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In this case, there are several conspirators who is involved in the fraud receiving punishment from either SEC or federal government. Robert Levin, the AMRE executive and major stockholder, and Dennie D.Brown, the company’s chief accounting officer, were subject to the punishment in the form of a huge amount of fine by the SEC and the federal government. This punishment came from reasons. After AMRE going public, the company have the obligation to publish its financial reports but its performance did not meet expectation. The investigation by SEC shows that Robert took the first step of this scam, fearing the sharp drop of AMRE’s stock price because of the poor performance of company. He abetted Brown, to practice three main schemes to present a false appearance of profitable and pleasant financial reports. Firstly, they instructed Walter W.Richardson, the company’s vice president of data processing, to enter fictitious unset leads in the lead bank and they originally deferred the advertising cost mutiplying “cost per lead” and “unset leads” amount, so that they deferred a portion of its advertising costs in an asset account. The capitalizing of advertising expenses allowed them to inflate the net income for the first quarter of fiscal 1988. Secondly, at the end of the third and fourth quarters of fiscal 1988, they added fictitious inventory to AMRE’s ending inventory records, and prepared bogus inventory count sheets for the auditors. Thirdly, they overstated the percentage

First and foremost, the accounting system used should be updated. The case stated that the system was 30 years old and that prior accounting period transactions could not be locked down, which enabled internal control processes to be bypassed. Enhancing internal

The organizational structure of Phar-Mor was ineffective and lacked many control activities including: segregation of duties, authorization, documentary and IT controls. As a result, Phar-Mor’s president had a stronghold on certain upper level management and executives which gave him the opportunity to control the fraud and hide it from other members of the organization and supposedly Phar-Mor’s auditors, Coopers and Lybrand LLP.

Although the dollar amount of the stolen components may not be a significant percentage of CIT’s net income such fraud has a ripple effect for the organization. The type of fraud that occurred at CIT is misappropriation of assets; this results in incorrect financial statements and in turn lead to incorrect publication of earning and annual report, as CIT is a public company.

Stephen Richards’s actions were extremely serious; manipulating Computer Associates’ quarter end cutoff to align CA’s reported financial results with market expectations by violating the generally accepted accounting principles and their financial reporting responsibilities. According to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Richards with other CA executives extended CA’s fiscal quarter, “ instructed and allowed subordinates to negotiate and obtain contracts after quarter end while knowing, or recklessly disregarding the fact that, CA would improperly recognize the revenue from those contracts, and failed to alert CA’s Finance or Sales Accounting Department that CA salespersons

This $490 million came from the netting manipulation when they offset their expenses with unrelated gains on the sale of assets. The geography manipulation allowed them to move millions of dollars to different sections of the income statement to “make the financials look the way we want to show them” said James Koenig, one of the primary forces behind the scandal. However, none of the fraudulent activities would have gone unknown for so long without the aid of the auditors, Arthur Anderson LLP, involved with Waste Management.

The one pattern within the data that appears to be inconsistent yet if the auditors had established an internal control systems would be Monus the founder moving so freely throughout every aspect of the company with no one checking his movements. From choosing what properties to purchase to purchasing supplies. In any company there should be segregation of duties. For example, the person making the deposits should not be the person writing the checks. Had there been stipulations made it would not have been so convenient to commit the

) There was a lack of adequate cut-off procedures to ensure the timely recording of certain period-end accruals. This resulted in an audit adjustment of $3,578,000. The benchmark for overall materiality is $3,508,000, I would consider the audit adjustment of $3,578,000 a material misstatement. Control environment, principle 2 the board of directors and management exercise oversight of development and performance of internal controls. Due to the severity and material weakness of lack of adequate cutoff procedures to ensure timely recording of period end accruals. Management and the board of directors should evaluate performance of internal control activities including adherence to standards of conduct and expected levels of competence. In

Because of its inherent limitations, internal control over financial reporting may not prevent or detect misstatements. Also, projections of any evaluation of effectiveness to future periods are subject to the risk that controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate (Louwers & Reynolds, 2007). We believe that the audit evidence obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a reasonable basis for our opinions.

The stakeholders in this fraudulent case of WorldCom consist of Bernie Ebbers, Scott Sullivan, Buford Yates, David Myers, Cynthia Cooper, and Betty Vinson belong to the company. While the other stakeholders would consist of the creditors, Andersen (accounting firm), investors, and the public. This fraudulent act committed within WorldCom impacted every single stakeholder in a way. Either in a negative or positive way, most of the impact was caused with harm to everyone. The main individuals such as Ebbers, Sullivan, and Vinson all had major consequences as resulting with the fraud. Criminal trials were a major result with their fraudulent acts within WorldCom. Cooper was a lifesaver by most of the community. Aside from these individuals, the rest also got affected by the fraud. Investments conducted by the investors were all lost within the fraud process. The impact towards much of the image for Andersen was ruined. Many of the public lost their trust on the honesty and professionalism of Andersen and other certified public accounting firms. The entire employees from the top management to the smaller group of workers stayed unemployed and some with criminal punishment.

Tom Padgett made the confirmations and management provided the paperwork, yet all the sources were involved in the fraud.

There are various procedures that could be taken in to account that would, if properly implemented, would have detected the frauds that occurred within the companies. There are many control risks that should have been taking regarding inventory along with preliminary audit strategies for the inventory and substantive test to be done that would have raised many flags during the typical audits as well as in depth ones.

The auditing firm has been in engagement with the company throughout the period when the fraud was being committed. One of the common and clear indicators of possible fraud was the company’s cash flow statement. The company experienced positive growth in its profits from the year 1996 through to the year 1998. However, a close analysis of the cash flow statement shows that the company had experienced negative figures of cash flow from both operating and investing activities and positive cash flow from financing activities which would not sufficiently offset the negative cash flows from operating and investing. It is therefore evident

Cendant filed suit against accounting firm Ernst & Young, who had been CUC's accountants at the time, claiming that the firm knew about the discrepancies and failed to report the wrongdoing.

One of the first things that could have been done was set the standards at the top level of the company. A good business practice that embodies the values of its customers, shareholders, and its employees is a good place to start. Upright code of ethics and conduct, set of structured policies and procedures, proper internal control as they were a software company, an accounting team that are true to their practices are all things that can be implemented to avoid further fraudulent