Joint Strike Fighter Program Analysis

Throughout the history of Air Defense Artillery (ADA), innovative steps were made for the technological advance in weaponry to defend our skies and ground forces. The diverse history and continuous research and development of air defense systems played a vital role in the safety of ground troops and foreign civilians during the Persian Gulf crisis. Though not always in the forefront of battle, ADA had its own vital roles that it played from the time of its birth, and it was no different during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield when necessity helped to bring about the evolution of the PAC-II Patriot missile.

Joint Special Operation Command requires individuals who are self-reliant, adaptable, and competent in assigned tasks and responsibilities. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced and rely heavily on human assets for mission success. The ideal candidate for JSOC is a well-rounded individual capable of adapting to challenges in new environments while completing the mission at hand.

The past decade has witnessed fundamental changes in the information environment, which makes availability and access to information more prevalent than in the past. For this reason, we must develop and maintain the ability to influence the content and flow of information to potential adversaries, as well as foreign civilian audiences in the area of operations.

The Department of Defense Education Activity has a duty to providing the higher quality of education to its learners by exposing the student with an effective curriculum that reflecting high expectations and standards (DoDEA, 2012). Department of Defense Activity is an agency of civilian of the United States Department of Defense managing all schools for the children and teenagers of military personnel in the United States as well overseas at American military bases around the world; this agency also provides support to more than a million military linked learners who are attending public schools within the United States (Wikipedia,

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2014 outlines the details regarding the current and future security environment. The QDR uses current lessons in order to list the most significant threats, challenges, and opportunities.

“Guys talk about Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) being the right place for light Infantry, but very few understand the power of a mechanized heavy battalion in an urban environment” -Lieutenant Colonel Pete A. Newell (Matthews, n.d.)

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Tragedy stuck America on November 4th of 1979, when 52 hostages were seized at the American Embassy in Iran during the midst of the Iranian Revolution. Different policy approaches prompted a vast range of potential actions, and ultimately “Operation Eagle Claw” was carried out between April 21st and 25th of 1980. The two primary executive divisions in dispute during decision process were the National Security Council (NCS) and its advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of the Department of State (DOS), Cyrus Vance. The decision for the use of military force, rather than continuing economic sanctions and diplomacy, was due to Carter’s attempt at re-election and a lack of resistance from Congress.

The F-35 Program meets this criteria and it is one of the reasons that it enjoys bipartisan support of its continuance. Many congress members are reluctant to suggest cancelling the program, despite its underwhelming performance, because of its widespread economic impact. Political engineering has resulted in an iron triangle among Congress, Lockheed Martin lobbyists, and Department of Defense bureaucrats whom seek to prioritize their interests ahead of the nation’s interest. This has led to a lack of fiscal and program accountability within the F-35 program.

1.The general differences between a geographic combatant command (GCC) and a functional command start with the titles, and is codified in what is called the Unified Command Plan establishing joint commands. A geographic combatant is responsible for a specific geographic portion of the world called an Area of Responsibility. The world is divided into 6 geographic areas, and respectively the commands that are responsible for all military operations in those regions are as follows:

Fort Bliss, Texas, 2003 5-52 Air Defense Battalion prepared to depart for their one year tour to Iraq. 5-52’s main objective to support the initial invasion of Iraq by providing protection to the invading U.S. ground forces from airborne threats. The Patriot Air Defense System is seen as the perfect weapon system for the job and 5-52 as the best battalion to man it. 5-52 arrives in Iraq in March, 19, 2003 with five Patriot battery’s, they were quickly split into two separate teams, Alpha, Bravo, and Echo Battery are tasked to provide forward coverage force that would move with the allied ground forces. Charlie and Delta are attached to the 32nd AAMDC and is to remain in Kuwait to defend the city and all military assets in the area.

In 2009, Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) convinced the President (POTUS) and Congress to truncate the F22 program, leaving the U.S. Air Force (USAF) with less than 190 operational 5th Generation air to air and air to ground combatants, this number of operational F22 was well short of the 381 the USAF estimated they needed to meet mission requirements. (AWC 1/ site) Robert Gates terminated the F22 production because of its low return on investments (ROI) for the U.S. taxpayer caused by the change in the U.S. Security and Strategic Environments and the obsolescent nature of the U.S. Department of Defense acquisition and development process leading to very expensive and marginally effective aircraft, which simply was not worth the investment. This essay will explore how the actual cost, including opportunity cost, of F22 capabilities were too expensive and unnecessary in today’s security and strategic environments. It will also expose the obsolete and probably corrupt nature of the Department of Defense weapons procurement process and Secretary Gates attempts to change this process.

the majority of nations consider Al-Qaeda and other such groups to be evil, and US to be good to fight against bad.

A goal is defined as the desired result a person anticipates and plans to accomplish. For example the ultimate goal in college is to graduate. It is the big idea of any mission. A company may have a goal to be the best pizza service in the state. So, for Amazon, it could be reduce the cost of books, or it could be drive profit by increasing the cost of shipping. Goals can be long or short term goals. For example, a short term goal could be drink water all week. A long-term goal could be set freshman year of college which is to graduate on time. A goal is anything that an individual, company, school, or organization set to be achieved.

It was the winter months of 1777 at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania and the Continental Army was in the middle of a six-month encampment. The Soldiers there faced some of the war’s worst conditions. General Robert H. Barrow, (USMC 1980) stated that "Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.” And it is very evident from that winter the Americans did not study logistics. According to ADRP 4-0, “Sustainment is crucial to the success of operations. It must be planned and synchronized with the operation at every level. It is dependent upon joint and strategic links and must be meticulously coordinated to ensure resources are delivered to the lowest level of need.” The lowest level of need is the Soldier, the warfighter.