Khrushchev Genuinely committed to peaceful coexistence

As tensions continued to augment profoundly throughout the latter half of the Cold War period, they brought forth a movement from a previous bipolar conflicting course, to one of a more multipolar nature. These tensions were now not only restricted to the Soviet Union and United states, but amongst multiple other nations of the globe. It became a general consensus that a notion of ‘peace’ was sought globally, hence, the emergence of détente. The nature of this idea in the short term conveyed itself to be an act of change for the conflicting nations, however, in the long term it proved to be a blatant continuity, ultimately acting as a ‘mechanism for domestic fortification’ which prompted a more divisive tone. It became apparent that by the prime 1970’s Cold War countries were now seeking a state of relaxation in political and international tension, détente, through measures of diplomacy and negotiation. Actions, influences and treaties such as the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the establishment of SALT 1, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and the Shanghai Communique of 1972 evidently help reinforce that the concept of détente brought a period focused on lessening the tensions of international relations and ultimately achieve political relation for the future of the Cold War, although the success and impact of this era is abhorred by many historians who have concluded that détente didn’t activate any positive changes to the cold war, and was conclusively a failure.

The stronger argument suggests that it was the failure to negotiate anything of substance which meant peaceful coexistence did not ease cold war tensions between the two superpowers. The first meeting in 10 years after the end of the second world war was at Geneva in 1955, although it was a symbolic meet, nothing important was agreed, such as Germany, European security agreements and the open skies initiative. Another symbolic meeting was that of Camp David in 1959, once again although they met up, nothing was achieved, failing to agree on the situation of Germany and

It was a focal point during the cold war, when the Soviet Union tried to positon nuclear weapons in Cuba, as a response to the American one in Turkey.

The Soviet Union packet clearly states the question at the top of the first page, What

community ownership. Russians didn’t like the idea of communism, but had to accept it, in

The Cold War holds a special place in the study of international relations and its paradigms and perspectives. In this part of the course, three readings work together to provide a basis of arguments and positions on the origins of the Cold War as they relate to international relations. As George Kennan describes in the article written under the pseudonym ‘Mr. X’ in the early years of the Cold War, the Soviets were widely recognized in the western world as being fundamentally expansionist by nature, and this fundamental attribute would lead to the ultimate quest to spread communist ideology across the globe, eventually leading right up to the United States’ doorstep. Similarly, Douglas J. MacDonald lays out the viewpoints held by policymakers

To conclude, Keenan states in The Sources Of Soviet Conduct that in order for the US to counteract the force of the USSR, a policy of tough and patient pressure must be

intervention (Doc 37, pg.360). During his Meeting of Communist Party organizations in 1961, he had directly outlined his personal disdain for American intervention, viewing it more as a building block to war, arguing that socialist reform is the guiding ideology to peace. Ironically, he spoke on imperialism as a thought that can only result in war, delaying it by thought of its consequences, yet Khrushchev worked diligently to gain support of smaller nations to not only build up alliances against the west, but as well avoid direct military conflict (Doc 37, pg. 359). Throughout his meeting, he would aim to highlight the ideals of war, more so glorifying its needs especially in these smaller nations as the only means to create peace. He even goes on to say, “the Communists fully support just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles (Doc 37, pg.

This is especially true for Gorbachev because he knew that The Cold War needed to end. However, in taking the steps to do this, Gorbachev eventually caused the collapse of The Soviet Union. However, in the end, he was ending the war for the greater good. This is a respectable and admirable trait of Gorbachev that is known globally.

Secret meetings involving malpractices and miscommunication will lead to global destruction. Senior Enlisted Leaders will understand the importance of acquiring proper intelligence through the right channels before making decisions that will impact mankind around the world. This essay will discuss the history, evolution, and the effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Edward McWhinney is a Canadian lawyer who specialized in international law. He has held high ranking positions at elite universities around the world and served as a legal consultant to the United Nations. This work explains how two Cold War super powers came to a mutual understanding and learned how to adapt their foreign policy to stabilize international power. The Soviet Union and the United States came to the agreement that they would learn how to coexist with one another in President Kennedys Letter to Nikita Khrushchev on October 28, 1962 which helped initiated the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Since Canada was a member of the Western Hemisphere and of NATO Canadians are biased to their ally, the United States, and wanted to protect

(Soviet Union) placed Nuclear Weapons off of the coast of the US, If invaded, the S.U.'s leaders could use nuclear weapons. In October of 1960 The U.S. Decided to refrain from invading Cuba as well as remove missiles from Cuba. The Vietnam war was also a turning point of the cold war from U.S.S.R. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) vs. U.S.

air of excellence got to his head. This is what led to the initial strain in the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He believed the Soviet Union would soon dominate over any other nation including the U.S. and his ambition and unpremeditated dreams led him into trouble. Nevertheless, the need to protect Cuba at all costs from the U.S. led him to make some poor choices. Initially, Khrushchev believed that Kennedy himself had no intention to invade Cuba but he worried about the rest of his administration.

The traditional, orthodox interpretation places the responsibility of the Cold War on Stalin’s personality and on communist ideology. It claims that as long as Stalin and the authoritarian government were in power, a cold war was unavoidable. It argues that Stalin violated agreements that he had made at Yalta, imposed Soviet policy on Eastern European countries aiming at political domination and conspired to advocate communism throughout the world. As a result, United States officials were forced to respond to Soviet aggression with foreign policies such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Yet revisionists argue that there was “no proof of Stalin promoting communism outside Russia” and that Stalin’s decisions were first and foremost, pro-Soviet and not of communist intentions. Up until 1947, it is evident through Marshall Plan as well as statements and interviews made by Stalin that he was still thinking of cooperation with the United States, Britain and France. Despite post-war conflicts and instability of Soviet-American relations, the USSR’s initial embrace of the Marshall Plan at its announcement expressed

This would force the west to recognise GDR, making the Hallstein Doctrine irrelevant. Although the Western powers refused to be forced into signing the treaty and rejected the ultimatum, it did force them to attend the Geneva Conference in 1959, where they were willing to discuss the German question. Prior to this, London and Washington statements were signalling their desire for compromise over the German and Berlin crisis. As Khrushchev had succeeded in getting Berlin to be discussed as a separate issue (where he could attempt to influence the West to make concessions over West Berlin), he continued this pressure and renewed his ultimatum. This suggests that in this instance, whereas the USA and UK were open for compromise over the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev’s continued forceful and pressurising attitude meant that he was not as willing to compromise and therefore little was concluded from the Geneva Conference. ‘Between 1959 and 1961, there were more summits than at a time since the Second World War’ (Williamson, 2006) – however little was achieved. Khrushchev often lead with periods of acute crisis and threat making during this time period, in order to increase this pressure on the West to concede West Berlin. This forceful leadership shown suggests that Khrushchev may have been so focused on the Berlin crisis and forcing the