Karl Popper And Imre Lakatos

He explains why UCTs are as popular as they are in modern society, and why people should nevertheless disregard and approach them with caution. What Keeley refers to as “virtues” are the reason for the popularity of UCTs. He gives the virtue of explanatory reach as the first and main reason for UCTs popularity, which is the account of all knowledge including errant data. This is in stark contrast to the received theory, which is imperfect by nature. This quality of UCTs is particularly attractive because it appeals to human rationality by allowing for no loopholes. Keely argues that errant data alone is not significant enough, and that a theory should never fit all of the data. This leads into one of the main points, concerning falsifiability and skepticism. Unfalsifiability is acceptable when the item or person under investigation is not actively trying to escape from the investigator. Keeley contends that the problem is not the innate unfalsifiability, but rather the increasing amount of skepticism required. Keely seeks a hole in the concept of conspiracy theories that accounts for a person’s innate sense that belief in a particular conspiracy theory is not justified. In the case of the natural sciences, falsifiability is acceptable because of the rigorous protocols in place, and therefore, we are warranted in believing scientific claims.

Material and ideological conditions are present in the modern society and those before, each influencing the other. Material conditions determine an individual’s way of life, the wages they collect, and how such earnings determine social class. It is through ideological conditions that ideas derive, which give birth to the ways civilization behaves and operates. This paper will look at a series of theoretical works by Karl Polanyi, James Rinehart, Max Weber, and Robert Heilbroner, deliberating the market society and its progression in relation to the material and ideological conditions that are constantly transforming throughout societies pivotal points in history. Each theorist offers excellent insight into the modes of production and

What is Science? When it comes to the word ‘science’ most of the people have some kind of knowledge about science or when they think of it there is some kind of image related to it, a theory, scientific words or scientific research (Beyond Conservation, n.d.). Many different sorts of ideas float into an individual’s mind. Every individual has a different perception about science and how he/she perceives it. It illustrates that each person can identify science in some form. It indicates that the ‘science’ plays a vital role in our everyday lives (Lederman & Tobin, 2002). It seems that everyone can identify science but cannot differentiate it correctly from pseudo-science and non-science (Park, 1986). This essay will address the difference between science, non-science and pseudo-science. Then it will discuss possible responses to the question that what should we do when there is a clash between scientific explanation and non-scientific explanation. Then it will present a brief examination about the correct non-scientific explanation.

In his argument, Michael Ruse defended the science communities’ position that creation-science was not a science. He claims that it is a pseudo-science. His main argument against creationism was based on the lack of support from the established view of real science. Ruse laid out what he believed the criteria for real science should look like. He then, expanded on several parts of scientific activity which included the role of prediction, explanation, testability, confirmation, falsifiability, tentativeness, and integrity. Ruse presents these as the absolute necessary empirical and social fundamentals for determining whether observable theories are scientific.

The theorists being compared in this discussion question would be Jean Piaget and Albert Bandura and how their theories fit into the developmental process. Both are great contributors to the field of psychology due to their theories on cognitive development. There are some similarities and differences between Albert Bandura’s Social learning theories with Piaget’s cognitive theory in term of ideas and subjects that were used.

The general understanding of democracy is that it is a state of leadership where citizens of a country participate equally either directly or by representative individuals in the establishment of laws, which run the society. However, like many other forms of leadership, democracy has its cons and may not give the citizens the necessary freedoms that they think they have. Different philosophers have different insights on democracy in terms of concepts such as liberty, which they embraced. This paper will look at Benjamin Barber and Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of democracy contrasting their definition in terms of citizenship, obligation, rights and duties of each individual in the society declaring whose idea of democracy creates a compelling vision (Terchek & Conte, 2001).

Demarcation is a philosophical problem with far reaching implications in our daily lives, both theoretically and practically. The issue of demarcation stems from the idea of how to distinguish science from pseudoscience and attempts to establish a set of criterion from which individuals can determine the empirical nature of a certain theory. Philosophical musings regarding demarcations have been around for the past hundreds of years. For the philosophers that we read, this time was during the era when Marx, Freud, Adler and Einstein were all proposing or had recently proposed their respective theories. Philosophers such as Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos all sought to determine the scientific nature of Freudian’s Id and Ego as well as Marx’s political beliefs. Popper, the earliest of the philosophers we read regarding the issue of demarcation proposed that a certain theory can only be deemed science if that theory had the ability to be proven false. Kuhn, on the other hand, attempted to define the problem of demarcation as that which solves puzzles rather than testing theories. Finally, Lakatos notes that a theory can be proven scientific if and only if it has the ability to prove an unusual future event. While all these philosophers indeed have powerful arguments, I found those to be proposed by Popper and Lakatos the most intriguing. My view on demarcation closely parallels that of Lakatos, however I do understand Popper’s position but notice pitfalls in his argument. The problem

The following essay aims to discuss the inconsistencies between the inductivist and Popper’s points of view of science rationality of science in light of claims that the scientific method is inductive yet an inductive method is no. I think is rational to say that inductivist view of science has significant contradiction that Popper’s view solves. To support Popper’s view my argument will introduce the inductivist and falsificationsist views and I will focus in showing the issues of considered science as objective, scientific knowledge as proven and nature as uniform as well as the differences between inductivism and falsificationism to the creation of hypothesis.

Unlike inductivists, falsificationists believe that there is no way to conclusively prove that a theory is true. Consequently, they will resist stating that they’ve proved a theory to be true. Instead, falsificationists will consider a theory to be true so long as it has not been proven to be false. Unlike the strict five-step process held by the inductivist account of science, falsificationists hold that scientific progress comes about “by trial and error, by conjectures and refutations” (Chalmers 60). In the falsificationist picture, theory change happens constantly, and this process is what constitutes scientific progress. “It can never be said of a theory that it is true, however well it has withstood rigorous tests, but it can hopefully be said that a current theory is superior to its predecessors in the sense that it is able to withstand tests that falsified those predecessors” (Chalmers

In the article, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations", Karl Popper attempts to describe the criteria that a theory must meet for it to be considered scientific. He calls this puzzle the problem of demarcation. Popper summarizes his arguments by saying, "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability." Kuhn

Popper opines that a significant problem with the scientific method is that scientists get so caught up in evidence that supports a specific conjecture that they either 1) fail to consider

For as far as we know through writings and drawings people have always been interested in doing some kind of science. The word science comes from the Latin word ”scientia”, which means ”knowledge”. The Egyptians, Greek, Chinese and Romans already had ideas about science. Some of these scientific ideas were nicely documented and preserved. Up until the 20th century people used induction1 as means of proof without questioning the principles of induction. This paper is going to explain why according to Popper induction was not the way to do ”good science”. And how Popper thought science

Popper and Kuhn held differing views on the nature of scientific progress. As seen in Popper’s falsification theory, he held that theories can never be proved only disproved or falsified. Once a theory is proved false we move on to the next. Kuhn, on the other, hand argued a new paradigm may solve puzzles better than the old one but you cannot describe the old science as false. Both seem to share the Kantian idea that the really real, independently existing world is completely unknowable. Kuhn further asserts that the empirical world, which is knowable, is partly constructed by our categories and concepts. The fundamental difference in their views are best stated in Kuhn’s own words, “A very different approach to this whole network of problems has been developed by Karl R. Popper who denies the existence of any verification procedures at all. Instead he emphasizes the importance of falsification, i.e., of the test that, because its outcome is negative, necessitates the rejection of an established theory. Clearly, the role thus attributed to falsification is much like the one this essay assigns to anomalous experiences, i.e., to experiences that, by evoking crisis, prepare the way for a new theory. Nevertheless, anomalous experiences may not be identified with falsifying ones.”(Kuhn, 145) As seen by this passage, the fundamental difference between Popper and Kuhn is that Popper disregards “verification” and Kuhn asserts that “falsification” only takes place once a

In this essay I will argue that science and pseudoscience cannot be clearly demarcated: rather that there’s great difficulty and complication on the fringes when asserting strict criteria that distinguishes the two. I will give a brief overview and draw on the arguments made by philosophers of science throughout history and explain why perhaps their criteria are problematic. I will look in depth into ‘creation science’ and why we strongly consider this as pseudoscientific and analyse the more ambiguous peripheries of science such as Freudian psychoanalysis or even economics.

Assumptions in the title of this essay imply that results, theories and laws resulting from the current system of peer review multiple perspectives produce completely infallible objective truth, this is a false premise. Whilst the group of knowers known as the scientific community have collectively less bias than one lone knower trying to understand the universe, there is still collective and engrained level of institutional bias. The same problems of confirmation bias and expectation are present in a group of knowers just as they are with one single knower. According to Karl Popper (1902-1994) the best way to eliminate any expectation and confirmation bias was to falsify and disprove rather than confirm one’s hypothesis and predictions. Popper argues: no matter how convincing an argument or theory is, all that is needed to disprove it is one piece of valid counterclaiming evidence. Whilst this theory is valid on an individual level, it really becomes an effective tool in the objectivity of science on a large scale. Despite this attempt at objectifying and ‘protecting against’ error and bias it is inadequate due to inherent flaws in the scientific method. Induction, moving from the specific to the general, is the key element in scientific logic. Any theory or law ‘proved’ through this logic has some key flaws: the main flaw being that inductive logic can never be certain of any event happening or of any prediction. Richard van de Lagemaat