John Searles Summary

Through this, Searle argues that if a human and machine receive the same input and then respond by the same output, how are they any different from one another? When given the same purpose, humans and machines have the same response, therefore machines may have a mind. Gilbert Ryle created The computational theory of mind that claims “Computers behave in seemingly rational ways; their inner program causes them to behave in this way and therefore mental states are just like computational states”. He continues on by saying that “If logic can be used to command, and these commands can be coded into logic, then these commands can be coded in terms of 1s and 0s, therefore giving modern computers logic. Through this, how is one to tell if robots don’t have minds if they use logic just like humans do. When the purpose of humans and machines are the same, they may process differently in order to complete that purpose, although they may have the same output. Because humans and machines receive the same input and return the same output, they both have minds in addition to functions and processes in order to do that.

One of the hottest topics that modern science has been focusing on for a long time is the field of artificial intelligence, the study of intelligence in machines or, according to Minsky, “the science of making machines do things that would require intelligence if done by men”.(qtd in Copeland 1). Artificial Intelligence has a lot of applications and is used in many areas. “We often don’t notice it but AI is all around us. It is present in computer games, in the cruise control in our cars and the servers that route our email.” (BBC 1). Different goals have been set for the science of Artificial Intelligence, but according to Whitby the most mentioned idea about the goal of AI is provided by the Turing Test. This test is also called the

The purpose of this paper is to present John Searle’s Chinese room argument in which it challenges the notions of the computational paradigm, specifically the ability of intentionality. Then I will outline two of the commentaries following, the first by Bruce Bridgeman, which is in opposition to Searle and uses the super robot to exemplify his point. Then I will discuss John Eccles’ response, which entails a general agreement with Searle with a few objections to definitions and comparisons. My own argument will take a minimalist computational approach delineating understanding and its importance to the concepts of the computational paradigm.

John Searle 1980(in Cooney, 2000), provides a thought experiment, commonly referred to as the Chinese room argument (CRA), to show that computers, programmed to simulate human cognition, are incapable of understanding language. The CRA requires us to consider a scenario where Searle, who is illiterate in Chinese, finds himself locked in a room with a book containing Chinese characters. Additionally, he has another book which has a set of instructions written in English (which he understands), that allows him to match and manipulate the Chinese characters so that he can provide appropriate written responses (in Chinese) to incoming questions, which are also written in Chinese. Moreover, Searle has a pile of blank paper with which he uses to jot down his answers. Subsequently, Searle becomes so proficient in providing responses that the quality of his answers matches that of a native Chinese speaker. Thus, Searle in the CR functions as a computer would, where he is the system while the books are the program and the blank paper acts as storage.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has made a major impact in current day technology. Scientists need the help of AI to solve mysteries or problems that cannot be solved with only human intelligence. Machine and software can formulate answers almost instantaneously that could possibly take scientists days, months, or even years to solve. AI is like a helping hand for humans. In the article “Call Them Artificial Aliens” by Kevin Kelly, Kelly states that machines think differently from humans.

Due to the fact that Searle is inside the room and does not actually understand Chinese, he claims the Chinese Room cannot be cognitively. Therefor, the Chinese Room would be functionally equivalent but not cognitively equivalent to the native Chinese speakers and furthermore, if the Chinese Room can imitate understanding without truly having it, then both Strong AI and Functionalism would have to be invalid. Functionalism’s imperative is to show that functional equivalence must always equal cognitive equivalence, so if one could show functional equivalence did not equal cognitive equivalence then Functionalism would be invalid. Additionally, if a computer or some other system could imitate intelligence without retaining understanding, then strong AI would be invalid as well. Strong AI is the view that if a machine can successfully imitate human intelligence in a way that it becomes functionally and cognitively equivalent to a mind, then the computer itself is a mind. Strong AI and its advocates respond to Searle’s claims by applying the Systems Reply. The Systems Reply states that despite the fact that Searle does not understand Chinese in the Chinese Room, the system as a whole does in fact understand Chinese. Just because Searle, or the

According to the creators of the experiment, proponents of strong artificial intelligence - those who claim that adequate computer programs can understand natural language or possess other properties of the human mind, not simply simulate them - must admit that either the room understands the Chinese language, or passing the Turing test is not enough proof of intelligence. For the creators of the experiment none of the components of the experiment includes Chinese, and therefore, even if the set of components exceeds the test, the test does not confirm that the person actually understands Chinese, since as we know Searle does not know that language.

The debate between those who are in favor of strong and weak artificial intelligence (AI) is directly related to the philosophy of mind. The claim of weak AI is that it is possible to run a program on a machine, which will behave as if it were a thinking thing. Believers of strong AI say that it is possible to create a program running on a machine which not only behaves as if it were thinking, but does actually think. Strong AI followers argue that an installation of a computer program is considered a mind as real

In Reason and Responsibility, John Searle presents his Chinese room argument to refute Strong AI, or artificial intelligence. Strong AI is an idea that a computer is as genuine and accurate by virtue of those who programmed it, not a simple tool. Essentially, a system that has a mental state, M, and follows a set of programmed rules as if it behaves as M. Searle wishes to prove that a mechanical application of communication rules to a system does not give the machine the ability to understand the language, hence, can’t think for itself. In other words, Searle is saying that computers cannot think. Searle’s argument is as follows:

John Searle developed two areas of thought concerning the independent cognition of computers. These ideas included the definition of a weak AI and a strong AI. In essence, these two types of AI have their fundamental differences. The weak AI was defined as a system, which simply were systems that simulations of the human mind and AI systems that were characterized as an

In “Can Computers Think?,” John R. Searle argues that strong artificial intelligence is false and therefore machines cannot think or exhibit understanding like a human mind. Strong AI claims that a correctly written program running on a machine functions as a mind and there are essentially no differences between the software exactly emulating the actions of the brain and the mental contents of a human. Searle uses a thought experiment called the “Chinese Room Argument” to argue against strong AI. Various objections, such as the Robot Reply, challenge Searle’s argument by further testing the potential of a machine to possess understanding, intentionality, and subjectivity. In this essay, I will argue that Searle’s argument against strong AI

Searle’s, The Chinese Room Argument, asks, if a computer can use data to output answers does that computer understand? In Searle’s experiment, he acts as a computer and is given translations of Chinese symbols. He states that even though he can find the appropriate translations for the symbols and output answers he still does not understand Chinese. Prior to my previous argument, I look to investigate in what instance can the computer be thought of as an understanding machine. In order to do this, I must investigate the following: what are the components necessary for understanding, why humans are thought of as understanding beings, and can we duplicate such things in a machine. The Chinese Room experiment is extremely basic, but given more inputs, can the computer think beyond its coded formulas. Searle concludes that Strong AI is not independent intelligence, that it is just simulation of intelligence, and although machines can act highly intelligent what separates them from humans is the notion of intentionality. Humans who are seen as having the ability to form representations, do so through experience. But what is it about the formation of experience that cannot be duplicated and why is it necessary to have such systems in place to be deemed an intelligent, understanding, and a thinking being.

Turing had this view that the potential of the computer has been just like that of humans. The limitation of the computer due to logic also occurs in human beings. If a human being is able to understand a computer, then they would be able to understand their inner self and abilities. The distinguishing feature of the computers from the human is that unlike men, it lacks

In his paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Alan Turing sets out to answer the question of whether machines can think in the same humans can by conceptualizing the question in concrete terms. In simple terms, Turing redefines the question by posing whether a machine can replicate the cognition of a human being. Yet, some may object to the notion that Turing’s new question effectively captures the nature of machines’ capacity for thought or consciousness, such as John Searle. In his Chinese room thought experiment, Searle outlines a scenario that implies machines’ apparent replication of human cognition does not yield conscious understanding. While Searle’s Chinese thought experiment demonstrates how a Turing test is not sufficient to establish that a machine can possess consciousness or thought, this argument does not prove that machines are absolutely incapable of consciousness or thought. Rather, given the ongoing uncertainty of the debate regarding the intelligence of machines, there can be no means to confirm or disconfirm the conscious experience of machines as well as the consciousness of humans by extension of that principle.

Rene Descartes’ “Discourse on the Method” focuses on distinguishing the human rationale, apart from animals and robots. Wherein, he does so by explaining how neither animals, nor machines possess the same mental faculties as humans. For Descartes distinguishes the human rationale apart from non-humans, even though he does agree the two closely resemble each other because of their sense organs, and physical functions (Descartes, pp22). Nevertheless, it is because the mechanical lacks a necessary aspect of the mind, which consequently separates them from humans. For in Descartes “Discourse on the Method,” he argues that the noteworthy difference between humans, and the mechanical is that machines are only responding to the world through of their sense organs. Whereas humans possess the significant faculties of reasoning, which allows them to understand external inputs and information obtained from the surrounding environment. This significantly creates a dividing ‘line’, which separates humans from non-humans. For in this paper, I will firstly distinguish the differences between the human and mechanical’s mentality in regards to Descartes “Discourse on the Method”. Secondly, I will theorize a modern AI that could possess the concept of an intellectual mind, and then hypothesize a powerful AI that lacks the ability to understand its intelligence. Lastly, in disagreeing in why there are no such machines that is equivalent to the human mind. For humans don’t possess all the