Khamenei's JCPOA Essay

Now is the time to use the power of American diplomacy to pressure Iran to stop their illicit nuclear program, support for terrorism, and threats toward Israel. Obama and Biden will offer the Iranian regime a choice. If Iran abandons its nuclear program and support for terrorism, we will offer incentives like membership in the World Trade Organization, economic investments, and a move toward normal diplomatic relations. If Iran continues its troubling behavior, we will step up our economic pressure and political isolation. In carrying out this diplomacy, we will coordinate closely with our allies and proceed with careful preparation. Seeking this kind of comprehensive settlement with Iran is our best way to make

With the shah still sick, it was hard to manage what was back in Iran. The speed of change in Iran was too hard to get command. “The shah was in trouble, reaping the harvest of years of brutal and unpopular policies, including the use of secret police that controlled dissent with arbitrary arrests and torture.” It was obvious that the shah had lost all control of his people of Iran, but the president had hoped for an alliance of opponents to be formed. A man

regarding the tense relationship between the U.S. And Iran in order to illicit a more

The article, written by David Sanger and Michael Gordon from The New York Times on August 23, highlights main controversies about Iran-US nuclear agreement. After months of negotiations between USA and Iran, the deal is waiting to be approved by Congress. However, there are many points of debate regarding the approval of this pact. The main point of polemic is the capacity of Iran to produce nuclear weapons after 15 years, when the agreement is supposed to end. Many people, like the Democrat Representative Adam B. Schiff from California, agree Iran would “have a highly modern and internationally legitimized enrichment capability” (Gordon & Sanger, 2015). Others argue in favor of the agreement because, as R. Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of

On the White House website, a 112 pages’ document called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) gives some detailed about the deal with Iran. It says that the deal:

When the deal was signed on July 14, 2015, it successfully achieved the limitation the aforementioned threats, as Iran will have no nuclear weapons and be subject to intense U.N oversight for at least ten years. This oversight, sanctioned by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), consists of stringent daily facility and centrifuge inspections, with a clause that states “the IAEA will have access where necessary, when necessary” (Chin and Lincy, Iran Watch). To quote President Barack Obama, the Iranian Deal “is not built on trust; it is built on verification” (Chin and Lincy, Iran Watch). Lifting sanctions placed on Iran in exchange for these allowances is not a difficult decision. A deal that restricts and checks enrichment, and also renders Iran a non nuclear- weapon possessing country is a good deal that allows states around the world to sigh a breath of relief.

Moreover, Iran will be able to access 100 billion dollars of assets that are frozen in overseas banks. However, if Iran violates the JCPOA there is a provision within the contract to implement the sanctions back on Iran. Consequently, the JCPOA international agreement was signed in Vienna on July 14, 2015 by Iran and the P5+1 nations. The Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid stated “A nuclear-armed Iran would pose the gravest imaginable threat to Israel. If America walks away from this agreement and loses the support of our allies in the sanctions regime, Iran could have enough fissile material to make a nuclear bomb in a matter of months. Iranian leaders have regularly stated that they intend to wipe Israel off the map and I believe those threats should be taken with the utmost seriousness. This agreement is the best way to prevent Iran’s leaders from obtaining the nuclear weapons that would empower them to follow through on their threats to Israel.” (U.S. Democratic Leader Harry Reid >> Reid Statement On The Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action.). Therefore, the majority of Democrats support the JCPOA and believe it is a better alternative to peace than using a military preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities (Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Along with the decrease in plutonium manufacturing, Iran will cut back their bomb enrichment from 20 percent to a meager 3.7 percent; along with shipping bomb fuel out of the country and not building heavy water reactors for at least 15 years (Broad). The main argument over the bill is that the republicans believe that the deal is setting low standards for international inspectors that will be monitoring Iran and that it will only delay Iran for a few years. In turn the republicans are trying to block the bill from becoming a filibuster in hopes that the senate will turn down the bill. However the Democrats have rallied and have received the needed 34 pledges to support Obamas veto of the Republican’s resolution to dissolve the bill. I believe that in this case the Democrats are doing the logical thing when it comes to the nuclear deal, protecting our country from a nuclear attack, for however long, is an important aspect of our government. I described a logical action, from the government, as having the support of the people and carrying out

The democrats in the U.S. Senate block a Republican attempt to stop the nuclear deal with Iran, handing President Barack Obama a major victory. Senate Republicans do not have enough votes to end a Democratic filibuster on the resolution of approval. Iran's highest leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, says there will be no further negotiations with the U.S. beyond the nuclear deal. The Republicans in the U.S. Senate attempt to stop the nuclear deal by pushing through a resolution rejecting it. In the deal, Iran has agreed to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98%, place two-thirds of their installed centrifuges under international supervision, give the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) permanent access "where necessary, when necessary",

Because of the sunset clauses in the JCPOA, the ultimate success of the nuclear deal depends on transformation of the Iranian regime over the next decade from a hardliner revolutionary regime to a moderate one. Surprisingly, the JCPOA removes the supreme leader’s financial empire from the sanction list on the implementation day. The Ayatollah has used this exclusively controlled financial-industrial conglomerate to pursue his hardline policy of supporting terrorist groups in the region, oppressing dissidents in Iran and demanding annihilation of Israel. Removing these entities guarantees prosperity of Supreme Leader’s financial empire in the Post-sanction Iran. Therefore,

This paper will begin by providing background information on the Iranian Hostage Crises, then shifts to the different viewpoints taken by the divisions of the executive branch. This will provide the different policy options and supporting actors. The final part of the paper will focus on the foreign policy outcome.

Some background information about the Islamic regime and the Shahs of Iran comes from the book, “In the twentieth century, Iran entered a new phase. Reza Shah decided to modernize and westernize the country, but meanwhile a fresh source of wealth was discovered: oil. And with the oil came another invasion. The West, particularly Great Britain, wielded a strong influence on the Iranian economy. During the Second World War, the British, Soviets, and Americans asked Reza Shah to ally himself with them against Germany. But Reza Shah, who sympathized with the Germans, declared Iran as a neutral zone. So the Allies invaded and occupied Iran. Reza Shah was sent into exile and was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was known simply as the Shah” (p.1-2). Which leads up to the reason why the shah seemed to have the worse policies.

OPTION 1: Continue to support the P5+1 Alliance and hold the IRI to strict accountability of all provisions outlined in the JCPOA. Utilizing public diplomacy, communicate that violations to the JCPOA will be seen as cause for the U.S. to seek an exit from the JCPOA. Make clear that significant violations would also introduce all instruments of statecraft to deter Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state. If the IRI continues to meet its obligations, and prior to the expiration of JCPOA enrichment limitations, the U.S. should attempt to negotiate a separate Section 123 like agreement with the IRI. The proposed bilateral agreement will further restrict any future enrichment activities to levels deemed acceptable by the U.S. As an

have nuclear and hydrogen weapons, but for Iran, which is not a member of NATO and its security is not guaranteed by any country in the world, the simple principle of self-defense becomes so problematic?” (Vaez, 2017). The JCPOA satisfies Iran’s demand for increased influence while maintaining the priority of international nuclear stability. With worldwide peace and proliferation safeguards an international interest, the United States should utilize a selective engagement mindset, specifically in regards to a great powers focus, to maintain leverage and unity within the multilateral agreement, “Selective engagement endeavors to ensure peace among powers that have substantial industrial and military potential – the great powers” (Posen, & Ross, 2000). By prioritizing vital interests, the great powers can develop a collaborative and effective strategy to force Iranian nuclear cessation and maintain unity to avoid Iranian partnerships with nations seeking to increase their sphere of influence. Additionally, the international response to Iran establishes a

A critical examination of public statements made by EU officials and the content of CEPS EU-Iran workshop show an apparent lack of strategic imperative in EU-Iran negotiations during the post-Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) period. Furthermore, it does not identify a coordinated EU effort in its relations with Iran or a planned approach which would synchronize and subordinate nation-level policies within all 28 EU Member States. This lack of a pan-European strategy, along with its centralized coordinating instruments at the EU Commission level, should be analyzed in coordination with an appropriate transatlantic committee.