Is The Genetic Argument For Panpsychism?

Consciousness, Thomas Nagel states, “is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.” Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as “perceptual experiences,” and Nagel describes as “something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argument in his 1982 thesis Epiphenomenal Qualia. Whilst Jackson’s argument occupies a seminal position in philosophy of mind, whether he adds anything new to knowledge of the nature of conscious experience, is debateable. Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to

“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” is American philosopher, Thomas Nagel’s, opinion on the widely debated mind-body problem. Nagel introduces the paper by explaining what it means for something to be conscious. He defines consciousness as an organism’s ability for there to be something it is like to be that organism. Using his definition of consciousness Nagel suggests that physicalism cannot be successfully defended using the popular reductionism theory. This is because in order to be defended a physical account must be given to phenomenological features themselves. This leads Nagel to his argument, “Every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He

In David Armstrong’s thought-provoking work titled, The Nature of Mind, he explains that the most convincing way to make sense of the mind-body problem is to approach it in a materialistic way. Specifically, Armstrong shows that the science of physico-chemical processes of the brain is the best way to explain the nature of our mind. He goes on to explain traditional and dispositional behaviorism, and states his own materialistic take on behaviorism. His arguments throughout his paper are very logical, and though there have been arguments against his explanations, he effectively justifies the materialistic view of the mind.

Property dualism proclaims the existence of a single, physical substance (unlike Cartesian dualism), but argues that this single

Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.

In his text “What is it like to be a bat?” of 1974 Thomas Nagel claims that consciousness is the

As stated by Thomas Nagel in his paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable (Reference). By this, he means that the relationships between the subject mind and the objective physical body are difficult to control or to deal with. Nagel states that without consciousness the problem seems less interesting, and with it, it seems impossible (Reference). Reduction has been a common method to attempt to link the relationship between the mind and the body, however Nagel has many critiques in the ways that reductionists attempt it. Reductionism is the process of taking one theory or phenomenon to be reducible to some other theory or phenomenon – in most cases to objectively clarify its meaning (Reference). Nagel criticizes reductionists take on the mind by saying that “Reduction theories do not attempt to explain the most important and characteristic features of the conscious mind.” He claims there may be knowledge available in the future to potentially reduce the mind, however not only do we not have access to that intelligence but we may never.

Nagel in his theory argues that “consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable” (Nagel 1). The consciousness is so important in the mind problem because it is the individual experience that cannot be reduced from our personal understanding. That is why Nagel believes some personal identities are beyond human understanding. If we were bats that eat bugs, hang upside-down in an attic and flap arms to fly that imagine maybe will be similar to everyone. But this is what it is like for human to be a bat, not what it is like for bat to be a bat. We will never know what it was like to be a bat due to the subjectivity of conscious experience. The only way we could know what it is like to be a bat will be a bat. But we can know

I think it is reasonable to reason from intelligence and consciousness because I think we discover and realize (not imagine) the evidence of it throughout the evolution of the universe. I think it unreasonable to claim that consciousness is a byproduct of an unconscious process. The consciousness and the intelligence we see as the culmination of the evolutionary process is but the current expression (and evidence) of the creative consciousness that begins the process. It is a humbling concept. Perhaps we are not the only species that expresses the life and nature of an infinite, universal Being. Perhaps we are only the current culmination of the evolutionary process. Perhaps Life could do better. I believe it can, will

Assuming that one has to be in a conscious state of mind in order for one to understand what it is like to be something, Nagel starts off his argument with an idea for consciousness. He criticizes the concept of functionalism for disregarding the subjective view of the mind into a purely objective view. Taking into account what he had just stated, Nagel makes his claim: “The fact that [a bat] has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something that it is like to be [a bat]” (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). This “what it is like” is the subjective aspect of Nagel’s theory. He suggests that previous theories on the mind-body problem did not capture this “subjective character of experience” (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). The “subjective character of experience” can be defined as the idea that a certain organism can only have conscious experiences that only it can feel. Using the subjective aspect of consciousness, Nagel explains that consciousness cannot be defined through only objective means. I agree in Nagel’s stance that the subjective experience is “not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states” (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). Nagel’s argument is convincing; when people feel an emotion such as pain, no one really knows how to describe it, for one person’s pain might be completely different from another’s. What is there to say that feelings such as pain could be described purely through objective means? In other words, the

There is an argument out there that Panpsychism is the best way to view the world, but there is also the objection that this view may not be correct as it is just a last-ditch effort to try and explain consciousness. This objection can be overcome with logic in the end.

This idea, then leads onward to the ideas of Noam Chomsky, who viewed the mind as a body in and of itself which had its own “organs”. These “organs” were construed as  “ontogenetic development is to be viewed as the unfolding of an "intrinsically determined process." In particular: "... we take for granted that the organism does not learn to grow arms or to reach puberty.... When we turn to the mind and its products, the situation is not qualitatively different from what we find in the case of the body"” (Fodor, The Modularity of the Mind). This idea then leads to the premise that what Chomsky thinks is innate is nothing more than a body knowledge that a child is born knowing

Ryle argues that, according to the traditional theory of the mind, mental acts are regarded as causing and