Joint Pub 3.0 Analysis

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective strategy. These contrasts are reflections of each author’s perspective on how war should be waged, the proper use of force, their definitions of the ideal victory and how best to achieve that victory as well as their methodologies,

Ever since the beginning of time, there has been conflict and conflict will always play a role in the development of history. The world has experienced hundreds of wars with countless casualties, these wars date back to the 10th Century and forward to the present. The United States of America is no stranger to war having participated in over 100 wars either it being a small war or a world war. Michael C. C. Adams “The Best War Ever” gives a rational explanation on the events that led the U.S to become the powerhouse country after sacrificing so much for the war, or did they? In this paper we will support the argument made in Adams “The Best War Ever” Chapter four, appropriately titled “The American War Machine”, other primary sources used will be such as Harry S. Truman first speech to congress in April 1945 and General George S. Patton’s praise speech to the Third Army. The argument being that the U.S did in fact play an impacting role in the outcome of World War 2 but how it also used appearances as an advantage to further develop itself as an international force, just like the tale from the Trojan War, the Trojan horse was all about appearances but with a precise objective.

Although, their conclusions can still be questioned, they have applied intensive and through analysis to their material, widening their subjects and have given legitimate reasoning for their views. While Brown has proven how terms such as War Hawks can be misleading, Horsman has provided enough evidence to prove that the War Hawks did exist and has successfully defined the term War Hawk with greater accuracy than other historians. Both the essays exhibit how historians should be aware of the material they use and careful about their generalizations when explaining such broad

One apparent reason why Johnson’s policies failed is because he didn’t acknowledge the military’s strength or potential in the war. According to General Curtis LeMay, “America’s greatest strength… is our air and naval power… We must use it strategically” (Document E). In other words, General LeMay believes the US military is very powerful and plays a crucial role in the war. LeMay alludes to the fact that the military has not been used in the most effective way possible. It refers to the current war

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

The realization, however, came with a stark reality: in order to obtain access to overseas markets, the US would need to devise clever strategies to validate and facilitate these aims. So, while power-hungry business moguls were busy conjuring up plans as to how to bring this about, government and military officials like Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Lodge, President McKinley and Captain A. T. Mahan sought to extend the political and military presence of US forces around the world. The plan was to gain a foothold, and eventually be positioned to control leaders and policies of overseas nations. Naturally, it was a plan that would require the careful construction of outwardly logical

To follow their goals in wartime, states tap their economic, political, and diplomatic resources and experiences, as well as their military ones. All of these are elements of grand strategy. Strategy means the larger use of military force. Some examples include implementing blockades, wear and tear, exhaustion, and applying immediate pressure at many points.

While the development of guerrilla war does not factor into Weigley’s thesis that the United States has moved from a strategy of attrition to a strategy of annihilation, it is important in understanding how and why the United States made that change. For Weigley, this change came during the American Civil War when Grant became Commanding General of the Army. Grant did not believe the war could be won with a single, decisive victory against the Confederate Army, rather, he initiated a strategy to destroy the Confederate Armies through many battles and by attacking their economic resources. The orders to begin destroying the war resources of the Confederacy may have had their roots in the Western and Trans-Mississippian Theaters of the war because of frustrations associated with guerrilla war.

For the United States government, the failure of U.S intervention in Vietnam provided lessons about where and under what circumstances the United States should intervene in foreign conflicts. Throughout the mid-twentieth century, U.S. foreign policy was characterized by the idea of “containment”. Coined by George Kennan in 1946,

This period represented the model of what war “ought to look like.” According to Tierney, following 1945, the United States stopped winning major wars. For him, the United States did not win in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. However, the term win is somewhat elusive. In Korea, the outcome was inconclusive as the goal of liberating North Korea was not met. Yet, the United States did successfully defend South Korea from totalitarianism. Perhaps this should open the debate as to how winning is defined. The current war in Afghanistan suffers the same criticism in that, even after a decade of war, the terms of conflict were not accurately defined. Tierney’s view of winning is rather narrow. The challenge is to provide a more realistic assessment of victory which does not simply consider the defeat of the adversary, but examines the attainment of

In conclusion, The American Way of War is an iconic book filled with the glorious moments of traditional strategic warfare. Weigley’s work was great on focusing purely on the details of American strategy. Weigley also did a good job in keeping it interesting knowing that it would be pretty difficult with this

The development of the allied military strategy in World War II (WWII) presented challenges for the U.S. and Great Britain as they worked together to defeat the Axis powers. First, this paper will review the environment at the time of WWII when Admiral Stark penned the “Plan Dog” memorandum and MAJ Wedemeyer’s War Defense Team put together the “Victory Plan”. Next, it will look at the advantages and disadvantages of coalition operations with supporting examples. Then, a review of two major meetings between U.S. and Great Britain will identify what strategic decisions were made and the effects they have on the war. Finally, this paper will explore the foundations of strategy (Clausewitz and Sun Tzu) by which the allied forces used and

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

While “The Art of War” was written by Sun Tzu during the 6th century B.C., long before the colonization of the Americas, the onslaught of the Crusades, and before the Persian Wars of around 490 B.C., it remains relevant to this day. There is also strong evidence that the work inspired Napoleon and was used in the planning of Operation Desert Storm. “The Art of War” has withstood the sands of time due to its simplistic approach, and its applicability to non-military strategies. “The Art of War“, interpreted by Gerald, A. Michaelson, as well as other authors, use Sun Tzu’s timeless strategies and apply them to the modern day corporate world.