Kant And Korsgaard's The Prichardian Challenge

When there are many biocentric individualists appealing to extend the moral standing to the other creatures than human, they always focus their minds on the every individual in the system no matter whether this individual is either conscious or non-conscious. Like the Taylor argued, “conscious or not, all are equally teleological centers of life in the sense that each is unified system of goal0oriented activities directed toward their preservation and well-being.” (taylor, 210). Gary Varner, as one member in the group of the biocentric individualism, is also having the similar argument that every non-conscious and conscious entity should have the moral standing in the different way. In this essay, I will first dispart and reconstruct Gary Varner’s argument into four premises and then indicate how it contradicts with the Peter Singer’s argument whose view is deviate from that of Varner in terms of the required conditions with which giving one entity moral standing.

Lawrence Kohlberg, a developmental psychologist, identified six developmental stages of human moral reasoning. The first stage that he recognized was the Punishment-Obedience Orientation, where the person’s concern is for avoiding punishment through obedience. The second stage was the Instrumental Relativist Orientation, where the person’s concern is to work in their self interest, and better their position. The third stage of moral development was the Good Boy-Nice Girl Orientation, where the person’s concern lies with their reputation. Next was the Law And Order Orientation, where the person was less concerned with their own immediate well being to the maintenance of a larger society. The fifth stage was the Social Contract

The leading premise claimed by Singer is a simple thought that provides clear direction or suggestion of one’s moral implication: "if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out" (Taylor, 2009). We can assume that no matter one's ethical views, wading into the water is nothing in comparison to the death of a child. The impact of Singer's argument relies on a carefully worded, yet agreeable set of claims that has a range of reasonable objections. Singer emphasizes the use of common sense in making judgments about moral and ethical choices and does this by daring the reader to question their own views of morality.

21. One of the most hotly debated criticisms of Kohlberg’s moral reasoning theory is that the theory is based on a longitudinal study of only

Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development has served as basis of the investigation of many issues related to morality. Building on Piaget’s belief that the moral judgment of children derived from their cognitive development, Kohlberg attend to identify cognitive stages that underline the development of moral thinking.

In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, Philippa Foot argues against Immanuel Kant, that morality exists in hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. For Kant, categorical imperatives alone serve as moral commands, and it would be impossible for a moral system to be based on hypothetical imperatives because such imperatives serve as means to ends and result from maxims that cannot be universalized into perfect duties. Despite this, Foot holds that acting on many hypothetical imperatives can be morally praiseworthy and can even serve as the basis of moral judgments. Although I agree with Foot that hypothetical imperatives can have moral worth, in this paper, I will argue that a morality based on the purposes that hypothetical imperatives are directed toward appears to be circular. To do this, I will explain Foot’s theory of how morality is known and binds. Then, I will argue that this theory is insufficient to explain the moral purpose that hypothetical imperatives must be directed toward, thus begging the question of what is the moral basis of the purpose directed toward in the hypothetical imperative.

MacIntyre introduces his first critique that modern debate has turned into an attack on personal identity, rather than a rational justification independent of theological, legal, or personal beliefs. He blames the Enlightenment as the "predecessor culture” in which emotivism first rooted itself in philosophy (39). He first points to is Soren Kierkegaard, who wrote Entern-Eller in 1842. The Copenhagen philosopher stated that one can choose to live the ethical or aesthetic life, meaning that one can choose to live by rules of ethics or one’s own perception of rational basis of morality. MacIntyre disagrees, since he believes the, "the ethical is [supposed] to have authority over us”, not choices based on rationality (43). Any attempt to justify morality on grounds of ethical or aesthetic fail because arguments moved from assumptions of human nature to questioning the authority of moral

Korsgaard takes Kant’s Formula of Universal Law to mean the following: “[one should] never…act on a maxim that [one] could not at the same time will to be a universal law.” For Korsgaard, it is impossible to will that a maxim be universally followed when the goal of that action would become unreachable if everyone practiced that action. For example, if everyone cheated at poker in order to win money, then no one would play poker and the goal of cheating would be made unreachable. From this interpretation, Korsgaard arrives at the “test question” for whether an action is right. The test question is “Could this action be the universal method of achieving this purpose?” If the answer is no, then that action would undercut its own goal if it were

In her work, The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard is critical of a number of acclaimed philosophers, Anscombe among the bunch. The structure of her criticism is, however, is largely unclear and somewhat indefinable. She recognizes that in Anscombe’s views about moral ideas of ‘ought’ and ‘obligation’ are connected to a divine law conception of ethics and without that connection to God and God like Sovereign, lack sense. Korsgaard mentions this particular view that Anscombe has because Korsgaard seeks to disarm that very notion. Korsgaard defends the concept of obligation without connecting it to divine law. She believes that even without divine law, people will still act with obligation. She believes and defends the idea of an agent

He persuasively unveils imperatives both universal and hypothetical, the elements of unconventional practical reason, and examples of extreme controversy that force people to consider situations from a previously unconsidered moral perspective; however, Kant’s initial moral work is not without its critique: ranging from

Korsgaard says that humans naturally have the instinct to do what is right and not do what is wrong. She goes on to explain the four conceptions for the “sources of normativity of morality.” I’d like to go over voluntarism and see how or if it aligns with moral obligation being directional in structure. The first part discussed, is the that obligations derive from God. God is the relevant authority. It’s saying, “I must act because God commands me to act. God, I believe, does not have anything

The theory of moral development, advanced by psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg is one of the most well-known persuasive theories in the field of cognitive science and stems from the work of Jean Piaget, which hypothesizes on the direct correlation that exists between moral and cognitive development. Kohlberg speaks of the appearance and understanding of what is right and wrong from childhood to adulthood and explains by this transition through the identification of various levels of morality known as pre-conventional, conventional and post conventional. People will make decisions based on the understanding of the possible outcome and through reasoning of morals. (Target Concept)

In the reading of The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard discusses four basic theories for the justification of morality: Voluntarism, Realism, Reflective Endorsement, and the Appeal to Autonomy. For the purpose of this essay, I will be defining Voluntarism, outlining the argument that Korsgaard presents for Voluntarism, and explain her criticism for why it fails. First of all, let me start off by defining the meaning of Voluntarism. Voluntarism is the theory that God or the ultimate nature of reality is to be conceived as some form of will (or conation). This theory is contrasted to intellectualism, which gives primacy to God’s reason. (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) The will, as referred to in the

Frans de Waal begins his argument by first stating the question as to whether or not a human’s moral actions originated from the psychological and behavioral nature of our evolutionary ancestors. He concludes this thought by saying that our moral actions do, in fact, originate from the psychological and behavioral nature of our evolutionary ancestors. De Waal further argues that the foundations of human morals are found in the primates of today. They are composed of actions and emotions whose evolutionary role assists us in our social organization and unity. In the beginning pages of his book, De Waal