Kodak And The Digital Vision

The problem in this case is concerned with Eastman Kodak losing its market share in film products to lower-priced economy brands. Over the last five years, in addition to being brand-aware, customers have also become price-conscious. This has resulted in the fast paced growth of lower priced segments in which Kodak has no presence.

It was Kodak’s’ strategy to sell the cameras at low prices, and it used to earn revenue from the films; this strategy is called the razor-blade strategy. This model for photography became flop when Sony introduced a camera with floppy disk inside, in which there wasn’t any use of films. As a result of Sony’s introduction of the Mavica in 1981, Kodak took it as a threat and started investing in the digital photography. For this purpose, it has conducted a huge research on the digital photography. As exposed by Fisher in 1997, Kodak’s respond wasn’t appropriate for the digital world: “One of the mistakes we [Kodak] have made is that we [Kodak]’ve tried to do it all. We [Kodak] do not have to pursue all aspects of the digital opportunity and service side.”

The problem in this case is Kodak's steadily eroding market share and shareholder value in the film rolls market. This is especially undesirable given the fact that the market has been growing at a tepid 2% annual rate and the steadily increasing threat from competition. Kodak needs to come up with a strategy for corrective action so as to arrest this decline, regain market share and increase share holder value. Kodak's strategy is to reposition itself by targeting a new segment of price sensitive customers and re-segmenting the super premium customers’ space by including a wider segment of special occasion customers.

(Bellis, 2009) Nevertheless, the main selling point of digital cameras was the convenient way that they could be stored. Every exposure is almost instantly saved to a removable disk drive, which remarkably expired the use of darkroom processing. It was convenient, less time was needed to produce an image, making it particularly appealing to journalism. The photograph has since then become an instant process. Combined with the invention of the Internet, and booming industry of personal computers, the newer technology would expire its predecessor. There are billions of photographs on the Internet, comprising the largest most diverse photo collection ever assembled. We have access to imagery from all over the world, using key words and hash tags to catalogue imagery and content; we can see what is happening without being there. The introduction of digital photography has enabled photographers to record terabits of imagery which can be stored in minute places, meaning the coverage that we have of the modern world is greater than ever. Unlike the formats that Henri Cartier-Bresson used, where each roll of film, or negative slide needed storing in a large physical place, under controlled conditions, an archive of objects. Automation came with digital photography, its combination of digital components allowed the camera to automatically detect light qualities, and

Kodak or Eastman Kodak (as it was known back in the 1970s) was a dominant player in the sale of photographic films worldwide for most of the 20th century. The firm had substantial market share, positive cash flow and a stack of patents (worth billions). Kodak could be forgiven to think that it enjoyed an unassailable competitive position.

Taking pictures with the Kodak camera was simpler than the earlier camera because first, it did not require a darkroom or chemicals and glass plates. It did not require any of these things because it was not only one person’s job to develop and take the photo. The photographer could send their camera in, and the Eastman Kodak Company would develop the pictures for them. “In the first year, 13,000 people paid $25 for a Kodak; they each took 100 pictures, returned the camera and within ten days, Kodak sent back the prints and camera with film for another 100 pictures,” (Buckland and Lefer 250). This opened up a whole new door for inexperienced photographers. All they had to do was take pictures, and send the camera

When Kodak began making changes to its organizational architecture in 1984, its current architecture did not fit the business environment for the industry. The largest factor that motivated Kodak to make this change was increased competition and decreased market share. Until the early 1980’s, Kodak owned the film production market with very little competition. This suddenly changed when Fuji Corporation and many other generic store brands began producing high quality film as well (Brickley, 2009, p. 358). Another factor in this change was technology advancements. As technology rapidly expanded in the 1980’s, other

In my March 6 memo, I discussed the need for Kodak to revamp its core strategy and regain popularity. Eastman Kodak has been the leader of photography and printing products for nearly 130 years. Over the last few years Kodak has been in distress due to its poor fundamental shift into the digital age. Lack of strategic creativity led Kodak to misunderstand the industry in which it was operating. This lack of strategic creativity was costly for Kodak.

In 1888, George Eastman made the first light and portable camera under the company name Kodak (Graham 28). These cameras gave people the ability to take a photo almost anywhere. The cameras had to be sent back to the factory so the photographs could be printed. Twenty years after Kodak’s first camera, they produced an improved camera, called “Brownie”. The Brownie was simple to use, making the art of photography boom. Flash cameras did not appear until the 1930s, letting people take pictures in areas with dim or little lighting. In 1947, Edwin Land invented the instant camera. Land got the idea after his daughter asked to see her picture after he took her photo. The next step in improving the camera was by making it digital, which was done in 1975 by a Kodak employee. As the camera gets smaller and simpler to use, the quality of the photographs it produces gets better.

While Eastman Kodak has remained an industry leader in the sales of film for photo-imaging, over the past five years Kodak has underestimated the demand for digital cameras. Digital cameras require no film whatsoever and with Kodak’s main line of production being film Kodak has suffered great losses in net profit. Just in 2004 Camera film sales have been falling even than projected. The Photo Marketing Association predicted a six percent drop in film sales and Kodak projected an even more dismal 10-12 percent drop in film sales. The actual drop in sales reached an unforeseen 18%. In 2003 digital camera sales were greater than traditional film camera sales for the first time.

While Kodak has historically been a well-established brand name in the marketplace, it struggled to find a niche when the industry morphed from a film-based market to a digital-based market. Kodak has struggled to successfully evolve its film-based business structure to the new structure of digital-based technology, which has allowed for competitors to enter the market, decreasing Kodak’s market share. Competitors (such as Canon Inc., Fuji Photo Film Co., Hewlett Packard Co., Nikon, and Sony Corp.) have posed major threats to Kodak’s livelihood. Kodak faces a 5% drop in film sales (2001-2003) and a 3% reduction in overall revenues over the same time period. In addition, revenues and net income are expected to be fairly flat (or decrease) in future estimates. Kodak faces much pressure to revitalize their business through digital imaging, a radical innovation, or risk being eaten alive in an industry they thought they controlled.

Background Eastman Kodak Company, headquartered in Rochester New York, was founded in 1889. The corporation, now multinational and focusing on imaging and photographic equipment, posted revenues in excess of $6 billion in 2011. During most of the 20th century Kodak was dominant in the photographic film industry in 1976 it held 90% of the market but began a downward slide once the Internet, digital cameras and computer processing grew. By 2007, Kodak ceased making a profit and in January 2012 filed for bankruptcy protection and ceased making cameras, video cameras and began to focus on the corporate digital imaging market (De La Merced, 2012). In evaluating Kodak's corporate strategy from the mid-1980s onward, we find that there four major management paradigms in place during this transitional period:

Progressing ahead several decades the first digital camera was produced by Eastman Kodak in 19751. The effects of digitizing light rather than making an analog negative of it was revolutionary. Whereas a picture architype in an analog format would degrade over time, and from simply copying it, a digital version would not be unpreventably corrupted over time. Digital pictures could then be stored on, displayed with, and distributed to any computer. Thus the photograph

Eastman Kodak Company, commonly known as Kodak is an American multinational imaging and photographic equipment, materials and services company headquartered in Rochester, New York, United States. It was founded by George Eastman in 1889. Kodak is best known for photographic film products. During most of the 20th century Kodak held a dominant position in this sector. In fact, Eastman Kodak Co. is one of the dominant market share holders within the camera and other photography-related industries. Kodak pioneered amateur photography and is often credited for the invention of roll film and the first camera. The markets for color film and color photofinishing in 1954 were controlled by Kodak. It had over 90% of the amateur color

In order for digital film to exist like it does today it had to evolve from something. Digital film evolved from Film or celluloid film as it is originally more recognized. I have a few questions that I wish to cover early on and continue to develop as time goes on. What is digital Cinema and what are the advantages and or disadvantages of it over film. What is film celluloid and where did it originate from ? Why did digital film start ? finally what is next for digital film is there more to come or will it transition to something else ?.