When President Johnson delivered his State of the Union Address to Congress on January 17, 1968 he spoke of the war in Vietnam with optimism. He listed the many military accomplishments to date, mentioned the word “progress” five times, discussed a “fruitful” visit with the pope, and spoke with a tone and tenor that suggested an imminent, peaceful resolution (“Johnson’s Annual Message”). Not three months later – in a similarly important speech to the American people – Johnson stoically announced that he would not be seeking reelection (“Johnson’s Address to the Nation”). What had seemed like an impending certainty dissolved into a distant dream. Public support for the war, and of Johnson, had deteriorated so swiftly in the winter of …show more content…
Thousands of soldiers and other military assets were moved to the isolated base of Khe Sanh, away from arguably more useful bases throughout the rest of the country. When viewed on its own, the strategic military advantages of a victory at Khe Sanh were relatively inconsequential. “Khe Sanh had little impact on the outcome of the Vietnam War. Seen in this context, and given the intentions of the participants at the beginning, Khe Sanh was an overall failure for both sides” (“The Battle of Khe Sanh”). The true significance of the battle at Khe Sanh is the fact that it laid the groundwork for the Tet Offensive, and thus for the psychological turning point of the war.
Ten days after the first rockets were exchanged at Khe Sanh, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces launched the series of surprise attacks throughout South Vietnam that came to be known as the Tet Offensive. It is through these two major events in combination that one can begin to understand the dramatic shift in American public opinion of the war, and of Johnson’s handling of it. “No understanding of the significance of the battle at Khe Sanh is possible if the fighting there is considered in isolation. Khe Sanh was a part of the Tet Offensive” (“The Battle of Khe Sanh”). With the American forces caught completely off-guard, and less than two weeks after Johnson delivered his State of the Union that saw an end
President Dwight Eisenhower conditionally pledged to support South Vietnam’s new nation in 1955. In the time period between 1955-1961 the United States pumped seven billion dollars in aid so that Vietnam would not “go over quickly” like a “row of dominoes” (McNamara 31). In the next 6 years Vietnam would cost America billions of dollars, thousands of lives, and the disaffection of much of the United States public. Yet in the end, South Vietnam would fall to the North less than 2 years after the United States military involvement ceased.
The introductory attack began spectacularly during celebrations of the Vietnamese Lunar New Year and left global lungs breathless (Farber and Bailey 34-54). Widely seen as the turning point in the Vietnam War, the NLF and PAVN won an enormous psychological and propaganda-associated victory, which ultimately led to the loss of popular support for the War in the United States and the eventual withdrawal of American troops. Additionally, the events surrounding the Tet Offensive piloted American citizens to increased polarization. Attracting members from college campuses, middle-class suburbs, labor unions, and government institutions, the anti-war movement was swollen with aggrieved affiliates (Farber and Bailey 34-54). The observable pathos of the protesters delivered the distrust of a growing population to the White House doors; the budding doubt in governmental affairs was difficult to discard and impossible to ignore. Indisputably, the Tet Offensive of 1968 cleaved the fragile harmony of the public and birthed a political skepticism that continues to subsist in modern American minds.
LBJ’s decision to Americanize the war was not wise and well-informed, an accurate answer for U.S. defeat in Vietnam was the decision to Americanize the war. Influencing the belief that Johnson’ decision to escalate appeared to have been predetermined; Johnson consistently appeared to be in favor of increasing military in South Vietnam, and he only needed something to happen in order to validate his reasoning for the increase of U.S. involvement. This something was the Tonkin Gulf incident and this event became Johnson’s basis “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States…” (Young, 119); that this was a declaration of war (Hunt, 67). However, this incident, as Nicholas Katzenbach said, “was
The increasing number of troops and military efforts involved with Vietnam and the seemingly optimistic reports reported by the government were the primary factors that caused the Tet Offensive and Counteroffensive. The American government had become increasingly involved with the Vietnam war. From 1965 to 1967, over 400,000 soldiers were sent to help the South Vietnamese forces. This massive increase in the amount of soldiers was frustrating to the American people. Johnson’s approval rating fell to a mere 40%, half of what it had been in 1965. (“Vietnam War (1959-1975)” ; Axelrod 1). When the American soldiers returned home from Vietnam, it was often heard that they were spit on, and
January 31, 1968 North Vietnamese attacked over 100 cities throughout South Vietnam on thirty-five of forty-four province capitals, thirty-six district towns, and many villages and hamlets. Dubbed the “Tet Offensive” because it coincided with the Vietnamese New Year’s holiday, Tet, was a turning point in the Vietnam War. Most historians agree that the Tet Offensive was the turning point in the Vietnam War as events shifted the role of United States involvement in Southeast Asia as the shock it produced was the catalyst that led to the reevaluation of U.S. policy. While intelligence failure contributed to the shift in the Vietnam War, most historians have disagreed on the role of the media in aiding the American public’s views against the war.
The Vietnam War lasted longer, bloodier, and more hostile than any U.S. President or American citizen imagined. Lyndon Johnson faced many other enemies during the war such as the duration, the immense number of deaths, and for the first time in most American’s history, failure. Through deep evaluation of Lyndon B. Johnson’s foreign policies as President during the Vietnam war, failure was a recurring outcome, as he faced military and political difficulties over having complete authority over political decisions made leading to the misuse of his respective power, receiving split support through torn Americans at home, and his accord to deport so many troops into combat in Vietnam.
Throughout America’s history, few things have left the nation in such controversial turmoil as the Vietnam War. With an American death toll of almost 60,000 troops, the Vietnam War has gone down in infamy as one of the most tremendous struggles Americans have faced both overseas and on the home front. Because of the tumultuous controversies caused by the war, Americans split into two social factions – those against the war and those who supported it. During the years of 1961-1975 - the era in which the war had its greatest effect on Americans - the population of citizens from 18-35 years old and the Presidency were both affected irreversibly.
In 1967 the anti-war movement caused Lyndon Johnson to start a major propaganda campaign with the aim of convincing the American people that the war in Vietnam was being won. Johnson never managed to gain public opinion, but neither did the movement. According to Johnson’s white house aide and confidant Doris Kearns the anti-war movement had a “deep personal effect on him” and “drained his self-esteem and energy.” He went on to limit the bombing and not seek re-election with the hope that he would salvage his place in history by making progress in negotiating an end to the war and restoring unity at home. This hope was not fulfilled and Richard Nixon went on to be elected as president.
The US has been known to diverge from its once-isolationist state, engaging in international affairs like World War I and several other events alike. It’s therefore no surprise that the US intervened in the Vietnam War during the 1960’s. At the time, President Lyndon B. Johnson put forth new ideas, plans and tactics to help and protect the South Vietnamese and surrounding countries from communist influence. However, the United States’ initial goals and plans didn’t always go the way they had expected. Indeed, Johnson’s Vietnam policies failed because of his unreasonable military strategies and his inefficient political actions.
It was the late Beatle, John Lennon who once said that “We live in a world where people must hide to make love, while violence is practiced in broad daylight.” This refers of course to his distain of the Vietnam War and frankly when you ask someone who was a citizen in America at that time, you will most likely get the same melancholy response. For the better part of 15 years, the Vietnam War was at the forefront of American society in ways that were political, social, and economical. As time went on, public opinion plummeted, leaving President Lyndon Johnson no choice but to decline the Democratic Party’s nomination for the 1968 presidential election. As the Johnson administration
In a nation divided by war in 1969, Richard Nixon delivered a speech with the hope that it would bring Americans together. At this time the American people stood divided on their views on the war. Many people wanted to withdraw from the war and many people supported the war in the quest for peace. The Vietnam War had already been going on for quite some time when Nixon came into office. Nixon was the second youngest president; he came to office in 1969 as the 37th president of the United States. (Sheppard) The goal of his speech was to unite the nation as he pursued the war and to try to win peace. Americans were divided among going to war and ending the war for peace. The tone
The investigation assesses the level of success President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization policy attained during the Vietnam War to end U.S. involvement in the war. In the strive to evaluate the level of success this policy demonstrated, the investigation evaluates the ability of the policy to equip, expand, and train Southern Vietnamese forces and allocate them to a substantial combat position, all while simultaneously reducing the quantity of U.S. combat troops in a steady manner. The Vietnamization policy is investigated and analyzed by both its causes and effects. The motivation that led to Nixon’s creation of this
As the Vietnam War progressed, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) generals led by General Giap reassessed and adapted their strategy to fit the circumstances. This enabled the VC revolutionaries, supported by North Vietnamese regular forces, to achieve success without ever defeating US forces on the battlefield. For instance, the Tet Offensive in 1968 represented an operational failure in Stage Three of the Dau Tranh strategy but was considered a success for the North since it weakened American public support for the war. As a result the defeat on the battlefield, Giap adapted Dau Tranh to avoid concentration of forces and the effects of superior US firepower by transitioning back to Stage Two. The return to guerilla operations ensured sustained US casualties and the continued erosion of public support between 1968 and 1971. At the same time, main force units that were decimated during Tet could withdrawal and reconstitute. (Pike, 229)
A quarter of a century after the Fall of Saigon, Vietnam continues to exercise a powerful hold of the American psyche. No deployment of American troops abroad is considered without the infusion of the Vietnam question. No formulation of strategic policy can be completed without weighing the possibility of Vietnanization. Even the politics of a person cannot be discussed without taking into account his opinion on the Vietnam Ware. This national obsession with Vietnam is perfectly national when viewed from a far. It was the only war that the United States has ever lost. It defined an era of American history that must rank with the depression as one of this nation’s most traumatic. It concluded with Watergate and led many to believe that the
The United States intervention in Vietnam is seen by the world as America’s greatest loss and longest war. Before the start of the war in Vietnam, the thought of the United States losing this war was unheard of because America was technologically superior, no country in south East Asia could contend with them. Lyndon B. Johnson announced that he would not be the president to allow South East Asia to go Communist . Why the United States lost the war has been a huge debate since the end of the war, because there were so many factors affecting why they lost; the war was a loss politically, after losing support from not only the American public but also the South Vietnamese and losing a political mandate for the war by 1973, when the last