Kusmider V. State: A Case Study

The plaintiff in Ard v. East Jefferson General Hospital, stated on 20 May, she had rang the nurses station to inform the nursing staff that her husband was experiencing symptoms of nausea, pain, and shortness of breathe. After ringing the call button for several times her spouse received his medication. Mrs. Ard noticed that her husband continued to have difficulty breathing and ringing from side to side, the patient spouse rang the nursing station for approximately an hour and twenty-five minutes until the defendant (Ms. Florscheim) enter the room and initiated a code blue, which Mr. Ard didn’t recover. The expert witness testified that the defendant failed to provide the standard of care concerning the decease and should have read the physician’s progress notes stating patient is high risk upon assessment and observation. The defendant testified she checked on the patient but no documentation was noted. The defendant expert witness disagrees with breech of duty, which upon cross-examination the expert witness agrees with the breech of duty. The district judge, upon judgment, the defendant failed to provide the standard of care (Pozgar, 2012, p. 215-216) and award the plaintiff for damages from $50,000 to $150,000 (Pozgar, 2012, p. 242).

Facts: Kyle John Kelbel was convicted of first-degree murder, past pattern of child abuse, in violation of Minnesota state statute section 609.185(5) and second-degree murder, in violation of Minnesota statute 609.19, subdivision 2(1). He was sentenced to life in prison for the death of Kailyn Marie Montgomery. Kelbel appealed, and argued that the district court failed to instruct the jury that it must find that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the acts that constituted the past pattern of child abuse and he also argued that the evidence against him was insufficient to prove past pattern of child abuse

When a person takes steps toward the commission of a crime and has a specific intent to commit the crime, but for unforeseen reasons is unable to complete the crime the person has committed the crime of Attempt (Jirard, 2009). In the case of the State of Indiana versus Donald J. Haines, emergency personnel including two police officers [Dennis and Hayworth] along with emergency medical technicians [Garvey and Robinson] responded to Mr. Haines’s apartment for a report of a possible suicide that just occurred. When officers Dennis and Hayworth arrived at Haines’s apartment they discovered him lying face down in a pool of blood. Officer Dennis noticed that both of Haines’s wrists were cut and were bleeding. When Haines heard the paramedics he stood up, and began screaming at Dennis that he has AIDS and that he should be left to die. Dennis advised Haines that he was there to help him, and Haines told Dennis that he wanted to fuck him so that he could give him AIDS. Haines than told Dennis that he was going to utilize his wounds to spray blood on him, and began to jerk back and forth causing his infected blood to get into Dennis’ mouth and eyes. Haines told Dennis that he could not deal with having AIDS, but that he was going to make him deal with it.

As children, we have all stepped that “boundary” between right and wrong. From stealing money to shoplifting to fighting, we have all made our parents frustrated, made poor decisions, and perhaps, even made a egregious mistake. However, when does stepping that “boundary” become irremediable? Can the government punish minors under the same criteria they do with adults? And most importantly, what does the United States Constitution say? These are all questions that both the Missouri Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court had to consider when they dived into the case of Roper v. Simmons. To provide a little historical

For my argumentation paper, I have chosen to address the issue of libel as it relates to the case of Draker v. Schreiber. Libel is defined as a published false statement that is damaging to a person 's reputation. Draker v. Schreiber was taken up by the Texas state court, on September 1st, 2006. I agree with the court 's decision to not charge the young boys for defamation and intentional emotional distress. Throughout this paper, I will support three arguments, first why the students should have been held responsible for defamation and libel per se, second why the students were not responsible for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lastly, why I believe the parents were not in question of negligence or

Although Etzewieler allegedly knew Bailey was intoxicated, he still allowed Bailey to use his vehicle while he

The case of Kusmider v. State, 688 P.2d 957 (Alaska App. 1984), was a state appeal’s court case that addressed the chain of causation for a murder, which had occurred, and the actions of the trial court judge (Brody & Acker, 2010). In this case, the appellant, Kusmider, appealed his conviction for second degree murder, based on the fact that the trial judge did not let him introduce evidence, which may have shown that the victim may have survived his wounds, if not for the actions of the paramedics.

Before going further, let me explain the charges you will hear. Section 222(5) defines murder as “a person commits culpable homicide when he causes the death of a human being.” Murder is first degree when it is planned and deliberate, and all murder that is not first-degree murder is second-degree murder. If Dr Kimball was provoked into killing his wife in the heat of passion then he will be guilty of manslaughter. However, the defence believes that he is not guilty. You will clearly hear the evidence to support this.

In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) the Supreme Court held that a law requiring children to

Perhaps, according to Bernard Schwartz, the greatest failure of American law during World War II may be illustrated by the case of Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu. As graphically described in 1944 by a member of the bench, his case is one that is unique in our system:

In the Case of Missouri v. Seibert, a mother named Patrice Seibert was convicted of second degree murder. Patrice Seibert had a son named Jonathan who was twelve years old and had cerebral palsy. Jonathan Seibert suddenly died in his sleep, and his mother thought that she would be held responsible for his sudden death. Ms. Seibert then devised a plan with her two older sons and their friends. She wanted to cover up the death of Jonathan, so she conspired with her sons and their friends to cover up the death by burning down their mobile home. Donald Rector was a mentally ill individual who stayed with the Seibert’s and later died as the home went up in flames. Several days later, Seibert was taken into the police station and questioned about the mysterious mobile home fire. While being interrogated, the officer waved Ms. Seibert’s Miranda rights. She was questioned for thirty to forty minutes before she was given a break. While being questioned, the officer hoped that Ms. Seibert would voluntarily confess to the crimes that had taken place. After her break, she was then questioned a second time. This time, the officer turned on a recorder and then read Ms. Seibert her Miranda Warnings, and the officer also obtained a signed waiver of rights from Seibert.

The United States Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion in the case of Missouri v. Seibert. This means that no single opinion was supported by the majority of the court, but the plurality opinion had more support than any other opinion. The plurality opinion was supported by four of the Supreme Court Justices. The plurality opinion affirmed the position of the Missouri Supreme Court stating that a post-warning statement should not be admissible.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) The Court held that a defendant must prove there is a legitimate expectation of privacy for a search to be challenged.

Based on the scenario, the motion to suppress the tools and diagram should not be granted. Based on the fact that an officer observed a man standing in an alley behind a place of business at 11:50 P.M. for more than 5 minutes, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the man was in the progress of committing a crime. Based on the fact that the officer had established reasonable suspicion, he was legally justified to stop and briefly detain the man (Cornell Law, 2017). The fact that the officer grabbed the subject, swung him around, and pushed him against the wall of the store is irrelevant because the subject is not accusing the officer of excessive force. Terry v. Ohio states that when a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is

The case cited State V. Newman is irrelevant to this case. Whereas, an alleged act of sleep-driving might have taken place in this case, he did not commit a violent crime, he was only charged with a DUI (1). Also, what proof can you provide that show’s Mrs. Cogdon was in fact sleepwalking the night of the murder? Did she have previous episodes of sleepwalking or was she heavily medicated? If she was trying to protect her daughter why couldn’t she have grabbed a knife from the kitchen instead of walking outside to grab an axe? Also, how could she manage while sleeping to strike her daughter with two accurate blows to the head and cause no additional damage? It is because she was in a conscience form and these acts where not only voluntary but