Joint Force Training

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

However, US advisors should be assessing the individual potential and performance of our partners. To increase this capability, US forces must stress strong continuity of support for those partners identified as having exceptional potential given the short term of deployments. Internally, USARCENT must stress emotional intelligence, patience, and language skills in its own talent management strategies as well. Fighting BWT requires Army leaders who are masters of exercising expertise and informal authority instead of formal authority. While BWT requires fewer personnel to execute the mission, it requires them much more skilled and

Effective training results in the measured potential of our Soldiers, which will be communicated directly to them through monthly and performance counseling. This counseling should not be limited to admonishment but instead present goals and challenges to help develop them for levels of greater responsibility, giving them a better understanding of themselves and what they are capable of. Effective training develops effective systems and processes which streamline mission success and develop greater synergy of a unit’s performance capability, while developing tactically and technically proficient

To answer this gap, the Office of Special Warfare (OSW) was developed to be the focal point for USASOC’s UW capability. With this change, each 4th Battalion across the regiment was redesigned to build a build a full spectrum UW capability in support of the Theatre Special Operations Command (TSOC) and Joint Force Commanders. It was during this re-design that the modern Jedburgh was re-born. Much like the World War II era Jedburghs, many skilled operators across the regiment jumped at the opportunity to enter a new phase of conflict and increase their skills in the application of unconventional warfare. With this personal commitment came the understanding that time would be allotted to build a small cohesive team with training and education needed to succeed in complex environment. This theory would soon be diminished because many of the newly selected Jedburghs, riding on the success of Jedburghs some seventy-two years ago, would be thrown straight into complex environment without the needed education and training. Premature operationalization of the Jedburghs has effected training, education, and organizational design needed to build a long lasting unconventional warfare

Dr. Williamson Murray once declared a want to develop his Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) seminar students into hand grenades. His comments were, of course, figurative, but Murray communicated a vision: his company grade students would read more deeply, think more critically, write with greater effect, and ultimately be more willing to challenge conventional wisdom than their peers. Murray, with EWS, engineered the course, from initial selection through the final seminars, to meet his goal of a competent, well-armed officer prepared to make and recommend just decisions grounded in history.

CPT Nobles was the lead planner representing one of 48 concepts and capabilities examined during the Army Warfighting Assessment (AWA) 17.1 at Ft. Bliss, TX. Ben synchronized the efforts of a 15 man team from four different organizations across all Army components. He took 10 analytical observations from the tactical level exercise and developed recommendations including potential solutions to improve warfighting capability at the tactical and operational level echelons.

While serving as an instructor for the Husky and Buffalo Doctrine and Tactics Training (DTT), SSG Ross oversaw the training of over 15 Active Duty BEB’s and 10 Reserve Component Combat Engineer Clearance Companies, also helped redesign the training by using his combat experience to create a more realistic training environment. SSG Ross’s impact on route clearance training impacted the entire force’s ability to detect and clear explosive hazards, resulting in countless coalition and civilian lives saved.

2) Background information: ARMEDCOM's mission is to provide trained, equipped, ready, skill-rich citizen soldiers to meet medical requirements across the full spectrum of military operations. Human resource deployment in highly specialized jobs and to highly sensitive areas is achieved by ARMEDCOM, which is the premier medical command support unit of the Army Reserves (ARMEDCOM, 2012). In addition, ARMEDCOM provides Command & Control for Table of Distribution & Allowance (TDA) Reserve medical units within the contiguous US, providing medical support at home as well as abroad (ARMEDCOM, 2012). In this way, ARMEDCOM provides medical support for all Army operation at one level or another, and is an essential part of the national army reserves.

When Halstead was given this mission in Iraq, she never anticipated the challenge she would soon face. She had one year to plan her operation, train and certify her units for deployments and after months of painstaking preparation and training, Halstead was confident her soldiers and unit were ready to be certified for deployment. However, certification had to be issued by her superior, a three-star general recently back from Iraq—and the most challenging boss Halstead had ever encountered in all of her years of services.

Given the context of current strategic guidance, it is important to ask if the U.S. can be prepared to conduct both conventional and irregular warfare successfully. The answer is yes. However, preparation for conventional operations should always be the priority. Preparation for irregular warfare should not come at the expense of conventional warfare preparation. This is necessary because of the reasons discussed below: the strategic limitations of irregular warfare, the enduring nature of conventional war, resource constraints, and prioritization of operations and training.

The National Guard success comes largely from training. From real-life training exercises, field training, simulation training and distributed learning. In the event of an activation, leaders must

As stewards of our profession, commanders ensure that military expertise continues to develop and be passed on to aspiring professionals through operational development. It is during this developmental phase that Professional Soldiers put their knowledge and skills to the test. Operational Army units certify and recertify their Professional Soldiers through repetitive and realistic training events including the Combat Life Saver Course, platoon live fires, and exercises at the National Training Center. In the course of these challenging and realistic experiences, the Army’s operational units develop Soldiers and leaders prepared to maintain high standards, discipline, and operational readiness. Operational development and adaptability will continue to drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, leadership, and education as we enter the post-war era. Without this kind of development, the Army could not maintain a well-disciplined professional fighting force.

“Know the self, know the enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories” was a quote from the world renowned Chinese General and military strategist, Sun Tzu. I believe this quote speaks in multitudes to the basic fundamentals of tactics. To be successful in any battle, it is important that I not only know my strengths and weaknesses but those of my enemy as well. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-3 provides seven pillars that provide a solid foundation of military tactics. All seven topics are equally important; however this paper will be focused on achieving a decision, gaining an advantage, being faster, and making it happen (U.S. Marine Corps, 1997). As a Marine in a combat support military occupational speciality (MOS), it is essential to have a thorough understanding of tactics and its relation to my profession.

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

Were you given training to perform this job? If yes, what was the quality of that training? What are areas for improvement?