Irregular Warfare

A small country such as North Vietnam was able to win a war against a superpower like the United States of America, through, namely, tactics – such as Guerrilla Warfare -, the ignorance of their enemy, the attitude of the South Vietnamese, as well as a strong leader such as Ho Chi Minh. The Vietnam War was a major conflict (of the Cold War) which lasted from 1959 to 1975 , with US involvement from 1964 to 1973 . US reasons for their involvement in the war was their fear of “The Domino Effect” - or – the US fear that communism would spread to Vietnam and Southeast Asia, making them a major threat to national security. The Fall of Saigon marked the end of the war in 1975.

Originally influenced by the strategic events seen throughout the Napoleonic Wars in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the nine principles of war derived from the United States’ Army’s “Principles of War and Operations” outline a basic strategic guide on waging war. Shortly before the military adopted these guidelines, however, the United States of America saw civil unrest as the Southern states seceded to form the Confederate States of America. As the Union Army of the North battled the Confederate Army of the South, strategic principles similar to those outlined in the U.S. Army’s doctrine began to appear on the battlefield. Although the armies of the Union and the Confederacy both utilized strategic elements outlined in the United States’ Army’s “Principles of War and Operations”, the Union army’s stricter adherence to certain strategic principles resulted in their ultimate success.

Beyond the lack of support from the United States’ citizens, the biggest reason that we lost was the lack of intel in regards to the enemy and the land. Before the Vietnam War, most of our wars had a very obvious enemy that we were fighting but this war was not the case. The most common enemy in this war which was referred to as North Vietnamese and they used a Guerrilla Warfare tactic and would blend in with the Vietnamese citizens. Guerrilla Warfare is also known as a hit and run tactic, the enemy would attack and then as quickly as they attacked they would disappear into the jungle without giving the United States the ability to mobilize and counter attack. The other tactic that the North Vietnamese that hurt the United States ability

History has shown us that though it’s lifetime, the Marine Corps has and will continue to participate in small wars due to its operational nature of being a power projection force that is always ready. From the Banana Wars of the early 20th century to the most recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Marine Corps has found itself in conflicts vice the large conventional wars that it trains for. Although there is no “one size fits all” approach to the challenges of small wars, as the Joint Operational Environment, 2010, points out, we “(t)he great difficulty U.S. forces will confront in facing irregular warfare is that such conflicts require a thorough understanding of the cultural, religious, political, and historical context within which they are being fought” (pg 67). What this means for the Marine Corps is its approach to in preparing for war must evolve to take into consideration the many facets of why the conflict is being fought/ what is causing the conflict and how balance the Force to provide stability to best win them. Success lies in focusing on the aspects of small wars that intertwine with each other and have proven to be effective across the range of conflict. While there is no type of small war that is more important than another, there is a common element in small wars that the Marine Corps is suited for take into consideration and develop.

The concept of close order drill has been used in some form in every war since the inception of the U.S. Marine Corps, and the practice still proves useful in the twenty-first century. It is much more than the Silent Drill Platoon performing on commercials to attract young adults to the military. This art form is being set aside in Marine Corps after a decade of war; even though drill influences combat efficiency by instilling precision, automatic response to orders and develops assertive leaders.

When talking about irregular threats that we face there is one thing that comes to mind when talking about that and it is about being technically and tactically proficient within your specific area of expertise. The Marine Corps takes a lot of time investing into training Marines on a daily or monthly basis in order to better prepare them for any course of action. Marines train consistently in order to master their skill set and become mentally prepared for any type of irregular warfare we might face. We use all the time we can to develop one’s self in his or hers military occupation in order to know how they can assist and support the companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions, they take part of. The experience over time that we

Revolution became very prominent in the life of the Uruguayans and Salvadorians. The documents from the Guerrilla Warfare and from Claribel Alegria describe how the revolutionary struggle was for both of their countries and described the involvement of the women. Women became very important through this time, by comparing and contrasting the obstacles and roles that the women had to overcome in these documents would give a better view of how important women were for the revolutionary struggle.

The performance Triad is as it sounds made up of three separate but interchangeable parts that are intended for the military services to utilize to enhance their combat readiness. It consists of Physical Fitness, Nutrition and Sleep and I will quickly explain each aspect to give the reader an understanding of what it is. I will also explain why I believe sleep to be the most crucial and important part of the Performance Triad and lastly looking at ways to implement the Performance Triad for soldiers that are in a field environment.

No 7. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose, and the conventional army loses if it does not win.

Maneuver warfare is comprised of concepts that create a foundation for tactical war-fighting strategies used by Commanders and subordinates that can be adaptable to any mission, which makes it an effective approach to address modern conflict and irregular warfare. In “Maneuver Warfare Theory and The Operation Level of War: Misguiding the Marine Corps?”, Major G.S. Lauer describes the theory of maneuver warfare as “Victory in war is achieved through the psychological dislocation caused by maneuver within an enemy’s decision cycle.” Maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 Warfighting (MCDP 1) is defined as a series of rapid, flexible and opportunistic actions taken to generate and exploit an advantage over the enemy. This advantage can be psychological, technology or temporal in nature.

If people wanted to know anything about the Guerrilla war or the fighters, they should read this book, despite it not having been written recently, and become enamored with the story of common men; who protect their homeland from foreign invaders, from conquering them, and taking away stuff that makes them, Spanish, and call Spain, their home.

During their work up they set one week aside in their DA phase for snipers and breachers break away to work on each skill. They then return for that last two of weeks of the DA package and finish training with the rest of the company. This is a simple model and is practical for 1stMSOB to implement; however, several things need to happen to make this effective. One portion is to establish a set sustainment checklist for both snipers and breachers that is considered mission essential tasks based directly on what the Marine Special Operations School (MSOS) is teaching in it’s courses. The next component is putting responsibility on the Company Commander for all CSOs in his company to attend this training. Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) Pub 1 states that the “Commanders are responsible for all training” (MARSOF, 2011) conducted to enhance or maintain the force. This level of responsibility ensures that the individuals form all the teams are pressed to attend training and that they meet all requirements to be declared mission ready. Last is T-Cell must be involved to aid in the development and supervision of training. The T-Cell ensures all training is conducted without favor and establishes a standard throughout the battalion. The three possible COAs

Doctor Jonathan Czarnecki of the Naval War College defined Operational Warfare as “a method by which a social group conducts complex military tasks against another social group to achieve some operational objective(s).”.1 Operational Warfare is influenced by individual leaders, organizations or established institutions, culture and current technology available to the social group/nation.2 Operational Warfare can be broken down into six basic functions: Command and Control, Logistics, Fires, Maneuver, Intelligence, and Protection.3

Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US