Judicial Diversity And Constitutional Interpretation

The given statement suggests that the emphasis on judicial diversity is unnecessary since there is no guarantee that a diverse judiciary would arrive at a different decision than that of a conservative judiciary. This essay attempts to argue that although there is no evidence that a diverse bench would radically change the outcome of a given case, the quality of justice will be substantially enhanced by the inclusion of a range of perspectives from which are currently not represented by the English judiciary.

The current Supreme Court is the most powerful branch of government, and one that may shape the course of democracy for generations to come. The current Supreme Court is made up of nine justices. The four oldest justices are 79, 76, 75, and 73 years of age; Five of the nine justices are Conservative Republicans; Three of the justices are women: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan; One of the justices is African-American: Clarence Thomas; and Sonia Sotomayor is the first Hispanic-American to serve on the Supreme Court. Eight of the justices come out of the appellate court system, and Elena Kagan was the solicitor general. The Court today is divided almost equally along partisan lines. On the corporate front, this is an extremist court, a court that has shifted extremely to the far right. In important cases decided 5-4, it is usually the Republican-chosen quintet that provides the victory. The Supreme Court is now a corporate court that by giving big business the advantage is shrinking access to justice for everyday citizens (Edwards, chapter 15 and Bill Moyer).

It is often believed that the relationship between certainty and flexibility in judicial precedent has struck a fine line between being necessary and being precarious. The problem is that these two concepts of judicial precedent are seen as working against each other and not in tandem. There is proof, however, that as contrasting as they are on the surface they are actually working together to achieve one common goal.

This is not to say that they do not have the intent to try to rule neutrally, or that the oath of office taken is cast by the wayside like refuse. Rather, I purport that the very process under which they have risen to be considered for the bench is a political one, and indeed makes them a part

The judge selection process in the USA today differs from one state to the other. Each state has its defined procedures to select and dismiss a judge from service. However, some of the States share the guidelines in choosing judges. Another common thing in the selection process is that all judges serve for a period of time upon which one is supposed to be elected to serve in the judiciary for another term. In this paper, the main focus is the selection process of the judge in Tennessee State. It also evaluates the similarities and differences between Tennessee State selection processes against Texas State.

Proponents of Judicial Elections argue that electing judges at a state level allows the judges to reconnect with the people in a closer way and to be more sensitive towards public opinion. However, the Judiciary system, unlike its other two counterparts, was not created to be a democratic institution. Instead, it was built to examine whether the government or the people are acting in accordance to law. Therefore, I oppose Judicial Elections for several reasons. One, it introduces partisanship to a supposedly impartial system and two, it risks disrupting the initial purpose of the Judiciary System which is to counterbalance the steps taken by the Congress and the Executive branch with the law.

78 examining issues surrounding the judiciary department of the new government being proposed. In his paper, Hamilton justifies the method of appointing the judges, the tenure by which they are to hold their places, and the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other. The method of appointing judges was fully discussed in earlier papers, and Hamilton saw no need in reiterating what was already said. Hamilton states that judges appointed are to hold their offices “during good behavior” (Bianco & Canon, 2015, p. A18). Hamilton’s belief that the standard of good behavior for the duration in office was one of the most valued advances in government. Basing a judge’s tenure on good behavior “secures a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws” (Bianco & Canon, 2015, p.

There are oblivious things in life that restrict us, they are called rules. Nobody prefers to play a game by the guidelines, but there are reasons for them to exist. The purpose is to maintain the fairness of the game. And for that reason, we have professionals like, umpires, referees, and justices who help to maintain the integrity of these procedures. Nobody pays to watch the umpire in a ballgame, but they are needed to enforce the rules. Similarly, a justice is needed to aid a nation comply by the rules. Comparably, Chief Justice John Roberts (Roberts) of the United States Supreme Court is an outstanding example of that. In this article, the author explains why Roberts makes decisions the way that he does even though they are considered constraints by many. The decisions made by justices should be unbiased and non- sympathetic to a particular political party or else the political system will suffer.

Judicial deliberations are different from that of the legislature because judiciaries at the federal level do not represent constituents or seek to be reelected. Judicial independence at the federal level provides a guarantee that judges are free to rule in an honest and nonpartisan manner that is in line with the law and evidence, without concern or fear of interference, control, or improper influence from anyone. This guarantee is provided because judges at the federal level are appointed for life, and need not to worry about partisanship. Contrary to the legislature, the government does not pose a consequential threat to the power of judicial independence because it is at war with itself. However, it is commonly seen that judges at the federal level rely too heavily on

Immediately consequent to being appointed, former U.S. President George W. Bush put across his thinking in regard to judicial appointments and made it clear that he intended this matter to be especially important when considering his administration's policies. It is very probable that the majority of voters chose to elect Bush as a president as a result of the fact that they were acquainted with his strategies in regard to the appointment of judges. His choices actually demonstrate that he was not necessarily interested in naming judges that would create a diverse environment, as he was actually concerned about appointing judges that would play a strategic role in the general state of affairs in the U.S.

In regards to the interpretation of the US Constitution, Scalia’s originalism is argued to be different from other varieties of originalism, such as interpretations that look to the intentions of a statute’s authors to examine the meaning of the statute. According to Scalia, in order to understand content from the text, jurists must use the judicial tradition and canon when they are faced with an obscure passage. Addressing statutory interpretation, the jurist has the full body of judicial

In 1968, Hensley initiated a more comprehensive survey on how national bias may affect the decision-making of the ICJ members. With the data covering ICJ’s decisions on 54 claims in contentious cases between 1946 and 1964, he analyzed a total number of 638 votes. In this research, Hensley found that the votes of regular judges from party states and ad hoc judges deviated from the votes of other Court members by 22% and 44%. While similar deviation are also found in the voting record of the advisory opinion. Hensley argued that national bias not only affects the judges’ decision making in contentious cases but also extended to advisory opinion cases. By highlighting how the voting patterns of the national judges differ from judges from non-party

Judicial selection and appointment is important in securing an independent judiciary as seen by the politicisation of the judiciary. In the UK and US the system of electing Justices is highly politicised. In the US it is ultimately up to the President to choose a Justice who fits his political ideology and philosophy. There is a clear divide between Justices nominated by Republican Presidents (Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito) and those nominated by Democrats President (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan). Presidents seek to nominate Justices who share similar political views. Republicans tend to nominate strict constructionists who favour a more narrow reading of the Constitution and Democrats tend to appoint loose constructionists who believe in a broad interpretation of the Constitution. Elena Kagen received only a single Republican vote and Sonia Sotomayor did not receive any. It is unlikely that the Republicans considered them to be underqualified, and more likely that they

Over the years, judicial diversity has been an issue of concern for Wales and England. Reform initiatives and debates for judicial diversity are critical features of various common law jurisdictions. The country faces gender and ethnicity diversity as the major dimension of inclusiveness in the judicial system. Critics have raised general

The expectation from our judges that they will always act objectively in making their decisions is correct but only to a certain extent. By using the theories of interpretation and judicial decision-making of both Dworkin and American Legal Realism, it is evident that a balancing act occurs between objective judgments and interpretation and subjective judgments and interpretation. Often, subjective judgments are the most dominant to a large extent. One must look at the ideas of Dworkin in terms of considering that judgments have aspects of both objectivity and subjectivity. One must also look at the ideas of American Legal Realism where subjectivity plays a gigantic role in judgments leaving objectivity with little or no influence