Law Suit/GTV/Alert: Legal Case Study

The State of Setonia should recognize the social host liability and develop the common-law duty of social hosts to prevent their guests, though reasonable care concept, from operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or while intoxicated.

In Maryland, insurance policies are generally construed in the same manner as contracts. Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass 'n, Inc., 327 Md. 1, 5, 607 A.2d 537 (1992). An insurance contract, like any other contract, is measured by its terms unless a statute, a regulation, or public policy is violated thereby. Pac. Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d 486 (1985). We do not follow the rule, adopted in other jurisdictions, that an insurance policy is to be construed most strongly against the insurer. Collier, 327 Md. at 5; Cheney, 315 Md. at 766. We construe the instrument as a whole in order to determine the parties’ intent. Pac. Indem., 302 Md. at 388; Collier, 327 Md. at 5; Aragona v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 281 Md. 371, 375, 378 A.2d 1346 (1977). In order to determine the intention of the parties, “Maryland courts should examine the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution.” Pac. Indem., 302 Md. at 388 (citations omitted). In doing so, we give the words their usual, ordinary, and accepted meanings. Id.; Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ackerman, 162 Md. App. 1, 5, 872 A.2d 110 (2005) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scherr, 101 Md. App. 690, 695, 647 A.2d 1297 (1994)). The test is what meaning a reasonably prudent layperson would attach to the term. Pac. Indem., 302 Md. at 388.

This is Mr. Hartshorn’s 1st DUI conviction; there are no others located in his history. Mr. Hartshorn accepts and takes responsibility for his actions that evening. Mr. Hartshorn does not believe he has a problem with alcohol. He states that he had been drinking twice a week but does not see it as a problem since he has stopped before. He advised that he has consumed alcohol since the incident, most recently around two and a half weeks ago. This was discussed with him in great detail. Based on the above information, his history, and what he reported, it is this officer’s opinion that there may be a need for a structured treatment program, and it would be a benefit to Mr. Hartshorn that he obtain an in-depth substance abuse evaluation.

At approximately 1203 hours, I notified the Provost Chris Coutts about the allegation that a Professor is intoxicated while on campus and teaching a class. At approximately 1209 hours, Dr. Coutts and I walked to the room and the class had just ended. Dr. Coutts entered the room by himself to make his initial assessment and I stood outside in case I was needed. Approximately 5 minutes later I was called into the room and it was determined that Professor Riasati did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or any other substance. There was no odor of alcohol, no slurred speech and appeared to be fully coherent. Professor Riagati advised he was willing to take any drug or alcohol

Mr. Frye attempted to collect on his automobile insurer Crimson Permanent Assurance Company. Crimson denied coverage. Mr. Frye brought suit against Crimson. Crimson moved for summary judgment on the basis that Carmon Frye was not occupying the vehicle and the damage to the vehicle was intentionally caused by Cameron Frye within the meaning of the policy. The policy defines occupying as “in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.” Under the policy “property damage to ‘your covered auto’ or any ‘non-owned auto’ that is intended or expected by you or any ‘family member.’” is excluded from

Plaintiff Brian Martin attended a high school graduation party hosted by Defendant Lee Martin. The majority of guests were between the ages of seventeen and twenty. There were two kegs of beer available at the party, as well as other alcohol provided by the guests. One guest, Matthew Marciano, had a history with Mr. Martin. During the party, a fight ensued between Marciano and the plaintiff’s friends. Marciano left the property, but later returned with Chijoke Okere, who was carrying a baseball bat. Okere struck Mr. Martin on the head. The defendant went inside her house and locked the door, refusing entry to those who were trying to help the plaintiff. Mr. Martin suffered considerable brain damage from the injury.

R.P.A. Int’l Corp., Ms. Iber grew tired of waiting for a bus, and deciding to call a cab from the office building behind the bus stop. Ms. Iber was walking towards the building when she slipped and fell on an overripe mango which had fallen from an overhanging tree (Iber v. R.P.A. Int’l Corp, 367). The trial judge found Ms. Iber to be an “uninvited licensee” rather than an invitee. (Iber v…..). The court held that Ms. Ibers was not an invitee because her purpose for being on the premise was to make a phone call, and not use the building for business (Iber v….). In Wood v. Camp, 284 So.2d 691,695 (Fla. 1973), the definition of invitees was extended to include a category of licensees who “are not invited, and choose to come onto the premises solely for their own convenience without invitation either expressed or reasonably implied under the circumstances”. (See Wood v. Camp, 369). It is clear that Ms. Iber fell within the category of an uninvited licensee, coming onto the premises for a purpose solely of her own. Thus, R.P.A Int’l Corp does not owe a duty of care toward Ms. Iber because she was an uninvited

The case involved a suspect who was stopped by a police officer for allegedly violating the right away of another vehicle in the City of Colton. He was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (DUI). This would have been his 3rd offense for DUI within 10 years. In the state of California, if found guilty, he could face 120 days in jail and 2 years revocation of his driver’s license. The Defendant believed that the police officer was not in a position to observe what he said he saw. A Department of Motor Vehicles hearing was schedule. The Defense presented evidence to the DMV officer to show that the officer could have not possibly seen what he indicated in his police report.

The party crashers started quarrel with the guests and the defendant chased everyone out where the crashers open fired on the guests and left. The plaintiffs (three guests) had sustained injuries and wanted compensation for it. Two were injured from gunshots and one was not able to get the affection and love that her husband gave her in the same way.

This would allow the defendant to receive the help he would need in order to address the challenges affecting him. The defendant had not been convicted of Public Drunkenness prior to this event. Due to this there was no reason to seek a class c misdemeanor with a $500 fine and 30 days of jail time. The charge of abuse of corpse was dismissed because there was no proof that the defendant caused the trauma to the corpse.

Arrested For DUI When You Were Sober As A Judge? 4 Steps To Prove Your Innocence

In July 1997, Geneva Hager, an Allstate policyholder was involved in a rear end auto accident resulting in neck and back injuries. The claimant’s auto insurance paid out to Allstate and Ms Hager, his policy limit of 25,000 for body injury. Therefore in December 1999, her claim was closed with Allstate and her

Mark was charged and arrested with (DWI) driving while intoxicated. After patrol officers complete the investargation of the car crash of what could have cause the fatal car crash. Mark have been accuse of reckless driven meaning that he was operation an automobile in a dangerous manner under the circumstance, including speeding, driving after drunk and also having too many passengers in the car while operation the automobile. Mark also have four counts of felony assault causing physical harm and life threathen injure to more than one person. Along, with a involuntary manslaughter causing a untimely death of an individual as a result of operation am automobile while intoxicated.

The defendant church sold meals after the religious services and argued that the plaintiff was a licensee, not an invitee. The plaintiff had alleged that she was an invitee because the plaintiff bought a meal after the service at the church cafe. Plaintiff also alleged that because she had spent money at the church on prior occasions she was an invitee. The court rejected the argument and reasoned that the prior financial dealing with the church would have no bearing on her status at the time of the accident. The court held that the plaintiff was a licensee. Sanders, 303 Mich.App. at 7, 840 N.W.2d at

Summing up the common law test Anne has a contract for service, which makes her an independent contractor. Anne Parish had signed a contract for employment with Ace Insurance Company which