Is Bespoke Tranche Opportunity?

In the movie the big short, Lewis Ranieri, who is a banker of the Wall Street, created an idea that companies packed thousands of mortgage all bundled together to sell, which is the AAA credit-rating bond, and can obtain high yields with low risk because everyone should pay for their mortgage. The concept of Lewis Ranieri is called mortgage-backed securities (MBS). However, the demand of buying MBS is more than MBS supply. Therefore, when the risk of MBS is high, Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) is a way to change subprime loans to high- rating bonds and it can be sold again. Although CDO is full of subprime loans, it still can get AAA rating because

The world’s financial system was almost brought down in 2008 by the collapse of Lehman Brothers that was a major international investment bank at that time. The government sponsored these banks’ bailouts that were funded by tax money in order to restore the industry. Before the crisis, banks were lending irresponsible mortgages to subprime borrowers who had poor credit histories. These mortgages were purchased by banks and packaged into low-risk securities known as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). CDOs were divided into tranches by its default risk. The ratings of those risks were determined by rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. However, those agencies were paid by banks and created an environment in which agencies were being generous to ratings since banks were their major clients.

Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) explains the old system of lending and the new securitization process. Matt Demon narrates how the home buyers repaid their loans to lenders, and consequently, the lenders sold the loans to the investment banks which combined the mortgage loans with other credit loans creating a collateral debt obligation a complex derivative. The collateral debt obligation sold to investors who paid the rating agency to evaluate the CDO's. The home buyers were now paying investors through this

Where do you begin with covering one of the greatest economic crash of our time, and the worst recession since the Great Depression? Michael Lewis takes us to the very beginning, covering the story of how cynical mortgage brokers and CDO managers were playing fraudulent roulette. A rigged system that was doomed from the beginning but that very well needed every piece to be in place for 2008 to happen. Credit rating agencies S&P and Moody’s had to be completely oblivious in properly rating the CDO tranche system, mortgage lenders had to be eager to write down sub-prime loans, and . Yet, through all the dust came a story of the underdogs; Steve Eisman, Michael Burry, Greg Lippmann & his Chinese side kick Eugene Xu, and Cornhole Capital

In 2008 the United States economy faced it most serious economic downturn since the great depression. This crisis began in 2006 when the subprime mortgage market showed an increase in mortgage defaults. This would lead to the decline of the U.S. housing market after a decade of high growth. The problems in the mortgage market where able to spread to other sectors of the economy especially in financial markets because of Collateralized Mortgage Obligations or CMOs. CMOs where mortgage backed securities that where given out by investment banks and where not regulated by the government. These securities fell as did mortgages due to increasing default rates. Because of CMOs companies bought Credit Default swaps or CDSs. These CDSs where nominally

Furthermore, those banks who invested in collateral debt obligations, a lot of whom before 2007 (particularly investment banks) sold off senior CDOs but kept junior ones for profit (8). However, the values of these CDOS plummeted and as a result banks with large amount of junior CDOS were in a bad position therefore many investment banks were in

CDSs are used as an insurance against the possibility that the borrower could not repay his or her loan. In such case the issuer has to pay a specified sum to the buyer. Of course they are sold for a premium and if no credit events occur, the issuer makes profit. After the subprime mortgage crisis began, and many borrowers started defaulting on their loans, the pressure on the companies that had issued CDSs was rising. There were companies that simply did not have enough money to repay everything they owed. A famous example is AIG. The subprime mortgage crisis and the bankruptcy of big financial companies, like Lehman Brothers, meant that AIG had to pay much more money that it expected and made the company insolvent. The company itself had AAA rating shortly before this. This made the investors confident that even their high-rating investments failed, the insurer would certainly be able to repay them. A bailout from the US government followed. Generally, the issuers of these instruments can be held accountable for issuing them, without the ability to pay what they had to, when the credit events occurred. Of course many of them were mislead by the credit rating agencies and the overall conviction in the market that it was not as risky as it actually was. Many people argue that such instruments need to be regulated much better. They can create clear conflict of interests. For example, a

In 2008, one of the worst financial crises since the Great Depression occurred. The severity of this collapse cannot be understated as demonstrated by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the US, and with many other financial institutions such as Merrill Lynch and the Royal Bank of Scotland having to be bailed out. In addition, the Global Banking System was within a whisker of collapsing and if it where not for the trillions of dollars invested in the system by national banks then this banking collapse would have lead to economic catastrophe. Therefore, in order to avoid such a calamity from occurring again, it is important to ask the question why did this financial recession occur and what factors contributed towards this downfall? Although there are many reasons as to why this recession occurred it could be argued that securitized lending and shadow banking played the largest role in this economic crisis. It is therefore important to understand what securitized lending and shadow banking means. Securitized lending is the process by which a financial institution such as a bank pools illiquid assets, such as residential and commercial mortgages and auto loans (by which the bank receives from the public through house mortgages and loans), and loans these newly formed short-term bonds to third party investors in exchange for cash or collateral. Since its creation in the 18th century, securitized lending was increasingly popular and very much

In 2008, one of the biggest financial recessions of our time occurred. The blame that should be placed on the unexpected crash of the housing market should come from the shady business strategies used by banks and investment agencies, which caused millions of everyday people to lose their jobs and homes. The role of subprime mortgages, CDO’s, and illicit ratings caused the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. The culmination of these things led to the downfall of the economy and start of a recession.

Derivatives allow brokers to gamble on virtually anything, such as the rise and fall of oil prices. By the late 1990 deviates was a 50 trillion dollar unregulated market. Now, lenders are no longer at risk if there is a failure to repay. In the new system, lenders issue loans. These loans are then sold to investment banks. The investment banks compile thousands of different loans together, such as student loans, mortgages and credit payments together to form complex derivatives called CDO’s (Collateralized debt obligations). Investment banks then sell these CDO’s to investors. These CDO’s are classified by ratings company on the risk of investing into them. The highest rating is AAA (lowest risk, highly securitized). Investment companies were rating extremely risky investments as AAA but held no responsibility if the CDO failed, because they claimed that their classification and rating system was just opinions.

This is exciting if the story stops just here. Unfortunately it didn’t. Banks and Government Sponsored Enterprises spotted a money machine for themselves—securitizing these mortgages. They went ahead to purchase these mortgages, package them and then resell them to Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs). SIVs, using mortgages as collateral, made products named Collateralized Debt Obligations, and CDO squares. They then sliced CDOs into credit tranches based on the level of credit risk. By doing so, SIVs and GSEs successfully transfer the credit risks to capital market investors, which would later be considered too big to fail and let the tax payers bear the consequences of the these people’s gambling. I’ll elaborate later why a ban on securitizing would not solve the problem mainly because as long as the gamblers can pass on risks to next person, they don’t bear the risks themselves. They would be motivated to lever and make risky investment for profits no matter in the form of securitizing or others.

These brokers have neither the credit skills nor the interest to conduct proper payment due of potential homebuyers. Their interest is only in selling the houses as fast as they can. The MBS instruments allowed all financial institutions to transfer the risks to other investors. The dissociation of ownership of assets from risks encouraged poor credit assessment and was fundamental increasing the risks.

The banks then created a new idea—linking investors to homeowners through mortgages. Ordinarily, a mortgage broker would connect a house-buying family to a mortgage lender, who would then supply them with a mortgage. In this system, everyone is happy—the mortgage broker earns a handsome commission, the mortgage lender earns a new mortgage, and the family is now a homeowner in a market of increasing housing prices.

In relation to the increase in house’s price, the rise of financial agreements such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO) encouraged investors to invest in the U.S housing market (Krugman, 2009). When housing price declined in the U.S, many financial institutions that borrowed and invested in subprime mortgage reported losses. In addition, the fall of housing price resulted in default and foreclosure and that began to exhaust consumer’s wealth and

The banks got into trouble because they got caught up in the mass psychology of an unprecedented property bubble – the steepest and longest of the several national property bubbles of the late 1990s and