Land Vs Air Force

Conventional warfare follows the single battle concept, where two or more well defined forces using weapons that target the opposing force. The contiguous battle-space is well defined with a deep, close and rear area allowing the force commander to array forces that can be visually displayed in a linear graphic. This does not hold true in an unconventional warfare, where the rear area may also be the close and deep fight and forces may target the civilian population either through direct, indirect or propaganda attacks. The will of the people play an important part in unconventional warfare and their support to either force is equally important. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the Marine Corps force in readiness is capable

In chapter eight of Sherry’s novel “The Rise of American Air Power.” Sherry writes about the obsession war generals had with air warfare during the 20th century. He brings up the time Roosevelt decided to use atomic bombs in World War II against Japan and how he wanted to drop these bombs over Japan by aircraft carrier. The technological aspect behind this mission is complicated and made Roosevelt ‘fantasize’ about becoming more advanced in technological warfare. However, some of these improvements left others up in arms, the use of telegraphs left war generals upset about how they were always being interrupted by their superiors during missions. Another advancement that led soldiers up in arms was the operational commands. Operational Commands were in charge of running the airways and pilots would always complain about how they would interfere air battles and cause a distraction. However, Operational Commands had their perks like the use of radar to detect any

"This country begs for air power" (House, 2009). These words were spoken by the commander of the Combined Air Power Transition Force, General Walter D. Givhan speaking of the Afghan fighting force’s needs. One might ask themselves how this say so much. From World War II to today’s conflict in Afghanistan the American ability to employ Air Power against opposing forces has allowed us to remain a nation that’s military effectiveness cannot be matched. However, one might ask themselves who envisioned such an ultimate ability? Pioneers such as the Wright brothers, General Billy Mitchell, and Gen. Carl A. Spaatz are all American heroes that played a critical role in the advancement of Air Power. But only one man is known as “The General

Most military members agree that being a leader means being “in charge” regardless of the situation. While this axiom may hold true during the joint operation phases of “Seize the Initiative” or “Dominate”, it is not the case for steady state operations with the IA. This axiom has become a caricature of the DoD mindset in the minds of many civilian leaders. If military service members are to become more effective with IA coordination, they must understand and appreciate three dynamics to steady state operations. First, the value that our partners bring to the fight . Second, that in the steady state, DoD is not the lead agency. Third, with the overabundant emphasis of the topic in joint doctrine, most leaders

One of the lessons learned after the first world conflict is the necessity of using the third dimension on military operations. That assumption has been conceptualizing by theorist through doctrine and implements differently from one country to another. The doctrine concerning air force warfare was a direct influence of World War I as a revolution on this domain. The challenge of many military theorists concerned the emergence of the aircraft as a weapon and the adaptation of this emerging capability on military operations. One of the Airpower advocates Giulio Douhet consider the airpower as a tool to use to avoid trench warfare and dramatically shorten wars. Thus, aircraft would attack an enemy’s sources of assets and it is the key to destroying the

The air war in North Africa highlighted the gap in US air doctrine’s emphasis on exclusive strategic bombing. Tactical airpower

During the course of this training period, both units were to conduct training that would prepare them for the upcoming operation. While both units conducted rigorous training independent of one another, instances of combined Airborne and Air training was extremely limited. Coordinated training between the two units was limited because there was no higher command linking the two units together. Within the article titled “Report of Airborne Operations- Husky and Bigot”, the author stated that “the lack of a supreme command over the Airborne and Air Units, who actually are but one force, complicated combined training and made extremely difficult the fixing of responsibility for shortcomings in training and

The author describes the relationship between the Navy and Air Force following World War II as a war in its own right. The two branches had many disagreements on the organization of military forces, and this led to the development of two different organizational concepts. The first was the Navy concept. This concept stated that each branch of the military should be given weapons, and the use of the weapons, regardless of whether on land, sea, or in the air, should be used to fight the enemy. The second organizational method was the Army-Air Force concept. This concept stated that the weapon itself should indicate which military branch would use it. The author gives an example by saying all aircraft, regardless of purpose, should be under the

From the early age of airpower development in the United States, airpower theorists, and advocates believed and prophesized, that airpower can win the war by itself. Turning back to the age prior to the independence of the United States Air Force (USAF) as a service, airpower advocates emphasized that bomber will always get through and that it will produce decisive blow to the enemy and win the war. Moreover, they argued that airpower alone could win the war quickly without the need to employ other services, that it is cheaper because bombers replace large force employment costs and precisely hitting only important targets avoids collateral damage. That promise of the early airpower advocates continued to be the core belief of the new independent United States Air Force after 1947. Looking its promise over the past 70 years the airpower gradually advanced toward its fulfillment and with rapid technology advances, that the USAF is highly dependent on, airpower finally achieved its promise. The airpower proved to end wars more quickly and save lives of solders, to cost less in order to achieve military and political objectives, and to avoid collateral damage with its precision capabilities. Nevertheless, implications of achievement of promise can be that airpower can be used as a mean of political objectives that can severely limit or misuse airpower’s capabilities.

The Air Defense Artillery is a necessary branch of the US Army today. Its complex weapon systems and highly trained service members accomplish its mission to deter enemy air threats. From its birth, many didn’t consider it to be a necessary part of the US military. For many years Air Defense struggled to prove itself worthy. The branch has adapted its technology through the years to counter advances in technology, and produced a Medal of Honor recipient. Although, Air Defense has not been actively used in every US conflict, it has carved a place for itself among the best of the US military.

Although Army Aviation has endured a multitude of challenging moments throughout history, none have compared to those faced in the land that has historically dared and tried many great nations such as the Macedonian Army around 330 B.C. and the Russian Army in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Because of this, this paper will be an informative look at the challenges the United States Army Aviation Operations faced during Operation Enduring freedom in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Included in the research, I will discuss the unforgiving terrain, such as a high mountain environment Aviators operated in, the extreme temperatures, degraded visual cues, the human errors aspect, as well the enemy situation, all which tested them all.

The First World War clearly demonstrated that airplanes had a promising career in warfare. With rapid development creating larger, faster and more capable aircraft the task of putting their munitions on target became increasingly complex and called for a new type of control. In March of 1942 FM 31-35 defined the role of the Air-Ground Cooperation Parties (AGCP) (Farmer & Strumwasser, 1967). The role of the AGCP was to coordinate airborne fires in support of ground units and the AGCP cell was assumed to be located with the headquarters element, usually detached from the front line (Farmer & Strumwasser, 1967). Through continued evolution of the AGCP concept the observer was moved further from the headquarters and placed on or near the front lines to provide immediate tactical control of airborne fires platforms.

The elements of surprise, stealth, Operational Security (OPSEC), precision planning and flawless execution were essential to victory. The opening aerial offensive has been called “one of the most stunning successes in modern warfare” .

The concept of airpower and its effectiveness against the enemy’s fielded military forces is well documented in a number of literatures. In the history of American military, airpower has been considered not only as the sharpest military sword but also a highly versatile set of tools used to effectively promote national strategy. Airpower’s effectiveness in support of national strategy has significantly improved since 1945. The study of airpower exposed certain consistencies which have affected its effectiveness. The theory and practice of airpower filled the past century with frequently persuasive victories coupled with a historical documentation packed with arguable failures. It is important to note that the effectiveness of airpower, as a military operational strategy, has triggered a debate among proponents and non-proponents. Some airpower theorists have debated its effectiveness. Throughout history, the many claims about airpower’s decisiveness to independently win wars or conflicts have hindered the notional and real application of this instrument of power. This essay highlights factors which consider the scope of the strengths and limitations of airpower that has been and will continue to be effective throughout the 21st century.

Egyptian air Force (EAF) is undergoing a prime convert in the field of technology and information warfare which requires the steady understanding of new technology and innovation and switch of equipment. However, material superiority merely is not sufficient. A greater importance is the development of organizations, training and education, leaders and personals that effectively take advantage of the technology. Thoroughly fancy equipment is nice, technology will not achieve full scale improvement without knowledgeable people. Professional education can link that gap. In the bilateral exercises with the air forces of United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, our men and machines put up outstanding performances making