John Mearsheimer's Argument Analysis

Robert Jervis in ‘Security dilemma’ states that “states can neither neglect the possibility that others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves remain peaceful”. He argued that although other motives such as ‘greed, glory and honour’ come into play, much of international politics is

The defining characteristic of the state is the ability to wield power. The use of power, both inside and outside of one’s border, directly speaks to the sovereignty of the nation. If a nation is incapable of disciplining or punishing its citizens it will invariably become a failed state. Moreover if a country isn’t recognized as powerful in the global political arena, that country stands a very good chance of being dominated by a nation who has the capacity to enforce its own will. The use, or at least the perception, of power is so fundamental in nationhood that those who wield the most power can easily dictate world events.

This rationality means they will pursue interests “in terms of power according to offensive neorealism, or in terms of security according to defensive neorealism” (Collard-Wexler, 2006). These two strands have been heavily debated within neorealist theory, particularly by Mearsheimer in favor of offensive neorealism and Waltz in favor of defensive neorealism. John Mearsheimer believes that the goal of states is to maximize power while Waltz believes the goal of states is to “maintain their positions in the system” (Snyder, 2001). There is no punishment for irrational or aggressive behavior because of the anarchic nature of the system so states must rely on themselves for survival, through the use of power. Due to anarchy, states will balance “against their peers by imitation, by boosting their national assets (internal balancing), forming alliances with other states (external balancing) or by adopting the successful power-generating practices of the prospective hegemon (emulation)” (Wohlforth et.al, 2007) and these 3 processes will prevent hegemony.

Wars have impacted the United States greatly on both beneficial and detrimental standards. Throughout the history of the United States this idea of war has played a significant role in the emergence of this prominent country. A politician’s standing policy on the concept of war has held great impact on the political spectrum, many voters hold strong views on war. Some argue we should enact a policy of isolationism, through this we can focus more on the issues within United States instead of other nations. On the other hand many claim being in war is beneficial because we can hold impact on surrounding countries and though wars recreate revenue and jobs

The most prevalent reasons for states going to war are security, interest, standing, and revenge; of these, I posit that security is the most frequent. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on warfare occurring since the onset of the 20th century, however many of the core arguments retain efficacy through the countless centuries of human warfare. States don’t trust one another; even the best relationships between states are mired in spycraft with, or in opposition to one another. To summarize Waltz, drive for security is something that all states want, and need, as long as there are multiple states and at least one of them is looking for power.

Countries, depending on the surrounding factors, may employ varied approaches toward the rising powers: especially, either a preventative war or, instead, an engagement. Some states would utilize war toward the challenger; even a victory is not probable, as doing so would be less costly now in compared to the later (Levy, 1987). Nevertheless, engagement, as a choice, is also widely utilized in the international relations; rather than attempting wars, states use positive inducements for cooperation (Nincic, 2010). Question is on those factors, which determine the choices of the states toward challenger. Regime types, international structure and players, and beliefs on challengers’ intentions affect the selection of either strategy besides other factors, yet each has its own costs at the end.

Threat affects the dependent variable of state behavior. Walt states that powers will either balance or bandwagon against another state. “If a weak state is on good terms with a powerful state, the weak state will be unlikely to balance against the stronger state.” Furthermore, the weaker state is likely to benefit from the alliance because of added security. However, “if the weaker state perceives the stronger state as a threat, then the weaker state will balance against the strong state in order to protect itself.” Additionally, if the state is not a good terms with the rival state, it is unable to bandwagon and will therefore engage in balancing. Balancing can be broken up into internal and external parts. A state can either build up their

In a realist world, states have “supreme power” over its territory and population, there is an absence of a higher authority. The fact that there is no higher authority has its consequences. States become self-interested, they compete for power and security. It can lead states to continuously struggle for power “where the strong dominate the weak (Kegley, 28).” This ultimately creates a system in which each state is responsible for its own survival, making them cautious towards their neighboring states. In addition, a realist world is a self-help system; “political leaders seek to enhance national security” by building armies and forming alliances (Kegley, 28). Economic and military power are key components to a state sovereignty and to national security.

Balance of Power, a type of post war order, could happen when weaker states form alliances with each other in order to counterbalance the leading state. This would prevent the leading state from having all the power, and would prevent tyranny of the leading state. This form of balance of powers is coined “banding,” because the weaker states ‘band’ together (Ikenberry 24). Also this form of post war order allows for the weaker states to have some of their postwar demands carried out. On the other end of balance of powers there is “bandwagoning,” which is where the weaker states ally themselves with the victor (Ikenberry 25). Bandwagoning ensures that the weaker states will not get oppressed and also guarantees them protection due to their alliance with the leading state.

Forceful deportation and uprooting of children caused opposition to stir amongst the public. In response to the public opinions a S.S. officer named H. Himmler addressed their concerns and ended his conference stating, “Gentlemen, You may call this cruelty, but nature is cruel” (Sosnowski 61).

Typically, in popular depictions of arms races, the political calculations that start and regulate the pace of the game remain obscure. As Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., has noted, “The strange result is that the activity of the other side, and not one’s own resources, plans, and motives, becomes the determinant of one’s behavior.” And what constitutes the “finish line” of the game is the province of assertion, rather than analysis. Many onlookers, and some participants, have claimed that the likelihood of war increases as the accumulation of arms proceeds apace.

Secondly, the motivation for war in pursuit of honor was alleviated through the formalization of international diplomacy and the evolution of beliefs about human rights. Lastly, we reviewed how the pursuit of self-interests, specifically security and resources, continues to serve a motivator for conflict, but primarily between those states operating outside of the current international order. So what are the implications of this argument for the future? The way in which we choose to manage the self-interests of states is of utmost importance. There is either the potential to reduce self-interests as a motivator for war, or the potential to erode the previous reduction of fear as a motivator. The current international order has prevented great-power war for over 70 years. There have been conflicts motivated by self-interests, but they pale in comparison to the death and destruction of the world wars. As threats to security arise and resources are restrained, states have the option to work within the system to meet them or pursue them by other

Most theories offered on the causes of war are done through the lens of historians; however, this essay uses the perspective of political scientists. The new lens allows for readers to look information in a new dynamic. Figure I lays out of the steps a hostilities must take to expand into war. Vasquez states that more than one step from each area is required to bring about combat (Vasquez). Vasquez defines a world war as:

For centuries, governments dreamed and had an almost universal hope, about the raise of inter-state systems, to preserve peace amongst potentially antagonistic states;

Morganthau (Cited in Haas,1953, pp.445) argues that the Balance of power can be viewed as either a description of any state of international politics in relation to power distribution or a policy or action intending to distribute power. From this framework we can use the balance of power to both understand static moments in history to observe where power lies at that moment in time and to look at how states themselves actively implement foreign policy for their own power related interests whether that be looking to balance the set of scales or to tip them