Joint Operational Planning

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

President Obama’s strategic plan in Iraq and Syria is to continue Airstrikes to slow the forward progression of ISIS, while utilizing deployed U.S. service members to work with coalition partners to assist with partner building capacities. These partners include “Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and moderate Syrian fighters, and both Sunni and Shia militia groups.”3 To be successful in this endear as mentioned by Sec Carter, “the only way to have a lasting defeat of ISIL is to have someone who can govern and secure territory once ISIL is defeated, a local force on the ground. That 's why the strategy calls for the United States to help train and equip, and then help enable local ground forces.”4 Without basic security the Government of Iraq (GOI)

The reframing led to the new priority from the transition approach to “protecting the Iraqi people”. The new objective would be to protect the Iraqi people while reducing ethnosectarian violence and defeating al-Qaeda. General Petraeus was selected to take command of the U.S. forces in Iraq leading the new strategy. Part of this change was President Bush’s approval of the surge forces, providing an additional five more brigades. General Petraeus went right to work implementing the new strategy of getting U.S. troops moved out of

In the early morning hours of the 19th of March 2003 the leviathan force better known as the United States military began an occupation to topple the brutal Saddam Hussein regime. The conflict later known as the Iraq War and dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom by the United States, brought together four separate nations to overturn Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist government. The war introduced tactics and strategies of urban warfare, the likes of which have never used by the U.S. military before; and despite President George W. Bush declaration on the 1st of May 2003 abroad the USS Abraham Lincoln, the war was anything but “mission accomplished.” Operation Iraqi Freedom consisted of twenty-one major battles throughout its rough ten-year occupation. Operation Phantom Fury, or better known as the Second Battle of Fallujah, was one of those strategic key battles. Then Major General Richard F. Natonski led the 1st Marine Division through Operation Phantom Fury. I will introduce a brief history of LTG Natonski, the strategic location of the City of Fallujah, and an in-depth critical analysis of the mission command throughout the deadliest battle in the Iraq War.

Arranging operations is an operational design element used to develop the synergy of effects against the adversary as well as anticipate and mitigate risks in the operational approach. The dual operation in response to the Kuwait invasion offers very clear examples of this element. Concepts used in arranging operations include phasing, sequel, timing and tempo, branches, simultaneity, and depth.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

Whereas lines of operation (LOOs) emphasize the position of enemy and friendly forces relative to each other, a LOE, according to JP 5-0, “links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.” LOE are most useful “when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance, such as in counterinsurgency or stability operations.” Planners would use LOOs for aspects of the campaign that are focused on the maneuver of forces. LOEs would apply to the stability operations-focused part of the

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Within days of Iraqi forces invading Kuwait in 1990, President Bush publicly backed the United Nations’ (UN) stance on the incursion with four national strategic objectives and determined that, ‘if invited, US forces would be deployed to deter further Iraqi attacks, defend Saudi Arabia and enforce UN resolutions.’ From the national strategic objectives, the military end-state is deduced. The military end-state is a conceptual element of operational design which describes the conditions that forces must achieve to attain strategic objectives/ hand over main effort responsibilities. The military end-state does not necessarily indicate the end of a military activities to attain national objectives. While one specific national objective would not

I showed up relatively late to the war, or so I thought at the time. My first deployment was in the midst of the chaotic surge of 2006. When I arrived in Iraq, I found faith in my training and hoped that my fellow comrades’ experiences would fine-tune my skills. Since that time, I have learned numerous things about our Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). To my surprise, the poor decisions I learned about while reading the book Roberts Ridge, have influenced the

Iraq began the crisis with one of the world's larger armies, equipped with great numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery, some of which were state-of-the-art models. It had a sizable air force with many top-line fighters and fighter-bombers (F-1s, MiG-29s and Su-24s) and a modern air defense command and control (C2) system. During the last six months of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi army had demonstrated a capability to conduct multi-axis, multi-corps, combined-arms operations deep into hostile territory. The staff could conduct long-range planning; coordination of air and artillery preparations; timing of movements and operations; coordination of complicated logistics requirements; and movement of supplies, equipment, and troops to the right place at the designated time. They had developed excellent operational security and deception. Iraqi ground forces had more than 5,000 main battle tanks, 5,000 armored infantry vehicles, and 3,000 artillery pieces

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protective (MRAP) program featured remarkable speed of development and mass production at the same time that the United States shifted its counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. The main controversy over the MRAP program revolved around the three year delay from its initial identification as a need to its production. This paper asserts that while MRAP development and production speed was impressive, the slow realization of the enemy’s Improvised Explosive Device (IED) capability and the lack of doctrine and concept development led to inaction. To support this position, this essay describes the strategic environment with its competing demands, and it highlights the roles of senior leaders, the Armed Services and the Combatant

The Iraq insurgency, and the US strategy to deal with that problem ultimately proved to be more complicated than originally thought. The simplicity that framed the initial phase IV strategy was ineffective and lacked understanding of the operational environment. If US leaders and policy makers would have had a better understanding of the context of the insurgency, phase IV planning may have allowed a timelier and more efficient transition to Iraqi government control. As a tool to aid military leaders and staffs, the Cynefin model can increase understanding of problems unique to new operating environments, such as the Iraq insurgency. By understanding cause and effect relationships, leaders can make better contextual decisions within their

The 'Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) case study is regarding the U.S-Philippines partnership in counter-terrorism (CT) operations that took place from 2002-2011. The CT operation was titled as 'Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) and was conducted by the partnership of Philippine security forces and US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The CT cooperation took place at three levels, tactical, operational, and strategic. The role of JSOTF was that of 'advise and assist' whereby ground operations were conducted by the Philippine forces. The US cooperation for CT in Philippines was guided by the Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and a policy and action framework to act as a binding framework for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational CT operations using full range of military operational capacity. The OEF-P was also conducted by incorporating JP 5-0 principles and guidelines of engagement. The OEF-P took place in Southern Philippines. Following is an assessment how the US forces used termination, military end state, and objectives of operational design (Joint Pub 5-0, page III-18) to develop and refine their operational approach.