Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 and Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2 have slightly different definitions of insurgency. JP 3-34 defines it as the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. FM 3-24.2 defines it as a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. I have problems with both definitions. However, I disagree more with the joint publication. This paper will explain why.
I actually agree with the dictionary definition. According to Webster's, an insurgency is an organized rebellion aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The joint publication expands the definition by inserting the phrase "or force change of". To me there are distinctions between insurgency, terrorism, and separatism. On the surface they seem minor. However, upon further analysis, this seemingly innocuous addition actually blurs those distinctions.
The word overthrow is clear. It connotes that the goal is for the constituted government to cease to exist. The means for achieving this desired end state, depending on the
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Forcing change can mean anything from complete overthrow to power sharing to policy shifts. If it means overthrow, then the phrase is superfluous because that concept was already stated in the definition. Thus the additional wording adds no value. It only adds confusion. If forcing change means power sharing or policy concessions, but the constituted government is allowed to remain in existence, then you have terrorism. The means for achieving this desired end state tends to be limited wars of attrition. An example of terrorism includes Usama bin Laden and the 911 hijackers, whose desired end state was to drive the United States out of the Middle East, not to overthrow the United States
The use of Irregular Warfare has been ongoing for years around the world. Irregular warfare is described as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. I will discuss where the U.S. may apply military force in conjunction with other means of national power to stabilize the nation of Somalia. I will also discuss why it would be considered as an Irregular Warfare environment.
Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its new foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
To overthrow is to take over the government, either certain characters in the government or even the whole governmental system. To achieve this, there are two major methods. The first is to use violence against the government. To attack the police would be considered as an act of rebellion and an attempt to take over the government. The other method is take over by political means such as voting against a person. To campaign against certain person, in some cases, can be considered as an overthrowing, but most campaigns are just an expression of ideas that oppose the idea of the government, not necessarily an overthrowing of the government itself. Just as how to correct a teacher would be to reform the teacher of a certain thought or method,
Counterinsurgency is the act against the activities of guerrilla warfare tactics or revolutionaries by military or political action. In a sense, states are trying to make peace without war. Counterinsurgency came into effect after the end of World War 1. Increasing mechanization is one the main reasons for this. The United States in an attempt to be proactive, as always, adopted a new way in which to possibly defeat insurgents.
Carl von Clausewitz stated that “the value of [the] object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.” (Clausewitz, 92) With that maxim in mind, it makes strategic sense for an outside power to intervene in an insurgency when it supports the power’s policy objective and the cost of the intervention does not exceed the value of the object.
As with much of Latin America, the support for insurgency came from peasants and indigenous communities who had been displaced from their lands by elites (UNDP 2006). The government officially became engaged in counterinsurgency in 1960, following a coup attempt and the establishment of formal revolutionary groups under the URNG umbrella. However, it is noteworthy that during its initial years, instead of large scale guerrilla war, the conflict took the shape of political oppression. It was not until 1966 that there was a clear military counterinsurgency effort (Ball, 1999). Deaths and assassinations per year did not surpass 500 in the first two decades (Ibid). However, during the 80s, this number rose to approximately 18,000 deaths per year (Ibid). Army numbers surpassed 40,000, with the support of 500,000 members of civil patrols, while the URNG had a total of approximately 2,000 soldiers (Keel, 1998). Some scholars have gone as far as suggesting that “guerrilla groups did not have the strength or numbers to pose a serious threat,” and that the war went on for as long as it did merely because it allowed the government to eliminate opposition of all types (Chapman, 2001). The continuation of the war benefitted the two main actors: insurgent groups who wanted to achieve national prominence, and the government, whose power and cruelty was justified as counterinsurgency. Paramilitary groups stood
overthrow a form of government that had been used for centuries, in a country that was and still
Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are
The book Adapting to Win is about a style of warfare called Insurgency. The author Katagiri Noriyuki explains that the new age of global conflicts that uses asymmetric warfare is not really asymmetric but uses a term called “extrasystemic”. The reason that wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are not really asymmetric warfare, but are extrasystemic is because asymmetric warfare is fought by two established powers and with the growing non state sponsored insurgents they are classified as extrasystemic. The author’s thesis in this book is about why an insurgency is successful or not, based on the model of insurgency used. I believe that the author does a good job explaining his thesis, but I do not really agree with the new classification of extrasystemic.
Due to its changing nature and different political viewpoints, terrorism is hard to define. Most definitions tend to include some form of fear created through an act of violence. While violence is the tactic, the goal is fear which will serve to create a desired change as a result. However, this definition has not always been appropriate for terrorism. Take for instance the words of Edmund Burke, a British philosopher, who described the situation in France in the 18th century French Revolution as a “Reign of Terror,” (White, Jonathan. 2013. "Defining Terrorism in Modern History." In Terrorism and Homeland Security 3-27, Wadsworth Centage Learning pp 7). In this time period terrorism was a word of the people in describing the brutal tactics of the government which were meant to keep the people in line. Because one time period is looking at
The conditions that people may alter or abolish their government are any circumstances in which the majority of the people feel oppressed and the rights to freedom are removed. When governing a people there has to be limitations on freedom. My understanding of the word freedom is having the ability to do what you please as long as you refrain from the physical or
Guerrillas fluctuate broadly in size, make‑up, strategies, and routines starting with one insurrection then onto the next. They even fluctuate broadly inside of an uprising, particularly in each of the three periods of a rebellion.
“The basic equation of guerrilla war is as simple as it is difficult to execute: the
I would challenge you to look at insurgents as more of a political movement. While there may be similarities with extremists, since some insurgent groups have employed terrorism, their goals are more politically motivated. For example, look at the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had overtaken the government with the support of the people utilizing mainly hearts and minds. Granted, the Muslim Brotherhood's ideals were altered over time to utilize threat tactics and tortures on their own people but this eventually lead to their downfall. They betrayed the people that had helped them rise. On the other hand, extremists employ terrorist utilize aggression against non-combatants with few internal reservations. Ultimately I believe both extremists and
In recent studies and readings of wars, I would agree with the definition of Insurgency for JP 3-24 and FM 3-24.2. I want to focus on the definition part that says to overthrow, force, weaken, or change a government. This is crucial in defining why I support the term insurgency and what it means.