Joint Compressive Plan Of Action Analysis

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The Joint Compressive Plan of Action In March 2013, President Obama’s determination to achieve real progress in the nuclear negotiations during his second term led to the start of a secret round of negotiations with Iran. Rouhani’s election brought back Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, who had previously negotiated with the E3. In September, just months after the Iranian election, the outline of a deal (later known as JPOA) the between the two states broke surface. “According to The Guardian, the secret talks ‘were the reason why United States and Iran were able to strike a deal quickly after Rouhani’s victory’” (Entessar and Afrasiabi 36). In addition, by summer 2013, Iran had completed the range of activities associated with a…show more content…
(“Iran Nuclear Deal”). In addition, Iran agreed to enrich uranium to very low levels (3.67%); limit how much low-enriched uranium it has; dismantle its plutonium reactor, redesign it, and not build new reactors for 15 years. According to the same B.B.C. article, “should Iran violate any aspect of the deal, the UN sanctions will automatically "snap back" into place for 10 years, with the possibility of a five-year extension” (“Iran Nuclear Deal” 1). Regarding the IAEA, Iran agreed to ratify the Additional Protocol and the Safeguards Agreements and “enact inspection measures that will enable IAEA inspectors unprecedented access to its nuclear facilities” (“Iran” 1). Per the agreement, “the IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council” (“Full Text” 4). In addition, Iran signed a "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues" agreement with the IAEA to resolve any questions the Agency still has concerning the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program. This issue was reported as resolved by the IAEA Director General in his report to the Board of Governors in December 2015 (“Full Text” 10). To ensure Iran does not construct another enrichment facility like Natanz, the agreement allows for IAEA inspections of the entire fuel cycle, “from the mining stage through waste disposal, and monitor all centrifuge production facilities”

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