Ipa Cheat Sheet

Issues from the linkage institutions do not always make it to the policymaking system because if it did not get much attention from the people it would not be considered. Because interest groups and political parties sometimes are based off particular issues, they are not always apart of the government’s agenda.

Political structures are defined as the formal or informal political procedures through which decisions are made regarding the usage, production and distribution of resources in any given community. Formal political structures through its organizations can control processes such as election of leaders; parts and tasks of the executive and administration; organization of political representation (through political parties); and the obligation and oversight of the state. Informal and communal political structures, customs and rules can work within or together with the formal political organizations. In development, democratic political structures are seen to deliver prospects for all without discrimination (Scott & Mcloughlin, 2014).

The political and administrative arms of government could be identified as the power structures described within the case study. The political arm being responsible for the legislation and the administrative arm for advice and implementation. Without these power structures the impacts of the legislation may never have arisen. The issue is both an individual and societal problem, due to culture, behaviour and norms that have allowed these problems to arise and grow. The societal aspect is the bigger influencer here

The Phenomena we’re trying to address will be encapsulated by the term ‘Institutional Inaction’. Formally, a case of ‘Institutional Inaction’ is found any time an institution decides to not speak, not learn, not publicize, all with the intention of improving or maintaining the standing, prestige, or funding of the group. It rests a great deal upon the assumptions of a ‘Bureaucratic Politics Model’, which posits that states are not unitary actors, but instead, that their myriad institutions vie for funding and clout in order to carry out their adopted objectives. Institutional Inaction 's closest relative is ‘Bullshit’ of the Frankfurt variety – the objective of such inaction is not necessarily related to any

In the reading, Krasner argues that many of the institutions that have been put into place to ensure that these nations prosper are aiding in the issues that these countries possess. The two institutions that are primarily used as policy tools for dealing with these states are governance assistance and transitional administration.

By merely glancing at the political systems across the world, it becomes clear that politics and the economy are inextricably tied. Both are institutions that maintain some sort of balance between freedom and equality, and both are associated with a variety of ideologies regarding what the best balance is (O’Neil 2013, 101 & 112). We often see how politics and economics influence each other, with policy focusing on economic regulation, and a country’s economy reflecting how well the state can operate.

These institutions are not central governments that rule above the states and it will not stop states to wage war against one another. Cheating and relative gains prevents states from cooperation and it will be the cause of the downfall of the neo-liberal order (Grieco, 1988).

In most countries of the world national authority and power are assigned to various individuals and groups through politics, usually through compromises between conflicting interests.

The central thesis of AR in their book “Why Nations Fail” is that inclusive economic and political institutions drives economic growth and prosperity. Extractive institutions, on the other hand, where the majority work for the benefit of the few impedes and sometimes block economic prosperity. The other part to the theory is that inclusive economic and political institutions are often the outcome of conflict between elites resisting economic growth and political change and those working to put limits and constrains on the economic and political power of existing ruling elites.

The primary characteristic distinguishing the contemporary international system from past international systems, and contributing to its description as a multipolar system, is the extensive role played by non-state actors. Polarity in the international system is identified on the basis of how many states hold economic, military, and cultural influence, with

Political factors Alternately how and to what degree a legislature mediates in the economy. In particular, political components incorporate ranges, for example, charge approach, work law, ecological law, exchange limitations, levies, and political security. Political components might likewise incorporate merchandise and administrations which the administration needs to give or be given (legitimacy products) and those that the legislature would not like to be given (products and terrible). Moreover, governments have awesome impact on the wellbeing, training, and framework of a country.

*At the center of the debate over the occurrence of the resource curse also lies the importance of the role of institutions in promoting economic growth and maintaining high-quality governance. If institutions are not strong enough to oversee ownership, profit taking and resolution of grievances, the rapid flow of resource rents can quickly overwhelm the government’s ability to exert

In this sense, another gap in the literature is that its emphasis on International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and policy-makers, what I call "top actors" and their impact on the initiation of the reform. On the other hand, a limited literature alludes the presence but inefficiency of the representative of the disadvantaged groups what I call "bottom actors" i.e., labor unions (Baccaro and Howell 2011; Culpepper and Regan 2014; Gulec 2016; Konstantinos and Ghellab 2014; Sarfati and Ghellab 2012; Vuković and Babović 2014). The present paper contributes the literature by fulfilling these two gaps. It focuses on the dynamics of policy-making processes, as the second step of Hall's formula. Beyond making implications, this paper examines the causes of the implied inefficiency of the bottom actors and argues that their inefficiency originates from meta-governance within policy networks (Bell and Park 2006; Jessop 1997; Scharpf 1994; Whitehead 2003). States which have a centralized authority and a statist legacy are more likely to refuse to share their power in the traditional models. They more tend to use policy networks as a mask of their continued meta-governance and even as a means to legitimize the criticized policy decisions made under their dominance. Policy network approach through the measures of Social Network Analysis (SNA) is an efficient way

The ABSM performs political analysis void of the wider historical and societal processes, assuming that bias would be accounted in the deliberation process between stakeholders. This indicates the centrality of the state and society complex. Yet it also fails to account for the extension beyond state and society, as Gill and Law point out “political rule is circumscribed by the problems of legitimation, mobilization, and communication in political time and space. Thus, capital as a social relation depends on the power of the state to define, shape and participate in a regime of accumulation” (Gill and Law: 480). In saying this, Gill and Law indicate the centrality of the global reach of economic activity within the socially territorially specific aspects of political rule, but more importantly introduce capital as a social relation to indicate the stark contrast between those with privileged ownership or control of capital in contrast to the remainder of society (Gill and Law: 1989). If capital is a social relation depends on the power of the state to define its participation in a regime, this illustrates an inherent contradiction in the democratic process. Then, the ABSM fails to account for the inner and outer functioning of a complex whole – it fails to understand Oscar Wilde’s observation – ‘the pure and simple truth is rarely pure and never simple’ (Wilde: 1989).

‘No man [or woman] is an island’ is a sentence that captures humanity’s need for interaction in order to secure its best interests. In the context of international trade, supranational structures are necessary for all parties’ best interests. With globalisation proceeding at an ever increasing pace, the frequencies and magnitudes of economic interactions between actors of different states increases exponentially (Nye, 298). Growing complex interdependence creates a common interest for cooperation, in terms of pursuing a common framework of regulation and establishing a common standard (Nye, 299-301). As such, this begs the question of how the above can be implemented and achieved. International organisations, agreements and governance is the functionalist answer to the above question (Rourke, 165), even under the framework in which states only consider self-interests. Throughout the course of time, these instruments have grown in number and complexity. Examples of their more rudimentary forms are the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU), which were both established more than one and a half centuries ago, providing a common technical standard among states (Rourke, 137). In the past century, more sophisticated forms of international governance in political economy evolved. For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round in 1996 established the current World Trade Organisation (WTO) and an elaborate