Japanese Navy Communication: The Battle Of Midway

Why was the battle of Midway so crucial? On the 4th of June in 1942 started the victorious win of the Americans that was soon to begin World War II! It was quite an amazing battle because the Japanese should have won, but the Americans out smarted them, hacking naval codes, being ready, and being where they needed to be at the right time. The Americans took down the Japanese keeping control of Midway. The battle of Midway between the Americans and the Japanese was the most decisive naval battle in history it was the turning point because it brought the Americans into the forefront of the war that eventually helped defeat Hitler.

On the Japanese side of intelligence, Yamamoto believed to have the element of surprise at Midway, which was thought to draw the Americans out of Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto had numerical naval superiority in the Pacific to defeat the Americans at sea but remained unaware that the code breakers ascertained its operational and strategic plan to attack at Midway. Spector argues that Japanese submarines knew the American forces were planning something at Pearl Harbor, but the intelligence was never passed on to Yamamoto. Additionally, Yamamoto believed that two of the American carriers were sunk at Coral Sea, which the Yorktown was hastily being repaired in Pearl Harbor. In reality, the Japanese had no idea where the American fleet or carriers were leading up to the Battle of Midway.

By the early morning of December 7, 1941 the Japanese Naval force led by Admiral Nagumo had parked his fleet of 6 aircraft carriers 230 nautical miles off the north coast of the Hawaiian Islands completely undetected. The fleet had approximately 423 aircraft with a final destination of Pearl Harbor. At 600 a.m. the first wave of 180 aircraft were launch to attach the sleeping Hawaiian bay. At 702 a.m. an Army radar station sights the aircraft inbound and report to their direct officer who is aware of a squadron of B-17’s due in from the west coast and write off the sighting am friendly forces. This was the first of many mistakes that would become evident within the hour.

Just after midnight on June 4th,1942, the United States attacked a fleet of Japanese transport ships. One American torpedo plane took out fleet tanker "Akabono Maru". Later that morning at about 6:30am, Japanese planes began bombing midway island installations, though causing minimal damage to the U.S. naval

Nimitz was able to crack the Japanese secret code of communication and he was able to prepare his military for the surprise attack on Midway planned by the Japanese. Along with this, other strategies used were American submarine patrolling (Mcgowen 26). The submarines would gauge the enemy's attack and shoot torpedoes to sink the enemies ships. It would also help in sending secret codes that would help the United States military to prepare for the attack in addition to also protect their battleships. The United States were also advantageous on their land.

Returning to their aircraft carriers to refuel and rearm the Japanese bombers noticed the U.S. fleet and prepared for their attack. Sent from the aircraft carriers were Devastator Torpedo Bombers and Dauntless Dive Bombers. The first to attack were the Torpedo Bombers, flying low to the sea the Japanese were able to defend their ship’s with ease. The Japanese destroyed 35 Torpedo Bombers, only 6 made it to their target destination which was one of the four Japanese aircraft carriers, but to their surprise none of their torpedo’s hit the intended target. Although the Torpedo Bombers did not hit their target their sacrifice was not in vain. High above the Dauntless Dive Bombers were closing in on their targets without any resistance. With just enough cloud coverage the Dive Bombers were able to approach their targets with ease. Within the first day the Japanese carriers Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, were hit, set ablaze, and abandoned (). According to ..: Over the next two days, the US Navy and US forces on Midway continued their attacks, forcing the Japanese to abandon the battle and retreat to Japan. The Japanese lost approximately 4,800 men, four carriers, one cruiser, and hundreds of aircraft, while the United States lost approximately 307 men, one carrier, one destroyer, and over 100 aircraft.

Before the assault, the Japanese's army was constantly improving and perfecting their surprise attack strategy. They knew that their plan was extremely risky, so the chance of success depended on complete surprise for the U.S. Pacific fleet. The Japanese attack force, led by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, began the 3,000 mile sneaky journey. Sneaking Six aircraft carriers, nine destroyers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and three submarines across the Pacific Ocean undetected would be a very challenging task. The

Despite all the success Japan had early in the war, they did not do as much damage to the United States Pacific fleet as they would have like to have done. This gave America a false sense of security at the time when Japan was preparing to take stronger action. Rear Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plan was to draw in the remaining American ships into an area where they could be attacked and destroyed by a much greater number of Japanese vessels. Admiral Yamamoto thought that if Japan captured valuable territory like the Midway Islands that the United States could not afford to give up, he could destroy the remaining American ships with ease because the Americans would have no supply chain.

……….The Battle of Midway was one of the most important battles of World War II. It was the turning point of the war in the Pacific between the United States and Japan. One of Japan’s main goals during WWII was to remove the United States as a Pacific power in order to gain territory in East Asia. The Japanese formulated a plan to sneak up on the U.S. forces. However, American code breakers had intercepted a number of Japanese transmissions.

Yamamoto had a complex invasion plan that included a second operation against the Aleutian Islands near Alaska, however, because of the damages sustained at the Battle of Coral Sea, his Carrier Strike Force consisted of only four aircraft carriers defended by only a handful of cruisers and destroyers (“HIGH NOON ON THE HIGH SEAS”). Even with the depleted fleet, the Japanese remained confident that the upcoming battle would be a swift victory for their advancement into the Pacific. Little did the Japanese know that U.S Intelligence was hard at work gathering intel to thwart an offensive on Midway.

Japan’s wanted to attack Midway to gain power in the Pacific Ocean and to eliminate the United States Navy for a long time. Since the U.S. suffered a major defeat at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, felt he could take advantage of the U.S. since they were weak in his mind (Hone). Japan was fixated on settling their differences with the U.S., so they began risking large naval units in Pacific battles. An article posted in the Los Angeles Time, “Japs Risk Large Naval Units in Blows at U.S.” says, “For the sixth time in six months Japan made a deadly bid to capture the mastery of the Pacific, and for the sixth time she has failed after paying a price that is fast becoming prohibitive,” (Symonds). Posted just after the Battle of Midway it showed that the Japanese had been planning this.

Prior to the upcoming Coral Sea battle, a number of Japanese military messages had been intercepted by the U.S. Navy signals intelligence unit. The first, dated March 28, 1942, was encoded as stating “The objective of MO will be first to restrict the enemy fleet movements and will be accomplished by means of attacks on the north coast of Australia.” (“Battle of the Coral Sea”) Subsequent messages were intercepted that provided allied forces with updated details concerning IJN fleet progress, as well as elements of IJN plans that included battleship and carrier logistics. This resulted in the U.S. Navy’s deployment of a cotillion of numerous warships and support craft, and also the carriers Lexington and Yorktown (“Battle of the Coral Seas”). In the upcoming battle, these ships would do battle against a superior IJN force comprised of far more battleships, submarines and support craft, as well as aircraft carriers.

suffered a major defeat at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, took advantage of the situation the U.S. was put in after its losses during Pearl Harbor (“Japs Risk Large Naval Units...”). With the backbone of U.S. Pacific Fleet torn out, Japan made several attempts to dominate the Pacific. Japan was anxious to settle their differences with the U.S., so they began risking large naval units in Pacific battles. An article posted in the Los Angeles Time, “Japs Risk Large Naval Units in Blows at U.S.” says, “For the sixth time in six months Japan made a deadly bid to capture the mastery of the Pacific, and for the sixth time she has failed after paying a price that is fast becoming prohibitive,” (“Japs Risk Large Naval Units...”). This article was posted days after the Battle of Midway, on June 7th, 1942 reflecting the actions of the Japanese Navy in the previous months. The Japanese were anxious to pounce on the weakened U.S. after Pearl Harbor, backing their attacks with large naval units. The Japanese felt that they needed to take over Midway Island in order to claim dominance over the U.S. in the Pacific.

Typical of Japanese naval planning during the Second World War, Yamamoto's battle plan was quite complex.[15] Additionally, his designs were predicated on optimistic intelligence information suggesting USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, forming Task Force 16, were the only carriers available to the U.S. Pacific Fleet at the time. USS Lexington had been sunk and USS Yorktown severely damaged (and believed by the Japanese to have been sunk) at the Battle of the Coral Sea just a month earlier. The Japanese were also aware that USS Saratoga was undergoing repairs on the West Coast after taking torpedo damage from a submarine.

Unfortunately, the officer on duty ignored the warning. Had he not, the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been less severe, if not countered completely. In addition, the task of almost the entirety of the air defense of Pearl Harbor fell upon the United States Navy and the United States Air Corp, despite the 16th Coast Artillery Regiment having eighty-two 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, twenty 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, and one hundred and nine .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns. The Army Air Corp’s P-36 and P-40 pursuit planes were the main deterrent to enemy aircraft, unfortunately, this was the target of the Japanese Naval Fleet (Anti-aircraft). At the end of the attack, only a few P-36’s were able to escape the barrage of bullets and bombs, and managed to destroy ten of the Japanese Zero’s, while the 16th Coast Artillery Regiment brought down six.