Investigating The Nine Aspects Of The Research Articles

There are three internal and one external governance mechanisms used for owners to govern managers to ensure they comply with their responsibility to satisfy stakeholders and shareholder’s needs. First, ownership concentration is stated as the number of large-block shareholders and the total percentage of the shares they own (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, 2017, p. 317). Second, the board of directors which are elected by the shareholders. Their primary duty is to act in the owner’s best interest and to monitor and control the businesses top-level managers (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, 2017, p. 319). Third, is the

Common stockholders are the basic owners of a corporation, but few stockholders of large corporations take an active role in management. Instead, they elect the corporation’s board of directors to represent their interests. Board members seldom get involved in the day-to-day management of the company. They establish the basic mission and goals of the corporation and appoint

Recent high-profile corporate failures, scandals and, in some cases, executive corruption, have focused international regulatory and public attention on the need for having appropriate corporate governance standards and practices. (Leblanc 2005) As such, much emphasis is being placed on board evaluation.

As Canadian Coalition for Good Corporate Governance indicates that the good governance of a corporation is essential to creating long-term sustainable value and reducing investment risk. In other words, the high quality performance of board directors plays a key role in the success of a corporation. We evaluate it based

People often question whether corporate boards matter because their day-today impact is difficult to observe. But, when things go wrong, they can become the center of attention. Certainly this was true of the Enron, Worldcom, and Parmalat scandals. The directors of Enron and Worldcom, in particular, were held liable for the fraud that occurred: Enron directors had to pay $168 million to investor plaintiffs, of which $13 million was out of pocket (not covered by insurance); and Worldcom directors had to pay $36 million, of which $18 million was out of pocket. As a consequence of these scandals and ongoing concerns about corporate governance, boards have been at the center of the policy

To the extent of prevention of corporate failure, I argue that three ASX principles and recommendations could halt the demise of Dick Smith. Firstly, the 2nd principle which is “Structure the board to add value” by structuring the board with a majority of independent directors would prevent CEO dominance because some suggest that independent outside directors can reduce the influence of dominant individuals (ASX, 2014, p. 17). In accordance with Gallagher and Bennie (2015, p. 20), the independent directors are likely to focus on the company’s objectives and not to make decision relying on others. Furthermore, an addressing of independent directors would reduce the reliance on management, and create the effectiveness on monitoring (Dechow et al. 1996 cited in Christensen, Kent, and Stewart (2010)), as well as capability to lessen the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Hardjo & Alireza, 2012, p. 4). Thus, DSE’s board would be more active to monitor the CEO’s performances because independent directors pay attentions to the interest of company (Gallagher & Bennie, 2015, p. 20) and shareholders (Hardjo & Alireza, 2012, p. 4)

In large corporations the success or failure of the company is the responsibility of the board of directors. According to Richard DeGeorge, “The members of the board are responsible to the shareholders for the selection of honest, effective managers, and especially for the selection for the CEO and of the president of the corporation.” (p. 202). The board members have a moral responsibility to ensure the corporation is run honestly, in respect to its major policies, and to ensure the interests of the shareholders are satisfied. The next responsibility within a corporation is the responsibility management has to its board of directors. DeGeorge writes, “It must inform the board of its actions, the decisions it makes or the decisions to be made, the financial condition of the firm, its successes and failures, and the like.” (p. 202). The management of the corporation is morally obligated to

* The roles and responsibilities of the board of directors in corporate governance and the way the board affects a company’s operation.

This paper analyzes the team effectiveness of the IPO board using a list of 10 performance measures for evaluation, 3 quantitative and 7 qualitative, taken from various academic and industry sources. The paper also identifies a number of important dynamics which contribute to IPO’s success and offers

This paper analyzes the team effectiveness of the IPO board using a list of 10 performance measures for evaluation, taken from various academic and industry sources. The paper also shows several important dynamics which contribute to IPO’s success and offers suggestions to improve the orchestra’s board

Boards members rarely have an understanding of key enterprise strategies or risks. They have no clear sense of their companies’ prospects 5 to 10 years down the road. They have limited time, lack of industry specific expertise and different definitions of success that prevent them from successfully performing

Coyle (2014) notes that the composition of the Board of Directors is dependent on the size of the company. The board is normally composed of a chairman, the Chief Executive Officer, a Senior Independent Director, executive directors and non-executive directors (NEDs).

Public debate regarding corporate governance issues tends to focus on one primary topic at a time, depending on the dictates of current events. Classified boards, “overboarding,” director compensation, risk management—the attention of the corporate governance community has been focused on each

Following a systematic literature search, data from 20 studies on 3097 companies published in peer-reviewed academic journals were included in the meta-analysis. On average, the boards consisted of eight members and female participation was low (mean 14%) in all studies. Half of the 20 studies were based on data from developing countries and 62% from higher income countries. According to the random-effects model, the overall mean weighted correlation between percentage of females on corporate boards and firm performance was small and non-significant (r = .01, 95% confidence interval: -.04, .07). Similar small effect sizes were observed when comparing studies based on developing vs. developed countries and higher vs. lower income countries.

There is extensive research on board composition and the importance it places on different aspects of organisation performance. (Kang H, et al 2007).