Kodak: Brand and Market Share

The problem in this case is concerned with Eastman Kodak losing its market share in film products to lower-priced economy brands. Over the last five years, in addition to being brand-aware, customers have also become price-conscious. This has resulted in the fast paced growth of lower priced segments in which Kodak has no presence.

our price increases off what our competitors were charging for a similar quality camera, while at

Probably increase marketing, promotional and expenses related to discounts in the subsequent year due to “Premier Vision” plan.

It was Kodak’s’ strategy to sell the cameras at low prices, and it used to earn revenue from the films; this strategy is called the razor-blade strategy. This model for photography became flop when Sony introduced a camera with floppy disk inside, in which there wasn’t any use of films. As a result of Sony’s introduction of the Mavica in 1981, Kodak took it as a threat and started investing in the digital photography. For this purpose, it has conducted a huge research on the digital photography. As exposed by Fisher in 1997, Kodak’s respond wasn’t appropriate for the digital world: “One of the mistakes we [Kodak] have made is that we [Kodak]’ve tried to do it all. We [Kodak] do not have to pursue all aspects of the digital opportunity and service side.”

Within the Economy brands, ScotchColor is priced lower than Funtime ($2.69 versus $2.79. see Appendix C for retail price calculation of Funtime) making

By reducing the price, Jones Blair will be more competitive with other brands. Right now, Jones Blair is prices significantly higher than all other brands and when a consumer sees the brands side by side at a store, they may not realize the higher quality of Jones Blair paint, just the higher price and immediately select against.

Fujifilm got its start with the production of motion picture film, dry plates and photographic paper. It was difficult for Fujifilm initially to develop brand recognition due to the market prevalence of the Eastman Kodak Company.   Fujifilm’s quality standards were not on par with Kodak and this created a challenge to gaining any traction. Fujifilm’s plan to compete was to develop film and paper that were compatible with the processing systems used mostly worldwide.   By 1969, all of their films, photo paper and chemicals completely matched these processing systems.   With the concentration on the quality of its products, Fujifilm was able to develop its first film product and a motion-picture negative film which proved to consumers in Japan that Fujifilm was technically proficient and resulted in a demand for their products.

Since the paint market has shown that consumers are price sensitive, cutting our price by 20 percent should in fact drive up sales. Perhaps we can achieve a larger market share if more people are drawn to our higher quality product, which is now at the similar price of the rest.

Taking pictures with the Kodak camera was simpler than the earlier camera because first, it did not require a darkroom or chemicals and glass plates. It did not require any of these things because it was not only one person’s job to develop and take the photo. The photographer could send their camera in, and the Eastman Kodak Company would develop the pictures for them. “In the first year, 13,000 people paid $25 for a Kodak; they each took 100 pictures, returned the camera and within ten days, Kodak sent back the prints and camera with film for another 100 pictures,” (Buckland and Lefer 250). This opened up a whole new door for inexperienced photographers. All they had to do was take pictures, and send the camera

When Kodak began making changes to its organizational architecture in 1984, its current architecture did not fit the business environment for the industry. The largest factor that motivated Kodak to make this change was increased competition and decreased market share. Until the early 1980’s, Kodak owned the film production market with very little competition. This suddenly changed when Fuji Corporation and many other generic store brands began producing high quality film as well (Brickley, 2009, p. 358). Another factor in this change was technology advancements. As technology rapidly expanded in the 1980’s, other

In my March 6 memo, I discussed the need for Kodak to revamp its core strategy and regain popularity. Eastman Kodak has been the leader of photography and printing products for nearly 130 years. Over the last few years Kodak has been in distress due to its poor fundamental shift into the digital age. Lack of strategic creativity led Kodak to misunderstand the industry in which it was operating. This lack of strategic creativity was costly for Kodak.

What I feel about Kodak’s move was that they are trying to make a space for themselves in an already crowded market. Kodak is trying to carve out a niche for them by offering inks for low prices. But, they have forgotten the abilities of the competitors. They have probably underestimated them. HP and Canon are big names in the printing industry and because of their continued rollout of good quality products; customers trust them more than they trust Kodak. It is also observed that Kodak had forgotten that if HP lowers their price to almost the same level like Kodak, Kodak won’t stand a chance. The only way that Kodak can hope to make some profit is by hoping that their competitors won’t reduce the price of the inks as it is the only source of revenue in the printing industry. But I am pretty sure that marketing research people of Kodak has made a blunder by opting for this. The major fact is that they have forgotten cartridge refilling industry which is cheap too and people have started to use that as they are comparatively cheaper to the original printing inks. I sincerely feel that Kodak has taken the wrong path to get out of their troubles.

To account for their miscalculation in film sales, Kodak is undergoing a massive digitally based shift. Kodak plans on building a stronger base in its consumer, medical, and profession imaging products. However, this shift does not come without a price tag. Kodak’s projected spending could reach as much as $3 billion in future investments to aid the shift. With these investments Kodak claims a tremendous turnaround in revenue. Kodak anticipates reaching $16 billion in revenue by 2006 and $20 billion by 2010. To pay

While Kodak has historically been a well-established brand name in the marketplace, it struggled to find a niche when the industry morphed from a film-based market to a digital-based market. Kodak has struggled to successfully evolve its film-based business structure to the new structure of digital-based technology, which has allowed for competitors to enter the market, decreasing Kodak’s market share. Competitors (such as Canon Inc., Fuji Photo Film Co., Hewlett Packard Co., Nikon, and Sony Corp.) have posed major threats to Kodak’s livelihood. Kodak faces a 5% drop in film sales (2001-2003) and a 3% reduction in overall revenues over the same time period. In addition, revenues and net income are expected to be fairly flat (or decrease) in future estimates. Kodak faces much pressure to revitalize their business through digital imaging, a radical innovation, or risk being eaten alive in an industry they thought they controlled.

Polaroid faced a little competition from “Kodak” company in instant camera industry; though they were sue by Polaroid for infringement of patent. Fuji and other company producing “digital camera” which was a competitive product of “instant camera”. So, we can say, Polaroid faced Competitive rivalry with better substitute product.