Iran Case Study

There are seven key points in this nuclear deal: Iran has to reduce their centrifuges, reduce their uranium enrichments, they can’t over produce anything nuclear for at least two months, their Fordow Facility has to stop producing uranium for fifteen years, they can keep doing research and development but can only do it with a break of three months, they will have inspection by the U.N., and we have to lift our sanctions that we have on Iran. President Barrack Obama said this deal, “is not built on trust, it is built on verification.” (Cato Institute 1/3) This applies to the quote by Barrack Obama wanting to make history. He wants to ensure the safety on America by declining the top producing nuclear war-heads country in the world, their production of nukes. President Obama will go into the books by already stopping a future nuclear

Since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), or Iran Deal, was signed in Vienna on July 14, 2015, there widespread debate as to whether the agreement would benefit both sides of the pact. Due to the numerous amount of steps taken to ensure Iran’s compliance, the accord between Iran China, France, Russia, the U.K, the U.S, Germany and the EU (P5+1+ Eu countries) provides both sides with comfortable allowances that allow each state to thrive. Though highly contested, as demonstrated from the varying opinions in the supplied articles, the JCPOA solidified the deconstruction of Iran’s uranium enrichment program, which is one of the hardest objectives to achieve in the field of international relations. As shown by the world’s quandary

In recent times a critical point of conflict is the US sanctions imposed on Iran. The key recent financial sanctions in place against Iran include: the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA); the USA PATRIOT Act money laundering designation of 2011; the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA); the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA); and the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 (Carter & Farha, 2013, p. 320).

The article, written by David Sanger and Michael Gordon from The New York Times on August 23, highlights main controversies about Iran-US nuclear agreement. After months of negotiations between USA and Iran, the deal is waiting to be approved by Congress. However, there are many points of debate regarding the approval of this pact. The main point of polemic is the capacity of Iran to produce nuclear weapons after 15 years, when the agreement is supposed to end. Many people, like the Democrat Representative Adam B. Schiff from California, agree Iran would “have a highly modern and internationally legitimized enrichment capability” (Gordon & Sanger, 2015). Others argue in favor of the agreement because, as R. Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of

They commended the parties for finding value and diplomacy and for seeking peaceful political solutions. However strenuous it may seem, that was evident in July, when the parties agreed to extend the period of the negotiations for another four months to give themselves more time to close the underlying gaps. They have continued the talks on P5+1 Iran’s nuclear program. The representatives of those countries are negotiating a comprehensive plan of action that, once implemented, would ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. They seek to finalize such arrangements by 24 November of this year. Hopefully the negotiation goes well. In the meantime, the Council and its Iran Sanctions Committee must ensure the continued implementation of United Nations sanctions. We have been troubled to hear reports of confusion as to whether the sanctions remain in effect during the period of negotiations. Although the P5+1 offered Iran some limited and reversible sanctions relief as part of the joint plan of action, the plan included no changes to United Nations sanctions. The role of the 1737 Committee in support of the P5+1 process is vital to its success. We agree with the Chair that only the Security Council itself can alter the sanctions measures applied by the

When the deal was signed on July 14, 2015, it successfully achieved the limitation the aforementioned threats, as Iran will have no nuclear weapons and be subject to intense U.N oversight for at least ten years. This oversight, sanctioned by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), consists of stringent daily facility and centrifuge inspections, with a clause that states “the IAEA will have access where necessary, when necessary” (Chin and Lincy, Iran Watch). To quote President Barack Obama, the Iranian Deal “is not built on trust; it is built on verification” (Chin and Lincy, Iran Watch). Lifting sanctions placed on Iran in exchange for these allowances is not a difficult decision. A deal that restricts and checks enrichment, and also renders Iran a non nuclear- weapon possessing country is a good deal that allows states around the world to sigh a breath of relief.

Moreover, Iran will be able to access 100 billion dollars of assets that are frozen in overseas banks. However, if Iran violates the JCPOA there is a provision within the contract to implement the sanctions back on Iran. Consequently, the JCPOA international agreement was signed in Vienna on July 14, 2015 by Iran and the P5+1 nations. The Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid stated “A nuclear-armed Iran would pose the gravest imaginable threat to Israel. If America walks away from this agreement and loses the support of our allies in the sanctions regime, Iran could have enough fissile material to make a nuclear bomb in a matter of months. Iranian leaders have regularly stated that they intend to wipe Israel off the map and I believe those threats should be taken with the utmost seriousness. This agreement is the best way to prevent Iran’s leaders from obtaining the nuclear weapons that would empower them to follow through on their threats to Israel.” (U.S. Democratic Leader Harry Reid >> Reid Statement On The Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action.). Therefore, the majority of Democrats support the JCPOA and believe it is a better alternative to peace than using a military preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities (Joint Comprehensive Plan of

The plan has drawn bipartisan concern for many reasons, as of late the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing to address how Congress should respond to the JCPOA and what this plan means post implementation day. The hearing primarily focused on concerns that are resonating now with the JCPOA which entitle: ballistic missiles, selling of Russian military equipment to Iran, national security threats, safety of Israel and Iran’s desire to acquire a nuclear weapon.

Because of the sunset clauses in the JCPOA, the ultimate success of the nuclear deal depends on transformation of the Iranian regime over the next decade from a hardliner revolutionary regime to a moderate one. Surprisingly, the JCPOA removes the supreme leader’s financial empire from the sanction list on the implementation day. The Ayatollah has used this exclusively controlled financial-industrial conglomerate to pursue his hardline policy of supporting terrorist groups in the region, oppressing dissidents in Iran and demanding annihilation of Israel. Removing these entities guarantees prosperity of Supreme Leader’s financial empire in the Post-sanction Iran. Therefore,

OPTION 1: Continue to support the P5+1 Alliance and hold the IRI to strict accountability of all provisions outlined in the JCPOA. Utilizing public diplomacy, communicate that violations to the JCPOA will be seen as cause for the U.S. to seek an exit from the JCPOA. Make clear that significant violations would also introduce all instruments of statecraft to deter Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state. If the IRI continues to meet its obligations, and prior to the expiration of JCPOA enrichment limitations, the U.S. should attempt to negotiate a separate Section 123 like agreement with the IRI. The proposed bilateral agreement will further restrict any future enrichment activities to levels deemed acceptable by the U.S. As an

and the output amount designated by the U.N. as safe. It also calls for unrestricted inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency or IAEA on all of Iran’s nuclear sites, for use and production output.

have nuclear and hydrogen weapons, but for Iran, which is not a member of NATO and its security is not guaranteed by any country in the world, the simple principle of self-defense becomes so problematic?” (Vaez, 2017). The JCPOA satisfies Iran’s demand for increased influence while maintaining the priority of international nuclear stability. With worldwide peace and proliferation safeguards an international interest, the United States should utilize a selective engagement mindset, specifically in regards to a great powers focus, to maintain leverage and unity within the multilateral agreement, “Selective engagement endeavors to ensure peace among powers that have substantial industrial and military potential – the great powers” (Posen, & Ross, 2000). By prioritizing vital interests, the great powers can develop a collaborative and effective strategy to force Iranian nuclear cessation and maintain unity to avoid Iranian partnerships with nations seeking to increase their sphere of influence. Additionally, the international response to Iran establishes a

US officials assert that the Administration seeks to renegotiate the JCPOA, or negotiate a separate accord, to address the full range of U.S. concerns on Iran. The other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran—Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany—assert that the JCPOA is succeeding in its core objectives and that its implementation should not be jeopardized.

Still, Iran continuously denies that its nuclear objectives are to construct atomic weapons, but a large majority of the international community remains skeptical to the legitimacy of this claim due to the secrecy of Iran’s productions and their refusal to cooperate with the IAEA on several notable occasions. However, in defense over the concerns pertaining to the secrecy of Iran’s program, Iran’s former ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammed Javad Zarif, claims Western tension and dwindling support for Iran’s early nuclear energy programs forced Tehran with no choice but to continue their nuclear activities in a discreet matter. Zarif wrote in Colombia University’s Journal of International Affairs, “To avoid the

Following the discovery of the undeclared construction of a large underground nuclear related facility in Natanz and the existence of highly enriched uranium in 2002, the Iranian nuclear crisis began in full force. The following summer, the then-director of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, presented a report to the IAEA Board of Governors in which “failures and breaches of safeguards by Iran” were cited without ambiguity and additional inspections were recommended (Mousavin 66). Despite this, ElBaradei refused to say the Iran was in “noncompliance with its safeguards” (Brown 174). This was of much disappointment to the U.S. and further strained its relationship with the IAEA which had just failed to uncover