Kodak and the Digital Revolution

The problem in this case is concerned with Eastman Kodak losing its market share in film products to lower-priced economy brands. Over the last five years, in addition to being brand-aware, customers have also become price-conscious. This has resulted in the fast paced growth of lower priced segments in which Kodak has no presence.

George Eastman invented roll film and an easy to operate camera that made photography easier for anyone to experience photography. He founded the Eastman Kodak Company to manufacture cameras and photographic supplies, making the art of photography available to the masses. This talks about his life and how he came about the inventions that made photography easier for people to use and produce their own photographs.

It was Kodak’s’ strategy to sell the cameras at low prices, and it used to earn revenue from the films; this strategy is called the razor-blade strategy. This model for photography became flop when Sony introduced a camera with floppy disk inside, in which there wasn’t any use of films. As a result of Sony’s introduction of the Mavica in 1981, Kodak took it as a threat and started investing in the digital photography. For this purpose, it has conducted a huge research on the digital photography. As exposed by Fisher in 1997, Kodak’s respond wasn’t appropriate for the digital world: “One of the mistakes we [Kodak] have made is that we [Kodak]’ve tried to do it all. We [Kodak] do not have to pursue all aspects of the digital opportunity and service side.”

The problem in this case is Kodak's steadily eroding market share and shareholder value in the film rolls market. This is especially undesirable given the fact that the market has been growing at a tepid 2% annual rate and the steadily increasing threat from competition. Kodak needs to come up with a strategy for corrective action so as to arrest this decline, regain market share and increase share holder value. Kodak's strategy is to reposition itself by targeting a new segment of price sensitive customers and re-segmenting the super premium customers’ space by including a wider segment of special occasion customers.

Comcast brushed away its main competitor by purchasing a greater share of Time Warner. The major failures of Kodak were majorly because it failed to embrace and market new technologies for fear of hurting and damaging the company’s lucrative business in the film production at a time when new digital products were being reshaped. Management in the Kodak Company did not fully grasp how the world was gradually reshaping and therefore could not remain in the industry. They still hung on to old -fashioned technologies and assumptions how, where and who took the pictures. Large companies in the media industry should learn to embrace new trends that are appealing to the consumers’ tastes and preferences. The la carte approach is one example of such a new technology and program that should be embraced by all media companies (Einstein,

Fujifilm got its start with the production of motion picture film, dry plates and photographic paper. It was difficult for Fujifilm initially to develop brand recognition due to the market prevalence of the Eastman Kodak Company.   Fujifilm’s quality standards were not on par with Kodak and this created a challenge to gaining any traction. Fujifilm’s plan to compete was to develop film and paper that were compatible with the processing systems used mostly worldwide.   By 1969, all of their films, photo paper and chemicals completely matched these processing systems.   With the concentration on the quality of its products, Fujifilm was able to develop its first film product and a motion-picture negative film which proved to consumers in Japan that Fujifilm was technically proficient and resulted in a demand for their products.

It is considered that photography only became widely available to the public when the Kodak Eastman Company introduced the box shaped Brownie Camera in 1900. (Baker, n.p.) Its features became more refined since its original placing on the market; one of the reasons why it has become considered the birth of public photography is because of the processing. Using a similar image capture system, the brownie exposed the light to a 120mm roll of film, which could be wound round, meaning six photographs could be taken before the slides needed removing. The first Brownie used a six-exposure cartridge that Kodak processed for the photographer. (Kodak.com, n.d.) Realistically, the armature photographers did not need to understand darkroom processes,

Taking pictures with the Kodak camera was simpler than the earlier camera because first, it did not require a darkroom or chemicals and glass plates. It did not require any of these things because it was not only one person’s job to develop and take the photo. The photographer could send their camera in, and the Eastman Kodak Company would develop the pictures for them. “In the first year, 13,000 people paid $25 for a Kodak; they each took 100 pictures, returned the camera and within ten days, Kodak sent back the prints and camera with film for another 100 pictures,” (Buckland and Lefer 250). This opened up a whole new door for inexperienced photographers. All they had to do was take pictures, and send the camera

When Kodak began making changes to its organizational architecture in 1984, its current architecture did not fit the business environment for the industry. The largest factor that motivated Kodak to make this change was increased competition and decreased market share. Until the early 1980’s, Kodak owned the film production market with very little competition. This suddenly changed when Fuji Corporation and many other generic store brands began producing high quality film as well (Brickley, 2009, p. 358). Another factor in this change was technology advancements. As technology rapidly expanded in the 1980’s, other

In my March 6 memo, I discussed the need for Kodak to revamp its core strategy and regain popularity. Eastman Kodak has been the leader of photography and printing products for nearly 130 years. Over the last few years Kodak has been in distress due to its poor fundamental shift into the digital age. Lack of strategic creativity led Kodak to misunderstand the industry in which it was operating. This lack of strategic creativity was costly for Kodak.

What I feel about Kodak’s move was that they are trying to make a space for themselves in an already crowded market. Kodak is trying to carve out a niche for them by offering inks for low prices. But, they have forgotten the abilities of the competitors. They have probably underestimated them. HP and Canon are big names in the printing industry and because of their continued rollout of good quality products; customers trust them more than they trust Kodak. It is also observed that Kodak had forgotten that if HP lowers their price to almost the same level like Kodak, Kodak won’t stand a chance. The only way that Kodak can hope to make some profit is by hoping that their competitors won’t reduce the price of the inks as it is the only source of revenue in the printing industry. But I am pretty sure that marketing research people of Kodak has made a blunder by opting for this. The major fact is that they have forgotten cartridge refilling industry which is cheap too and people have started to use that as they are comparatively cheaper to the original printing inks. I sincerely feel that Kodak has taken the wrong path to get out of their troubles.

To account for their miscalculation in film sales, Kodak is undergoing a massive digitally based shift. Kodak plans on building a stronger base in its consumer, medical, and profession imaging products. However, this shift does not come without a price tag. Kodak’s projected spending could reach as much as $3 billion in future investments to aid the shift. With these investments Kodak claims a tremendous turnaround in revenue. Kodak anticipates reaching $16 billion in revenue by 2006 and $20 billion by 2010. To pay

The Eastman Kodak Company was established in the 1880’s as a film business, set on establishing its brand name in the marketplace through customer-focused advertising and growth through research and development and low cost mass production. The founder, George Eastman, described Kodak’s competitive philosophy by commenting that “nothing is more important than the value of our name and the quality it stands for. We must make quality our fighting argument” (Gavetti, Henderson & Giorgi, 2005).

Background Eastman Kodak Company, headquartered in Rochester New York, was founded in 1889. The corporation, now multinational and focusing on imaging and photographic equipment, posted revenues in excess of $6 billion in 2011. During most of the 20th century Kodak was dominant in the photographic film industry in 1976 it held 90% of the market but began a downward slide once the Internet, digital cameras and computer processing grew. By 2007, Kodak ceased making a profit and in January 2012 filed for bankruptcy protection and ceased making cameras, video cameras and began to focus on the corporate digital imaging market (De La Merced, 2012). In evaluating Kodak's corporate strategy from the mid-1980s onward, we find that there four major management paradigms in place during this transitional period:

Eastman Kodak Company, commonly known as Kodak is an American multinational imaging and photographic equipment, materials and services company headquartered in Rochester, New York, United States. It was founded by George Eastman in 1889. Kodak is best known for photographic film products. During most of the 20th century Kodak held a dominant position in this sector. In fact, Eastman Kodak Co. is one of the dominant market share holders within the camera and other photography-related industries. Kodak pioneered amateur photography and is often credited for the invention of roll film and the first camera. The markets for color film and color photofinishing in 1954 were controlled by Kodak. It had over 90% of the amateur color