Joint Force Training

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

Being at war for the last 14 years the Army now finds it has the best trained and the most combat experienced force in its history. However, the intense focus on a relatively small number of mission sets such as irregular warfare detracts resources for the other missions required by Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). To address this shortfall, the Chief of Staff of the Army General Ray Odierno directed implementation of the Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) concept as means to address Combatant Command’s (CCMD) requirements. Regional alignment of Army units provides the GCC assigned units for a dedicated period , capable of executing myriad of specified missions as outlined in their Lines of Effort

During the latter part of FY16 and the beginning of FY17, the EEOCA cadre successfully conducted three Institutional Army Warfighter Assessments (IAWAs) designed to test the validity of the proposed curriculum. Substantive changes were instituted throughout the IAWA process and the finished version of POI 16.0 is pending approval and validation. Since the IAWA process, there has been a graduate rate of 64% and a total of 270 Soldiers will be trained during FY17. The desired outcome is a course that better meets the needs of all components, reduces resources, and trains the critical tasks to

The National Guard success comes largely from training. From real-life training exercises, field training, simulation training and distributed learning. In the event of an activation, leaders must

To answer this gap, the Office of Special Warfare (OSW) was developed to be the focal point for USASOC’s UW capability. With this change, each 4th Battalion across the regiment was redesigned to build a build a full spectrum UW capability in support of the Theatre Special Operations Command (TSOC) and Joint Force Commanders. It was during this re-design that the modern Jedburgh was re-born. Much like the World War II era Jedburghs, many skilled operators across the regiment jumped at the opportunity to enter a new phase of conflict and increase their skills in the application of unconventional warfare. With this personal commitment came the understanding that time would be allotted to build a small cohesive team with training and education needed to succeed in complex environment. This theory would soon be diminished because many of the newly selected Jedburghs, riding on the success of Jedburghs some seventy-two years ago, would be thrown straight into complex environment without the needed education and training. Premature operationalization of the Jedburghs has effected training, education, and organizational design needed to build a long lasting unconventional warfare

In these modern times, demonstrations, civil unrest, public disorder and riots are prevalent in our society. Joint Task Force Guantanamo Troopers with the 308th Military Police Company participate in riot control training on U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, July 29.

A submission to the Faculty of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements for Joint Professional Military Education Phase II. The contents of this submission reflect our writing team’s original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

The operational environment coupled with the transformation of the National Guard since the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) has created a vacuum, preventing the National Guards ability to train and maintain a force of Joint Qualified Officers (JQS) for the future. Today’s volatile, uncertain, and complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment require all officers’ to train and equip to operate in a joint spectrum of missions. Joint qualifications are as much of a necessity in today's environment as the component service expertise. Officers in the National Guard have difficulty obtaining official credit for joint operations, exercises, and training. Their participation has been invaluable and necessary to the success of warfighting operations, yet the experience and time served in joint arenas go overlooked.

CPT Nobles was the lead planner representing one of 48 concepts and capabilities examined during the Army Warfighting Assessment (AWA) 17.1 at Ft. Bliss, TX. Ben synchronized the efforts of a 15 man team from four different organizations across all Army components. He took 10 analytical observations from the tactical level exercise and developed recommendations including potential solutions to improve warfighting capability at the tactical and operational level echelons.

In today’s society, military style training is progressively becoming more necessary. With various factions and everyday citizens possessing weapons and anti-government sentiment, law enforcement should be trained in the tactical manners of military training to stay ahead of offenders. As seen in recent assaults around the country, society and law enforcement officers are being increasingly targeted with military precision and tactics. As a result, law enforcement officers should be afforded the most effective training available. Because the communities’ officer’s patrol can be attacked without notice or provocation, and with any manner of weapon, military style training provides the officers skills that if or when presented with a situation

Staff Non-Commissioned Officers can begin to prepare their Marines for the difficulties of Irregular Warfare by training their Marines to a high technical standard. It is important that a Marine is technically and tactically proficient in their MOS in order to have success on the battlefield and better support the forward warfighter. An example of a Marine having a high technical standards would be an airplane mechanic in an air wing unit that has mastered his skill and is able to rapidly and correctly fix a mechanical error on an aircraft. This will enable that unit to retain an acceptable level readiness and keep that unit operational. A platoon of poorly trained Marines can and will

As stewards of our profession, commanders ensure that military expertise continues to develop and be passed on to aspiring professionals through operational development. It is during this developmental phase that Professional Soldiers put their knowledge and skills to the test. Operational Army units certify and recertify their Professional Soldiers through repetitive and realistic training events including the Combat Life Saver Course, platoon live fires, and exercises at the National Training Center. In the course of these challenging and realistic experiences, the Army’s operational units develop Soldiers and leaders prepared to maintain high standards, discipline, and operational readiness. Operational development and adaptability will continue to drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, leadership, and education as we enter the post-war era. Without this kind of development, the Army could not maintain a well-disciplined professional fighting force.

Complacency is definitely one of the major reasons realistic training has suffered over the last few years. Multiple deployments, sometimes to the same area of operations, has fostered a laid back approach to unit’s road to war training. Even rotations to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) incorporated similar scenarios that don’t require too much complex thinking on behalf of the unit. In the last year JRTC has started focusing more on the DATE scenario in preparation for future conflicts. Units need to develop a training program to fill the gap between RL progression and deployments or CTC rotations.

The world is a complex changing environment. Due to globalization, we as a nation are more interconnected with the world around us and are affected by other nations. In the 21st century, we have witnessed the rise of a new enemy, motivated by religious ideology, which is waging a war that cannot be won through traditional means. If the United States Army wants to win in this changing environment, there needs to be focused, sustained and collaborative efforts that unify capabilities across war fighting functions to address the needs of the new world to accomplish the mission. The Army does this by asking questions that will help to shape the future force. These questions come from the Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFCs) which is a framework