John Rawls Moral Knowledge Summary

John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice holds that a rational, mutually disinterested individual in the Original Position and given the task of establishing societal rules to maximise their own happiness throughout life, is liable to choose as their principles of justice a) guaranteed fundamental liberties and b) the nullification of social and economic disparities by universal equality of opportunities, which are to be of greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of society , . Rawls’ system of societal creation has both strengths and weaknesses, but is ultimately sound.

He argues only that if a group of rational men did find themselves in the predicament of the original position, they would contract for [his] two principles [of jjustice].” 4 Rawls’ contract is hypothetical, “and hypothetical 1 Nussbaum, Martha. Ethics: The Big Questions . p. 270.

John Rawls then turns to his justice principles, arguing that the parties in the Original Position would adopt two such principles, which would structure the theoretical organization. The first and most important principle is the Liberty Principle. The

However, Chappell does not disregard the moral theory nor the Master Factor and Question all together. He goes on to talk about how there can be many sub-questions, and with these sub-questions, moral theory can become sophisticated. The problem does not lie with moral theory in general, but rather it is a problem about crudity of thought. We must be willing to be open-minded with thinking of the moral theory, for it not to corrupt our minds.

In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, Philippa Foot argues against Immanuel Kant, that morality exists in hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. For Kant, categorical imperatives alone serve as moral commands, and it would be impossible for a moral system to be based on hypothetical imperatives because such imperatives serve as means to ends and result from maxims that cannot be universalized into perfect duties. Despite this, Foot holds that acting on many hypothetical imperatives can be morally praiseworthy and can even serve as the basis of moral judgments. Although I agree with Foot that hypothetical imperatives can have moral worth, in this paper, I will argue that a morality based on the purposes that hypothetical imperatives are directed toward appears to be circular. To do this, I will explain Foot’s theory of how morality is known and binds. Then, I will argue that this theory is insufficient to explain the moral purpose that hypothetical imperatives must be directed toward, thus begging the question of what is the moral basis of the purpose directed toward in the hypothetical imperative.

In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” Philippa Foot argues that moral judgments are in hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. For Kant, categorical imperatives are actions that are good in themselves and do not depend on desires, while, hypothetical imperatives are “actions that are good to some purpose” (306). According to Foot, hypothetical imperatives alone serve as the basis of moral judgments because categorical imperatives give us no reason to obey them. In this paper, I will explain foots argument that moral judgments are hypothetical imperatives. I will then argue that that Foot’s theory of moral judgments fails in two ways. First, placing moral judgments in hypothetical imperatives fails to designate moral from immoral contingent ends, and second, the hypothetical imperative weakens morality by making it too optional. To show this, I will first argue that placing moral judgments in hypothetical imperatives begs the question of what is the moral basis of its own contingent end. I will then propose a decision procedure for determining the moral value of the contingent ends of hypothetical imperatives. Then I will argue that the Leningrad does not solve and that basing moral judgments in hypothetical imperatives still makes morality too optional.

John Rawls wrote several highly influential articles in the 19950`s and 1960`s, his first book, A Theory of Justice (1971), revitalized the social-contract tradition, using it to articulate and defend a detailed vision of egalitarian liberalism. In Political Liberalism [PL] (1993), he recast the role of political philosophy, accommodating it to the effectively permanent “reasonable pluralism” of religious, philosophical, and other comprehensive doctrines or worldviews that characterize modern societies. He explains how philosophers can characterize public justification and the legitimate, democratic use of collective coercive power while accepting that pluralism. (Richardson)

Rawls also formulated the two principles of justice to emphasize ideas of justice and fairness. The first principle states that each person has validated a claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal fundamental liberties which is compatible with a similar liberty for others. The basic freedoms of citizens are embodied in the political constitution. As such, citizens have the liberty to vote and run for office, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech and assembly, autonomy from arbitrary arrest and freedom of personal property. Rawls elaborates that this principle controls protection of an identical set of basic civic liberties. Rawls also relates his description of social basic goods to a specific perception of the individual as liberal and equal and as holding certain capacities and interests. This assures the members of the society that they will have all the tools necessary for a good life. Rawls himself acknowledges that this principle

The ethical theory of moral absolutism has raised many arguments since Plato produced the Theory of the Forms. Philosophers have argued over it for centuries; whether it is correct, whether we should be absolutists or relativists or whether we bypass both of these theories and decide our actions based on virtuous people.

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls presents his argument for justice and inequality. Rawls theorizes that in the original position, a hypothetical state where people reason without bias, they would agree to live in a society based on two principles of justice (Rawls 1971, 4). These two principles of justice are named the first and second principles. The first is the equal rights and liberties principle. The second is a combination of the difference principle and the fair equality of opportunity principle, or FEOP (Rawls 1971, 53). Rawls argues that inequality will always be inevitable in any society (Rawls 1971, 7). For example, there will always be a varied distribution of social and economic advantages. Some people will be wealthier than

Political philosopher John Rawls believed that in order for society to function properly, there needs to be a social contract, which defines ‘justice as fairness’. Rawls believed that the social contract be created from an original position in which everyone decides on the rules for society behind a veil of ignorance. In this essay, it will be argued that the veil of ignorance is an important feature of the original position. First, the essay will describe what the veil of ignorance is. Secondly, it will look at what Rawls means by the original position. Thirdly, it will look at why the veil of ignorance is an important feature of the original position. Finally, the essay will present a criticism to the veil of ignorance and the original

John Rawls' "A Theory of Justice" has long been revered as a marvel of modern political philosophy. It's most well-known for the two principles of justice outlined by Rawls: (1) that all persons have an equal right to liberty; and (2) that (a) all inequalities in society should be arranged to benefit the least advantages, and (b) that all positions and offices should be open and accessible as outlined by fair equality of opportunity. Rawls' conception of society, as a "co-operative venture for mutual gain", forms the basis for both principles, and he is at all times concerned with creating a stable concept of fair and just society. Rawls' second principle, dealing with distributive justice and equality

Communitarian critics of Rawls have argued that his A Theory of Justice provides an inadequate account of individuals in the original position. Michael Sandel, in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice argues that Rawls' conception of the person divorces any constitutive attachments that persons might have to their ends. Hence, Sandel asserts that Rawls privileges the standpoint of self-interested individuals at the expense of communal interests. I do not find Sandel's specific criticisms to be an accurate critique of what Rawls is doing in A Theory of Justice. However, this does not mean the more general thrust of the communitarian analysis of Rawls' conception of the person must be abandoned. By picking up the pieces

Rawls first reason to take the original position seriously is that everyone recognizes the original position as reasonable. In order to consider a principle fair, one must be rational with certain limitations so, it would not advantage or disadvantage any one else. For example, if a man knew he would become wealthy, he would find the principle of various taxes for welfare to be unjust. This would be the same if a man was poor and would consider the same principle just.

The original position is a device of representation, and the principles of justice which “survive” this “filter” are deemed a suitable for the real world. Moreover, it is important to clearly understand that Rawls uses these theoretical intellectual tools to help achieve reform in the actual and concrete real world rather (opposed to truths based in metaphysics).