Lessons Learned From the Tet Offensive of 1968

January 31, 1968 North Vietnamese attacked over 100 cities throughout South Vietnam on thirty-five of forty-four province capitals, thirty-six district towns, and many villages and hamlets. Dubbed the “Tet Offensive” because it coincided with the Vietnamese New Year’s holiday, Tet, was a turning point in the Vietnam War. Most historians agree that the Tet Offensive was the turning point in the Vietnam War as events shifted the role of United States involvement in Southeast Asia as the shock it produced was the catalyst that led to the reevaluation of U.S. policy. While intelligence failure contributed to the shift in the Vietnam War, most historians have disagreed on the role of the media in aiding the American public’s views against the war.

Two nations, both alike in military, battled for the world, to see who would set the scene, for their political differences result in new violence, leaving the blood of civilians on their hands, now unclean. During the mid-20th century, communist and capitalist ideas were being spread by two superpowers, the United States and the USSR. Both nations interfered in multiple different countries to coerce them to participate in a war that would determine the new political power and ideology of the world. However, many countries were divided on the issue, resulting in multiple communist and capitalist revolutions, as well as civil wars. These countries, after receiving economic and military support from the USA and USSR, went from being mere skirmishes

The Vietnam War was a conflict, which the United States involved itself in unnecessarily and ultimately lost. The basis of the conflict was simple enough: Communism vs. Capitalism, yet the conduct of the Vietnam War was complex and strategic, and brought repercussions which had never been seen before. The struggle between North and South had an almost inevitable outcome, yet the Americans entered the War optimistic that they could aid the falling South and sustain democracy. The American intentions for entering the Vietnam conflict were good, yet when the conflict went horribly wrong, and the resilient North Vietnamese forces, or ‘Viet Cong' as they were known, refused to yield, the United States saw they were fighting a losing battle.

The goal of the USA and South Vietnam was to preserve South Vietnamese independence by defeating the Viet Cong (VC) and North

In the first essay Fear, Ambition, and Politics by Robert Dallek, he talks about the way that the United States started to really conflict with Vietnam and how some of Lyndon Johnson’s issues led the U.S. into it. One thing was clear and it was that Lyndon Johnson did not want communism to spread. Johnson’s advisors would continuously report to him that things were starting to become more serious in Saigon. Johnson did not want to send troops though, saying the he would “not permit the independent nations of the East to be swallowed up by Communist conquest, and it would not mean sending American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing themselves.” Clearly his word did not last though. Dallek seems to have a rather negative view of Johnson because he wasn’t taking the precautionary steps to prevent certain events, and he could not keep his word. Johnson seemed to disagree with his own actions about what we should do in Vietnam because it was so unpredictable. He did not want American involvement, but the pressure ended up getting the best of him. He sent one of his advisors, McGeorge Bundy, to Vietnam to talk about what we should do to help alleviate South Vietnam. Bundy thought that U.S. action was a must or “defeat would be inevitable and there is still time to turn it around.” Johnson then decided to start bombing the North on February 8th, but he was not pleased with having to make this decision. This is known as the Rolling

Many ordinary Americans saw from the start that we could not possibly win Vietnam for the South Vietnamese. It was regarded as a "no-winner" (Encarta IV, C). Even so, we supported South Vietnam with containment, which was the Cold War policy of keeping Communism within its borders, instead of trying to get rid of it. Unlike the Korean War, we fought to keep South Vietnam, but we did not fight to gain control of North Vietnam.

Johnson. We simply did not have the knowledge and the man power to do it. Another point we wanted to make if we got involved in Laos was to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail to cut off the supplies coming in to South Vietnam from North Vietnam, thus winning the war. Some analysts have an interesting point to make as well, stating that “expanding the war would only be detrimental and have less of an impact.” Brigham states that “most leading military strategists in Hanoi agree that cutting off the Ho Chi Minh Trail would not have accomplished anything for the United States.” A third suggested strategy was the concentration of U.S. forces on defenses of “enclaves” close by strategic assets. This was just a more thought out and sophisticated way than the current invasion strategies. Analysts say that the reason this strategy would not have worked is because their superior fire power would not have been used to its maximum advantage if they were all being herded into these

The USA was extremely vain when going to war in Vietnam. They had extreme firepower. With a few weeks notice at the time, had the power to turn Vietnam into a region of radioactive glass. The US’s strategy of search and destroy conflicted directly with the Vietnamese’s strategy of hanging onto their belts (caplan,2012). Unlike previous American victories against

While conducting intelligence missions along the coast of Vietnam, the USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy were attacked by Viet Cong forces. This attack prompted President Johnson to go to Congress and The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed, which gave the President the ability to conduct military operations in Vietnam without actually declaring war. Early in the war, many U.S citizens and troops did not know where or what Vietnam was. They thought since Vietnam was insignificant there is no reason to intervene. This ideology would be one of the root causes of the anti-war movement that is to come. The mindset of the U.S troops was the same as every previous conflict, ‘We’ll be home by Christmas’. The The early strategy in Vietnam was to bomb the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong into submission. After bombing target areas, the U.S would send troops in to perform search and destroy missions. After attacking their target they would return to their base. During the night, the Viet Cong would return to the area the U.S attacked and it would generate a cycle in which the U.S bombs, sends ground units, and withdraws. The early campaign in Vietnam was filled with many top officials being very arrogant about their chances of winning the war. They thought the Vietnamese were essentially savages with makeshift weapons who posed no threat. As the war progressed it became clear the path to victory would not be an easy one. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were holding strong against the American war machine and were even delivering decisive blows physically and to morale. With the North holding their own, the American Homefront was shifting. It was becoming clear America had no reason to be in Vietnam and the people were making it known through music and

The US has been known to diverge from its once-isolationist state, engaging in international affairs like World War I and several other events alike. It’s therefore no surprise that the US intervened in the Vietnam War during the 1960’s. At the time, President Lyndon B. Johnson put forth new ideas, plans and tactics to help and protect the South Vietnamese and surrounding countries from communist influence. However, the United States’ initial goals and plans didn’t always go the way they had expected. Indeed, Johnson’s Vietnam policies failed because of his unreasonable military strategies and his inefficient political actions.

Here Isserman and Kazin acknowledge that the military’s hands were tied, as they were, not only by popular discontent, but because Johnson did not want to risk making the Cold War hot. Insomuch as success in the conflict was measured by enemy body count in lieu of territorial gains, there would be no direct bombing of Hanoi. As much as the consummate Texan and his inherited Alamo mythology made him believe he was fighting for freedom, there was a line he would not cross, and the North Vietnamese took advantage of this. Americans who opposed the war by 1968 did so because they believed that it could not be won. Once the Pentagon Papers were released in 1971, this purloined collection of documents related to the escalation of American involvement in Southeast Asia, spanning presidencies from Eisenhower to Johnson, further deteriorated the credibility of the American government, and helped to lead the majority of Americans to believe that the war in Vietnam was wrong

public a different view on the war (7). Now, not only had attacks been made on the Army

US policy during the war was weak and not nearly aggressive enough to beat the North Vietnamese. For example, President Johnson was unwilling to order a full scale invasion of North Vietnam. His reason for this was it passed through the territory of countries not involved in the war This was due to fears that it would also provoke China into entering the war directly. Another example would be Johnson’s refusal to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail. As a result, supplies would continue to flow uninterrupted. The reasons for not cutting off the trail were mainly political. These political reasons include not wanting to breach Laotian neutrality, especially since the North Vietnamese had no qualms about breaching, and that US

Likewise, the Vietcong received weapons, supplies, and heavy armaments, such as tanks, from the Russians and Chinese which made the resistance even greater than the U.S. and its allies' forces put together. This was evidenced clearly during the Korean war when the U.N. and U.S. forces arrived to Korea and forced the North Korean forces back to the 38th parallel and were even about to take North Korea as well, but as this was about to occur, the "human waves" created by the Chinese soldiers were introduced into Korea, retaking North Korea and forcing the allied forces out of Korea absolutely. Correspondingly, when the U.S. introduced its forces into Vietnam, the Vietcong received much support from Russia mainly but also from China, which turned the tide of the encounter and lead the communist Vietnamese to victory. On a more detailed level, during the mid of the conflicts, there were also several similar points. Operations on behalf of the U.S. had similar results, such being the case with "Rolling Thunder" and "search and destroy" tactics during the Vietnam war and the attack on North Korea after having taken the 38th parallel during the Korean War.

As the Vietnam War progressed, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) generals led by General Giap reassessed and adapted their strategy to fit the circumstances. This enabled the VC revolutionaries, supported by North Vietnamese regular forces, to achieve success without ever defeating US forces on the battlefield. For instance, the Tet Offensive in 1968 represented an operational failure in Stage Three of the Dau Tranh strategy but was considered a success for the North since it weakened American public support for the war. As a result the defeat on the battlefield, Giap adapted Dau Tranh to avoid concentration of forces and the effects of superior US firepower by transitioning back to Stage Two. The return to guerilla operations ensured sustained US casualties and the continued erosion of public support between 1968 and 1971. At the same time, main force units that were decimated during Tet could withdrawal and reconstitute. (Pike, 229)