligence products and procedures to meet idiosyncratic and “unsolvable” problem sets. In so doing,

During World War 2 what was once thought be only be an enabler that the British and US would utilize both Germany and Japan began to utilize Electronic Warfare as a means to target Allied Forces During the beginning of World War 2 The Wehrmacht (Nazi German Defense Forces) prior to the beginning of WWII consisted of three branches. The Heer (Army Ground Forces) which consisted of the Kriegsmarine (Navy) and the Luftwaffe (Airforce). The Wehrmacht from 1935-1945 is believed to have had over 18.2 million members total during the time frame across the military.

The uses of Information Operations during Operation Desert Storm, specifically Psychological Operations were used to influence the enemy’s moral as well as influence the way the enemy approached the coalition forces. What was important during these operations was the way the enemy was engaged with the PSYOP operations, from leaflets being dropped as well as loud speakers being used to spread pre-recorded messages. Reaching the enemy through these means was a way to ensure that the enemy’s moral was diminished greatly to enable coalition forces operations against the Iraqi military.

This open source report, prepared by the Program on Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Studies Program Manager Susan Stipanovich, aims to detail an historical analysis of the Taliban and Al Qaeda using unconventional warfare against civilians in Afghanistan.

Do not give out your credit card information!” The first word my brother told me when I

According to Milan Vego in, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice, he defined Operational Art as, “a component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic or operational objectives in a given theater.” (p. I-4) Even though I am not in the business of defining the term Operational Art, I would still suggest amongst all of the various definitions that I have read this one definition by Vego appears to be practicable and serves its purpose well. For any military action, there must be planning, sustaining, executing of a mission such that theater objectives are met. In other words, a belligerents Center of Gravity must be identified through means of military and policy actions to obtain success.